Why has climate change been the subject of international negotiations for more than two decades and no progress has been made towards a common global decision? Do we have to experience and observe these discussions, ups and downs, successes and failures of countries year after year in order to reach a better global decision to deal with climate change? Are these discussions not only scientifically but also practically very complex, so why do they create such great challenges for the countries of the world again?
Climate change has been the subject of international negotiations for more than two decades to reach a common global decision. We experience and observe these discussions year after year, the ups and downs, successes and failures of countries to reach a better global decision to deal with climate change. These discussions are not only scientifically but also practically very complex, because they create great challenges for the countries of the world. In the author’s view, the most important reason for this is that countries need to take effective national and international action to address the global problems of climate change, which they can then discuss at international climate conferences. In this book, I focus on the policy processes of global climate negotiations and the related implementation measures. Using the term integrated intergovernmental decision-making (IID) as a theoretical framework rather than participatory approaches, I aim to draw attention to the changes in the policy of global climate negotiations related to decision-making since the Paris Agreement entered the international debate. While countries had taken steps before the Paris Agreement, the Paris Agreement and the post-Paris period have created a new paradigm and new processes for climate policy negotiations among different governments for better decision-making. In this book, I argue that global decision-making on climate change under the Paris Agreement means nationally determined contributions and avoiding dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. This requires different and effective regulation by different actors. This requires different and effective regulation through different options supported by a large number of governments. By using the term – IID – I want to draw attention to the fact that the Paris Agreement includes different integrated intergovernmental laws and measures (policies). Above all, I want to show that the politics of global climate change negotiations have undergone a real transformation since Paris until COP26.Climate change is one of the most complex issues in the world today and in global decision-making. International negotiations on climate change are the best way to find an effective solution to the problems of global climate change. The negotiations started more than 20 years ago with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, i.e., carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions. In order to find a solution to this problem and other related climate issues, the international negotiations experienced many ups and downs until the Paris Agreement was agreed. The Paris Agreement is the most important global decision on climate change and, compared to previous debates, contains policies and strategies for all governments. Copenhagen, for example, was one of the most unsuccessful negotiations to reach a common global decision (see Asadnabizadeh, 2020). The 2015 Paris Agreement is a breakthrough in international diplomacy and global decision-making on climate change. It represents the most ambitious outcome possible in a deeply divisive political context. The Paris Agreement breaks new ground in international climate policy by recognizing the primacy of national climate policies and allowing countries to determine their own level of commitment to mitigating climate change. It provides a mechanism to make voluntary commitments that can be measured and verified globally, in the hope of increasing the global integrated ambition of governments. The most important question, then, is how the Paris Agreement is actually structured as a global decision on the politics of climate negotiations and what the politics of implementing the Paris decision will look like in the future phase. Therefore, the author has decided to look at this agreement differently and develop a new approach, namely IID. To define IID, the author points out that the Paris Agreement consists of a set of rules and policies for all governments that integrate the decisions of governments based on the inter-consensus for the politics of global climate negotiations. This approach consists of a set of thematic categories comprising 5 types of criteria, namely: decision situation, decision centre, decision process, decision, and implementation, which are interlinked. The application of this approach enables the author to systematically analyze the content of the above category (e.g. using rules, policies from the Paris Agreement and post-Paris). The discussion of the main approach of this book, namely IID, has not been precisely, but somewhat hinted at in the literature. In order to clarify this approach in the context of decision-making for the politics of global climate negotiations, the author would like to take a look at the literature here and make a comparison. Some classic authors such as Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (1963–2002) have identified the decision-making approach as an approach to the study of international politics that seeks to explain the importance of states in empirical work that captures the vision of participation in global decision-making, as the field of international politics is not just an idea from the past. Feldman (1991) discussed decision-making on global climate change issues. He argued that practical international co-operation is the result of a gradual and iterative learning process between scientists, environmental groups and policy makers who have different views and interests on resource controversies. Todd Sandler (1992) analyzed the logic of collective behavior and discussed the issues of international regimes in relation to international environmental cooperation and decision-making, including the international regime and process of climate change. Parson and Fisher-Vanden (1997) highlighted integrated assessment modelling of global climate change. Integrated assessment models aim to combine knowledge from different disciplines in formal, integrated representations, inform policy, structure knowledge, prioritize key uncertainties and improve knowledge of broad system linkages and feedback, particularly between socio-economic and biophysical processes. In Climate change, decision-making: science, policy, and economics study, the strands of the literature have changed somewhat since 2000. Mohan Munasinghe (2001) noted that predictions about climate change, its impacts and the costs of its mitigation are essential to the policy dimension and decision-making, as climate change issues are integrated into the broader issues of better decisionmaking and sustainable development. van den Hove (2000) looked at participatory approaches to environmental decision-making. The essence of this process is to create interfaces between four criteria, such as 1 the research community, 2 the EC climate negotiation team and through it the representatives of the EU Member States, 3 other stakeholders of the Commission (the ‘internal stakeholders’), 4 a range of ‘external’ stakeholders including industry, finance and trade, employment, environment, consumers and citizens’ interests. Adger and colleagues (2003) consider the environmental policy decisions of individuals, civil society, and the state. Four criteria, namely economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, equity, and political legitimacy have become the dominant rhetorical tools of environmental decision-making and governance. Dernbach (2003) also deals specifically with environmental policy decisions. Dernbach, a law professor at Widener University Law School, argues that integrated decision-making is the foundation for environmental problems and sustainable development. It is a response to policy failures that cause and contribute to unsustainable development. Due to the complexity of environmental issues, Kiker et al. (2005) consider the method of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) as a scientific-theoretical approach. This method is used for contaminated sites, land-use planning, and official procedures. Delreux (2006) found that most international environmental agreements are mixed. The internal decision-making process between EU states in relation to mixed agreements is somewhat complicated and the framework of the EU decision-making process must be considered. Antto Vihma (2014) explores ideas for reforming decision-making at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) and the importance of COP decisions for the 2015 PA, arguing for improving consensus building through presidency leadership, expectation management and transparency to achieve more systematic and efficient decision-making at the COP. One of the most recent studies – From Integrated to Integrative: Delivering on the Paris Agreement – suggests that the Paris Agreement represents a truly integrative approach to supporting climate change policymaking (Doukas et al., 2018). Another recent study suggests that the Paris Agreement has improved the global governance of climate change through the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of participating governments (Sun et al., 2022). The author compares these bundles of literature and approaches that can help evaluate IID as an original robust approach. These approaches and IID share some similarities. Some of the literature focuses either on integration or on collective action in the process of decision-making or policymaking. Both IID and these approaches include the concept of a state function. These studies had sought to explore strategies and models that maximize the performance of decision-making in the context of the Paris Agreement, which is not exactly the subject of the global climate change process and decision-making. Thus, the IID and most of these approaches use a qualitative method to link the decision-making process of the Paris Agreement to global climate change issues. However, in terms of key differences, both the IID and these approaches differ in their analytical approach: they mainly analyze environmental decision-making and not specifically the politics of global climate negotiations in the context of decision-making since the Paris Agreement entered the international debates and the process of policy implementation, and they use different models (e.g. MCDA) to gather information. There is a gap in the literature on IID and other models of decision making. From 1970 (classical literature) to somewhat more modern work (e.g. Vihma (2014) and the most recent (Sun, Gao, Deng & Wang, 2022), no one has attempted to examine the politics of global decision-making on climate change using the Paris Agreement and the 5 key analytical steps (i.e., situation, centre, process, decision, and implementation). Decision-making in the context of global climate policy is truly complex, and the literature to date has not fully captured this analysis. However, another difference is that IID is an adaptive approach to look at the policy process of global decision-making on climate change under the Paris Agreement and the way forward, because this approach supports the global decision-making process to define the best pathways for politics of implementation.
Abbas Kashani
Climate change has been the subject of international negotiations for decades, yet despite numerous diplomatic efforts, a comprehensive and binding global agreement remains elusive. This situation should not be viewed solely as a failure of political will, but rather as a reflection of the inherent complexity of the problem, which is simultaneously scientific, economic, legal, institutional, and deeply political. From the standpoint of environmental protection—and particularly from the perspective of systems-based climate risk management—the lack of progress in reaching a unified global decision stems from multi-layered barriers, including asymmetric national interests, unequal capacities for implementation, divergent levels of responsibility for emissions, and varying vulnerabilities to climate impacts.
The article correctly identifies that international climate negotiations are not only scientifically challenging but also practically and politically complex, creating deep structural challenges for countries. Addressing climate change requires integration across multiple policy sectors (energy, transport, agriculture, industry), interdepartmental coordination, and institutional reforms that go beyond the confines of typical political cycles. From the viewpoint of an environmental protection expert, the inadequacy of previous global agreements stems from fragmented environmental governance, the lack of legally binding enforcement mechanisms, and a heavy reliance on voluntary nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which often lack alignment with science-based climate targets.
The author rightly acknowledges that the Paris Agreement introduced a novel approach through the concept of Integrated Intergovernmental Decision-making (IID), which encompasses a combination of legal, political, and institutional instruments aimed at fostering coordinated climate action. As a theoretical framework, IID enables policy analysis that moves beyond the content of decisions alone and instead considers five interrelated dimensions: decision situation, decision center, decision process, the decision itself, and implementation. This methodology has strong potential as an analytical tool to evaluate the effectiveness of global climate policy, taking into account varying levels of engagement from states, regional blocs, non-state actors, and the scientific community.
However, a critical challenge in international climate negotiations remains the lack of robust enforcement and compliance mechanisms. While IID is an innovative approach, it must be complemented by performance assessment tools and adaptive policy mechanisms informed by the latest scientific findings, particularly those from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Furthermore, strengthening climate justice and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is essential; without recognizing the historical responsibility of developed countries and ensuring adequate financial and technological support for developing nations, implementation of the Paris Agreement will remain limited in scope.
As an environmental protection expert, I argue that without a transformation of global climate governance—shifting from declarative commitments to binding and verifiable legal instruments—international negotiations will continue to oscillate between political promises and insufficient results. IID may serve as a useful theoretical lens to understand decision-making dynamics, but it must function as part of a broader system of environmental regulation, social accountability, and institutional cohesion required to achieve the Paris Agreement’s targets and limit global warming to below 1.5°C.
In conclusion, global climate decision-making requires not only science-based policies but also a structural transformation of the global political economy, where ecological integrity, social justice, and intergenerational responsibility are foundational principles of international cooperation.
There are many season in your country so the wealther change. Nowadays people produde to do sth and there are many mechine.The world will gradually warm earth.That's why I think the climate will change.Thankyou.
International climate change negotiations have stalled for two decades due to conflicting interests between developed and developing countries regarding historical responsibilities, financing, and technology transfer, as well as political and economic barriers that hinder binding agreements.
Why do international climate negotiations take decades and what actually counts as “progress”?
Climate change is a classic collective-action and distributional problem under deep uncertainty, embedded in national politics and incumbent interests, and governed by consensus-heavy institutions. That combination makes a fast, centralised “one big global decision” unlikely. Since Paris (2015), the system has shifted to an iterative, nationally determined, transparency-and-ratchet architecture that produces gradual but real progress uneven across countries and sectors and whose effectiveness depends on implementation, finance, and stronger coordination mechanisms.
1) Why has it been so hard?
a) Collective action and free-riding. Mitigation is a global public good. Benefits are diffuse and delayed; costs are local and immediate. Each state has incentives to wait for others, creating under-provision of effort.
b) Distributional conflicts. Decarbonization redistributes costs and opportunities within and across countries—between fossil exporters and importers, workers and capital, and present and future generations. Therefore, negotiations are not just technical—they are distributive bargaining.
c) Sovereignty & consensus procedures. UNFCCC/COP decisions are consensus-oriented, giving many veto points. Ambition tends to be set by the most hesitant, unless coalitions create outside pressure.
d) Domestic politics first. International commitments must survive elections, courts, parliaments, and lobbying by incumbent industries. If domestic coalitions are weak, international pledges remain symbolic.
e) Equity & responsibility. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) is legitimate but contested in practice (historical emissions vs. current capabilities vs. development needs), slowing agreement on who pays and how fast.
f) Uncertainty, learning & path dependence. Technology costs, climate impacts, and policy effectiveness have evolved markedly (e.g., the dramatic fall in solar, wind, and battery costs). Institutions that enable iterative updating do better than one-off grand bargains.
g) Measurement & enforcement gaps. Until recently, uneven baselines, data quality, and limited verification weakened trust. Where monitoring and enforcement are weak, pledges under-deliver.
h) Geopolitics & shocks. Strategic rivalry, energy-security crises, and supply-chain shocks repeatedly re-prioritize governments, sometimes slowing, sometimes speeding the transition (e.g., via industrial policy).
2) Has there really been “no progress”?
It depends on the metric. The Kyoto-style top-down model failed to universalise stringent, binding caps. But post-Paris progress is visible in several dimensions:
• Universality of participation: Nearly all countries have NDCs; transparency and five-year global stocktakes create a common scoreboard.
• Technology diffusion & cost curves: Rapid declines in clean-tech costs have shifted feasible ambition, enabling stronger policies (renewables, EVs, heat pumps).
• Policy proliferation: Carbon pricing now covers a growing share of emissions; standards and industrial policies (e.g., clean power, vehicle efficiency, green hydrogen) are scaling.
• Sectoral & club approaches: Complementary coalitions (methane pledges, coal transition partnerships, deforestation compacts, carbon market pilots under Article 6) address specific bottlenecks.
• Adaptation, loss & damage: These moved from the margins toward dedicated finance and institutional attention (still insufficient, but materially advanced versus two decades ago).
Ambition and alignment with a 1.5 °C pathway remain inadequate, but saying “no progress” overlooks structural changes in governance, markets, and norms since 2015.
3) Do we need years of ups and downs to reach better global decisions?
For complex transboundary problems, iteration is a feature, not a bug. Evidence from international cooperation suggests that learning-by-doing, periodic ratchets, and polycentric action (cities, firms, clubs, MDBs, trade measures) often outperform a single, comprehensive treaty. The key is designing iterations that raise floor ambition, tighten accountability, and unlock finance and technology fast enough to match the physics.
4) Why are negotiations “scientifically and practically complex”?
• Science–policy interface: Translating probabilistic risk (impacts, tipping points) and evolving IAMs into equitable national pathways is non-trivial.
• Policy integration: Climate policy touches energy, transport, industry, land use, trade, finance, and labour markets each with its own institutions and winners/losers.
• Temporal mismatch: Investments today lock in emissions for decades; political cycles are short. Good climate governance must reconcile these horizons.
5) An analytic lens: Integrated Intergovernmental Decision-making (IID)
A useful way to read the Paris architecture is through five interlinked criteria you highlight situation, centre, process, decision, implementation, which map well onto how Paris actually works:
1. Situation: Global risk with asymmetric capabilities and historical emissions - necessitates universal participation plus differentiation.
2. Centre: Paris shifts the “decision centre” to nationally determined pledges, coordinated by global transparency and periodic stocktakes.
3. Process: Pledge–review–ratchet cycles foster learning, benchmarking, and normative pressure (naming and shaming/praising).
4. Decision: Hybrid of soft commitments (NDCs) and hard procedures (reporting, review, stocktake), enabling dynamic ambition rather than one-off targets.
5. Implementation: Domestic policies, sectoral clubs, MDB reforms, and market linkages (e.g., Article 6) convert intent into tonnes reduced and resilience built.
IID adds value by treating Paris not as a single treaty but as a system of interacting rules and actors whose performance depends on how these five elements reinforce one another.
6) What would accelerate progress now?
• Tighten the ratchet: Align 2030/2035 NDCs with 1.5–2 °C pathways; embed automatic update triggers tied to stocktake findings.
• Finance at scale: Operationalise a credible path to trillions-per-year in clean investment for emerging economies through MDB balance-sheet reforms, risk-sharing instruments, and policy-linked concessional finance.
• Fossil transition clarity: Commit to a time-bound, orderly decline in unabated fossil use with robust “abatement” definitions; end new unabated coal; curb methane rapidly.
• Sectoral deals: Lock in global standards (power, heavy industry, road transport, buildings) and targeted Just Energy Transition Partnerships.
• Article 6 integrity: Stand up high-integrity carbon market rules to mobilise private capital without greenwashing.
• Accountability & data: Strengthen MRV systems, open emissions/finance data, and independent review to close the implementation gap.
• Trade & clubs: Use climate clubs and carefully designed border measures to raise the floor while supporting partners’ transitions (finance + technology + safeguards).
• Adaptation & L&D: Scale predictable funding and locally led adaptation, with clear metrics for effectiveness and equity.
Conclusion: International negotiations are slow because of the political economy of global public goods. Since Paris, the regime has become iterative and transparency-driven. The urgent task now is to strengthen the pledge–finance–implementation cycle so that ambition truly matches the science.
Select references (for readers who want a deeper background)
• IPCC AR6 Working Group III (2022) – Mitigation of Climate Change.
• Keohane, R. & Victor, D. (2011). “The Regime Complex for Climate Change.” Perspectives on Politics.
• Ostrom, E. (2010). “Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action.” Global Environmental Change.
• Barrett, S. (2003). Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making.
• Hale, T. (2020). “Catalytic Cooperation.” Global Environmental Politics.
• Victor, D. (2015). Global Warming Gridlock.
For further discussion, see my recent work on ID: 0009-0001-7355-3672