Why does raising interest rates by central banks have more of a slowing effect on the growth of the economy and a limited anti-inflationary effect?
Have central banks started a race to raise interest rates? The attempt to fight inflation results in a slowdown in economic growth and a depreciation of the national currency. During the SARS-CoV-2 (Covid-19) coronavirus pandemic, some central banks raced to add money and inject as much added money as possible into the economy treated as anti-decessionary, anti-recessionary money for a situation of exceptional economic crisis caused indirectly by the pandemic and more directly by interventionist type measures. The crash in the financial, capital, stock and commodity markets that occurred in March 2020 and triggered a deep recession in many countries was, among other things, the result of a new crisis factor, a new concept, a new term rapidly disseminated by the media and formally established by the World Health Organisation. This new factor was the establishment of the pandemic condition as a new economic crisis factor, which generated a high level of uncertainty. As a consequence of the interventionist measures applied on a record high scale, large amounts of printed money were pumped into the economies of many countries in 2020. In this way, the economies of many countries were thrown out of relative equilibrium and put on a path of rising inflation, which occurred in 2021 and was exacerbated in 2022 by the energy crisis initiated by the war in Ukraine. For smaller economies and less economically developed economies, raising interest rates will lead to deep economic crises. In 2022, on the other hand, many central banks are successively raising interest rates, commercial banks are so far over-liquid, on the other hand credit is becoming more difficult to access, companies are holding back on new investments, wage growth is slowing, rising unemployment is imminent and possibly stagflation in 2023. This puts the economies even more out of balance, as it will be an economic crisis of 2023 that lasts much longer than the Covidian one of 2020 and is more difficult to control with government interventionist measures, as these measures are exhausting themselves in their existing formulas. Is the so-called anti-crisis economic interventionism from the covid trap now falling into the trap of rising interest rates raised by central banks? To date, interventionist measures by central banks have been treated as the 'last resort' of anti-crisis measures. Perhaps indirectly, this issue has also been highlighted by the Nobel Committee, which awarded the 2022 Nobel Prize in Economics precisely for achievements in research on the genesis of emerging banking crises and their resolution by strengthening systemic security solutions for the banking system. But this time, do the hitherto anti-inflationary measures of central banking cease to work when other factors of economic policy, including the mild fiscal policy that activates economic processes, are activated and carried out by the government as part of the so-called policy mix? Should the central bank raise interest rates faster? When applied in parallel with a tightening monetary policy, does an easing fiscal policy result in a limited anti-inflationary effect of raising interest rates by the central bank? Or are commercial banks showing excess liquidity too slow in raising deposit and deposit rates despite the fact that they are raising lending rates? Or are there other reasons for this situation?
In view of the above, I address the following question to the esteemed community of researchers and academics:
Why does raising interest rates by central banks have more of a slowing effect on the growth of the economy and a limited anti-inflationary effect?
What do you think about this topic?
What is your opinion on this subject?
Please respond,
I invite you all to discuss,
Thank you very much,
Warm regards,
Dariusz Prokopowicz