Thank you for posting this interesting question. I believe regarding the "immigration" the best perspective is a complex thinking since it is impossible to embrace the reality only with the experience of the political thought. The current invasion of Europe has so deep roots in  population migrations in prehistory, as well as in Middle Age. But it also has characteristics (based on the goals) comparative with the Turkish army invasion in the 14th century. If historians, sociologists, anthropologists and politicians begin to think together. they will easy conclude that  today we are like in 1939. In past our ancestors had Hitler, now we have Putin. So, there is no relationship between the politics and political thought. If there was, the world would be already together to be able to make Putin stop his invasions and finally the world to enjoy to peace and to turn toward the big problem of poverty. Putin does not fight with terrorism, he stimulates terror and war all over the world.

Even sticking just with migration, the historical literature on the topics you suggest is enormous. So, I will just suggest a few broad overviews. 

This has a few nice studies from all over the world:

Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdee (eds), Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial collapse and forced migration in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 2011)

The following are excellent on post-WWI and post-WWII Europe:

Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe (Oxford, 1995)

Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees 1939-1952: A study in forced population movement (Evanston, IL, 1956)

There is very rich literature on W. Europe more recently, particularly on the French experience (esp. Algeria), Britain, and Germany (Gastarbeitern). 

Leo Lucassen, The Immigrant Threat: The integration of old and new migrants in Western Europe since 1850 (Chicago, 2005)

Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History (Oxford, 2003)

The literature on the United States, alone, is huge. For example:

Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law (Oxford, 2014)

Justin Nordstrom, Danger on the Doorstep: Anti-Catholicism and American print culture in the Progressive Era (Notre Dame, 2006)

Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American history (Cambridge, MA, 2010)

Michael Barone, Shaping our Nation: How surges of migration transformed America and its politics (2013)

Dear Lolita,thanks for your answer. I fully sympathise with your harsh feelings, however, I do not think that the directr link which you suppose to exist between past experience and present challenges is perhaps a bit too optimistic, and therefore your conclusion that there is no link between politics and political thought is not really convincing for me. 

On the contrary: I think you might be interested to find out, what is the reason behind the surprising fact that there are those who still believe putin. Their hopes and fears have a mental, intellectual character, which has its own prehistory. SO you might want to study that history to make sense of present day attitudes towards Putin's rgime.

Philadelphia, PA

Dear all,

This strikes me as a pretty complicated question. Certainly, politicians are known to read the history of political thought, or to be influenced by advisers who do. But, perhaps, political practitioners more frequently read the history of earlier political practitioners --and often take the history of political thought for subsidiary?  Political biographies are much more popular than histories of political thought.

Political and social history will seem, perhaps, more relevant to problems of contemporary politics, since it can provide suggestive models of events and of errors to be avoided. Such history, may, in turn be informed by the history of political thought. I doubt that political thought (theory in particular) can be regarded as itself a political "deed," though the expression of it may plausibly be so regarded. That would seem to depend on the circumstances of expression. Is it addressed to people in general, say, or is it addressed to particular correspondents and people in an academic field?  How is this distinction to be drawn in our networked world?

As remarked above, large-scale immigration is itself a very varied phenomenon and complicated topic and field of study. To be sure, it can be disruptive both for the places from which people may leave and for the places to which they go. Consider the mass immigration of Europeans to America in past centuries. What effects did this have on Europe? What effects does the comparative lack of European immigrants have on America now?

I would first think to look to the empirical facts on the ground, regarding the contemporary phenomena, and then look to historical comparisons with similar events in the past. The comparisons can help to guide policy and policy decisions, though history never repeats itself exactly.

H.G. Callaway

I agree with much which Professor Callaway has to say and would be interested in his views on another recently posed question about what John Boehner's resignation has to say, if anything, regarding the political "atmosphere" in Washington.

Regarding the relationship between politics, political thought, and the history of political thought, I think it is more likely that the work of political thinkers has been influenced by political events than that political actors facing challenges, such as pressure placed on nation state borders by a surge of immigration, have been influenced by political thought. 

For example, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was deeply concerned by the execution of Charles I and the English Civil War.  He states this explicitly and his defense of absolute monarchy in Leviathan is believed to be justified in preventing similar wars of "all against all".  John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, published in 1688, argues that absolute monarchy is no (legitimate) form of government at all and is a defense of the success of England's Glorious Revolution.

Although Locke's political thought was of tremendous influence on the delegates who wrote the US Constitution, which was ratified in 1787, I think it is fair to say that no work of political thought has played nearly such a formative role on political actors or events in the US since the Constitutional Convention.  

Finally, the harmonious, transcendent, and absolute nature of Plato's ontological Truths, presented in The Republic and other dialogues, have been seen by many of his interpreters as a reaction to the political turmoil and declining cultural dominance of Athens evident during his life (427-347 BC).

To the extent that political thought can provide guidance to political elites dealing with the current "immigration crisis in Europe", the normative nature of state borders is an issue of key importance.  Among contemporary political thinkers there is more disagreement than agreement on the nature of borders.  Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice) argues that without clearly-defined and secure borders, a state stands to lose control of its very identity.  On the other hand, thinkers, such as Carol Gould (Rethinking Democracy), have challenged traditional conceptions of the sanctity and normative significance of borders with theoretical work on global democracy and transnational justice.

Dear Ferenc, thank you very much for your invitation to this post.

There is, it seems to me, an implicit assertion here, namely that politicians are rational beings. I would ponder such a claim twice, perhaps more times. Greed and anger, pride and irrational feelings do drive their deeds, too. Not every single political leader is a rational strategist and rational leader. At leasts not within the frame of classical rationality theory.

The examples can vary from Napoleon to Hitler, on to Mao or Bush, f.i., and the resulting examen would throw surprising lights on to our topic.

Political thinking and history do stand out as paradigms of rational action. That's why they cross multi fields and try to bring as exhaustible as possible arguments.

 Dear Carlos Eudardo,

I would be interested in an empirical investigation into the ratio of "rational beings" among politicians, in comparison to other professions. I do not think that there could be a siginificant difference in this respect. Of course, if we focus on authoritarian, totelatarian or simply bad politicians, the ratios are going to be much higher. :)

But I have a suspicion that without crazy ideologies, the actions of rattional politicians could have been so devastating as they turned out to be.

On the other hand, as long as we try to make sense of our crazy politicians, i.e. we exercise what is called political history and history of political thought (and action), we can collect reasons why to be careful with our politicians, which can have an indirect effect on their respective behaviour. :)

Best,

Ferenc

Dear H.G:

I can take your point, and go first for empirical data, and later on try to see for lessons in political history and history of political thought.

But of course mine is a perspective of a scholar, intellectual and citizen of a country which confronts the problem, and certainly not that of a politician who needs to act (and think) here and now.

But she, too, needs advisors, who had better to look both for empirical data and historical lessons.

Best,

Ferenc

Thanks all for this very interesting and challenging thread. I think determining the relationship between politics, political thought and the history of political thought firstly requires a definition of each -- challenging.

A starting point might be to defend a philosophical account of what actually constitutes social/political interactions -- a social ontology. Key to that task would be deciding between philosophically realist and philosophically idealist accounts -- determining whether the (social/political) world is formed from ideas/perceptions/concepts or subject-independent material existence. Philosophical idealism, acutely in the aftermath of the linguistic turn in philosophical and social thought, recommends viewing political thought and its history as prior to politics itself -- the latter only being knowable through categories concepts and ideas. Philosophical realists might invert that ordering seeing agency as being prior to our conception of it.   

Philosophical realists and idealists would have to address the agency-structure, levels of analysis, and micro-macro phenomena problems in order to articulate a social ontology that could convincingly account for the nature of politics. Distinguishing political thought might emphasize the epistemological rather than ontological nature of those issues. Distinguishing the history of political thought might emphasize the production of genealogies of both ontological and epistemological innovation for understanding and explaining the political/social world over time.   

I am finding in practice theory a compelling approach that is able to coherently relate politics, political thought, and the history of political thought. I think the approach, once defended, invites looking, first and foremost, at primary sources. Perhaps interviewing refugees caught up in the crisis, policy makers/ bureaucrats/ NGO& IGO officials responding to it, media coverage ... etc. -- such sources allow insight into humanitarian, international relations, and international legal practices that are shaping and defining the phenomenon in question.   

Dear Ferenc, I love your call on empirical studies, and the like. Quite sharp, indeed.

One reference i the direction that you are asking - please be generous - is the following:

J. Goldberg, Liberal Fascism, New York, Broadway Books, 2009.

Dear All,

Politics is a means of governance and acquiring political power of individuals through political thoughts that emanate  from politicians themselves or from advisers or  political philosophers and thinkers, and arguments made. The history of political thought is therefore the chronological sequencing on the time axis of the history of the human society  when and how they begun and used political thoughts and thereby politics to establish and govern societies, the pitfalls and successes of political actions. 

Politics, by virtue of being a social activity, is chaotic and effects of a small social mishaps will lead to unpredictable political consequences that may reach outer societies near and far. Case in point is, how WWI was started by a  simple incident of a young man killed a would be king of an Austro-Hungarian country and the consequence left a socio-political scar on the world. The same thing with almost all political turmoils that happened and still happening across the globe. No political philosophy or political thought from outside or foreign society will have control  over social political eruptions in an other and devastating spill overs that challenge broader societies.    

What is happening in the middle east, although may have some causes of global political dynamics but it is mainly a result of internal social and political dynamics with  devastating consequences of human tragedy and a complete destruction of societies, in which those who escaped the tragedy necessarily should move to places where there is no fire and death. No political thought, philosophy or politics will stop this phenomena but to handle the effects properly with politics that is empowered by  wisdom and maturity, which countries in the European union displayed that magnanimity graciously.  

Political history is essential for societies to travel back in time and reflect and learn cases of political failures, social turmoils and tragedies. Those who do not know history or forget history due to amnesia of history,  might either commit or repeat  colossal mistakes of the kinds of the past.  

What politicians of world countries should learn from the current situation is that the human society is indeed a very case sensitive aggregate of individuals that are capable of thinking, not only for today but for the future, not only for themselves  but for groups or for larger society,  and the politics that handles them should indeed be very fair, free, just and democratic. All powerful and democratic countries that have political and financial power of influence should always put that criteria when dealing with other countries so that freedom,  democracy, equal rights of individuals, rule of law and justice are their tenants of governance so that that stability reins and mobility and dislocations are minimized or eliminated.

To my perception, there is the very clear connection between political thought and its historiography, it primarily connected to the issue as what the lessons learned from the past. As distinguished German thinker Leibnitz indicated, "The present is big with the future". I only believe that such kind of prism of understanding definitely tackled or solve any kind of politico-social challenges raised in the worldwide political or legal landscape. 

For me as a young constitutional scholar, it was the impressive analytical resource and material to think more about historical dimension of global relationships by the side of constitutional, particularly global constitutional realm. Thus please find very tentative article published by Journal Global Constitutionalism. 

THOMAS MÜLLER (2014). Global constitutionalism in historical perspective:

Towards rened tools for international constitutional histories. Global

Constitutionalism, 3, pp 71-101 doi:10.1017/S2045381713000051

I only hope that this contribution enriched your fruitful conversation regarding above mentioned great issue and topic.

Sincerely,

Karlo Godoladze

Nihil sub sole novum.

I am not a philosopher, but I see that there are good summaries of work by philosophers on immigration/migration, including the "morality" or "ethics" of immigration (a phrase that seems very odd to me - "morality" or "ethics" of people moving?), or rather the moral issues of political reactions to immigration ("arguments for closed borders", "arguments for open borders", issues related to the treatment of refugees, etc.).

The first is from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Psychology, and includes a useful bibliography:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/immigration/

The second is an article available online:

James L.Hudson, "The Philosophy of Immigration", The Journal of Libertarian Studies, 8: 1 (1986), 51-62.

A personal anecdote: In August 1991 I arrived to Budapest's Keleti train station. The platforms were so packed with people sleeping there that there was scarcely room for passengers to walk. People were also sleeping on cardboard in the tunnels and underpasses nearby. They were all refugees from Slavonia. They all were just passing through Hungary. None wanted to register there. Their dream destination was Germany.

A historical reminder related to a recent statement by someone (not here): Prior to 1918 the figure of the Bosnian (Muslim!) trader was a normal part of everyday life for Hungarians. These traders had warehouses, and complex systems of credit enabling them to carry out trade everywhere in Hungary. This was "natural", simply because parts of Hungary (today S. Somogy co.) are (and were) closer to parts of Bosnia than they are to Budapest, and because the border between Bosnia and Hungary - being an internal border in the Habsburg Monarchy - was open.

This was not unique to the Habsburg Monarchy. Muslims are, in longer historical terms, "native" not only to (old) Hungary, but to Europe in the broadest sense. Native Muslims include, in addition to Bosnian Muslims and Muslims in S. Serbia, Muslim Albanians, Pomaks and other Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, Lipka Tatars of Poland and Lithuania, and the remaining Turkish minorities of the Balkans. There is also the massive Muslim population of Russia.

For a very long time historians have treated these Muslim populations as a curious "remnant" of Ottoman or Tatar times, as if they were irrelevant and would simply disappear sooner rather than later. 

One can be resigned to it, hate it, or like it - regardless: Islam is native to Europe. It is apparently not going away. 

Dear Eric,

thanks for the useful bibliographic suggestions, I will look at that material. We are going to have a discussion on this issue from the perspective of philosophy so that is going to be very useful.

As for the Hungarian historical background certainly, Hungary had famously open borders - not only to the south, but also to the north, from where the Galician Jews for example migrated in huge volumes (hundreds of thousands).

It is also true, that the European Balkan (roughly ex-Jugoslavia) had a long history of Turkish natives, and Hungary had historic relationships with them, too.

However, it is also known that this very region was a hotbed of fierce political conflicts including the sparkle which started WW1. So if Europe does not want to "go way", it should try to defend its own values, including (beside human dignity, which certainly does belong to evary individual, regardless of race, culture, political stance) the respect of individual property, freedom of religion, non-interference. 

Let me also remind you  of the fact that Germany does not accept refugees from these Baltic regions, either: they apparently regard these countries by now safe.

As for the theoretical question, it seems to me, that your reference to historical examples show that indeed we can learn a lot from a recapitulation of earlier thought patterns -. even if situations change, and our own priorities, too. Therefore, perhaps historians, too, had a job here, to try to remind politicians, and the general public, too, of thought patterns that seem to be relevant even today. And I do not mean by this statement any history writing with a "national" bias or partisanship, but one which has a strong sense of what is relevant today of the historical past. In which case, of course, the temptation of anachronism and "hidden messages" should also be avoided.

Well... I am a pessimist but am not a philosopher; still, in your "should" I recognize a very strong and rather raw statement. ;-)

It sounds almost as if you already have the answer you want, and are just looking for the philosophical underpinnings to support it. I know you to be a serious philosopher, so am sure you will look at contradicting arguments.

I don't believe anyone involved in the issue wants Europe to "go away," (your words) so think you have put together a straw man with that phrase. Refugees are coming TO Europe, not running from it.

I, personally, have no idea how Europe "should" deal with this humanitarian catastrophe, which is evoking the most elemental reactions from people everywhere (sympathy, deeply Christian charity, but also natural worries, fear, and even most un-Christian hatred).

Some of these reactions from native Europeans seem to be anti-European and anti-Christian in the deepest sense (European extremism/nativism is also an issue, after all). Fire-bombings of refugee hostels in Germany, for instance. The "kebab murders." I could go on.

Europe seems perfectly capable of tearing itself to pieces without Muslims. And the same goes for the US (I'm thinking of mass murders, the murders of minorities, and other old American problems.) Again, nothing new under the sun - or perhaps I should write it: אין כל חדש תחת השמש

As to something else you said: As a historian, and even as a Christian, I would remind you that Europe's native Muslims and Islam had nothing to do with the political conflicts that started WWI (though, interestingly, one of those who conspired to murder Franz Ferdinand was a Muslim - Mehmed Mehmedbašić, never caught by the authorities)

Though Turkey did take part in WWI, the horrors of the Great War and its aftermath can and must be laid squarely at the door of Europe and Christianity.

Germany and refugees from "Baltic" (of course Balkan) regions: Germany is perfectly right. Kosovo and Bosnia are safe countries: poor countries, but safe countries. Is Syria safe, though? Indeed, is Turkey?

This brings another observation on all this talk about people who "just want to come to work" in Europe, as if there were something wrong with that. It seems very odd. Could it not be that these people are precisely those who are most likely to succeed and integrate fully into European society? Going from the N. American example, I suppose this could be the case. There are quite a few Christians in this group of "economic refugees" - notably those from Africa.

Finally - something few people seem to have noticed: Germany recently released statistics on the faiths of refugees that have been processed to date. 18% of them are Christian. A further 5% are Yazidis. Thus, about 23% of them are not Muslim at all. That is, a much higher percentage of them are Christian than the percentage of Christians in all Syria. 

It seems likely that, rather soon, there will be no Christians at all left in that ancient Christian land. 

Dear Eric, thanks again for your thought provoking, and indeed, sometimes even rather raw statements ("can and must be") :). I certainly learnt a lot from that, including your reminder to be modest with one's expressions, and restrained with one's possible emotions.

Let me see your points.

As for my supposed prejudice in the debate, I share Gadamer's point, that prejudice in human interactions are hard to avoid - in fact, your own points can be shown to be just as much determined by your own cultural-social, etc. backgound, as mine. But I take your point and try to reformulate my ideas.

As for "going away", I took your word: "Islam is native to Europe. It is apparently not going away." so you might want to consider if your criticism about my use of it can be turned against your own claim, or not. 

However, you surely would agree with me (and Merkel, and Hollande, and almost all European leaders with the possible exception of Mr. Juncker) that Europe is facing a rather large socio-political crisis. And if that claim is acceptable, phrases like "go away" are perhaps a bit exaggerated, but have a basis, too.

As we know each other, I suppose you do not remind me of the radical  non Christian anti-Islamic reactions because you think my points have much to do with that. But to be sure, let me be explicit: I do think that European leaders have to confront more honestly the dangers of the crisis because of the frequency of these extreme violances, and it is not an argument not to tackle the situation's risks.

Surely, Europe has its sins, just as any other regions, countries, cultures, and I do not want to relativise them. But surely, sins of the past are no good reasons to give up a culture's achievements, which build up its identity. 

As for your historical reminder of the reasons behind the outbreak of WWI I agree with you that "Europe's native Muslims and Islam had nothing to do with the political conflicts that started WWI". However, I have memories from school lessons that the Balkan (and indeed not the Blatic) region was a hotbed of political conflicts in the preceding decades which had connections with that outbreak of WWI. 

I am certianly in full agreement with you that to focus on a religious clash is misguiding. However, I have to admit, that I do think the cross-cultural fertilisation that can be the result of a mass movement of this scale has serious political and social risks, which need to be honestly confronted by European leaders. 

I also find quite important that you call our attention to the fact that Christians are in danger in those territories (including Syria) and we did not hear much about their sufferings in the global news streams, and our politicians were not too eager to tackle those issues as well. 

Let me add to all these, tha the fact that you, as a historian,  turned our discussion, which had a methodological problem in its centre, to the political issue so directly (which I took only as an example) proves to me how deep is the anxiety caused by this political event, and once again how important it can be that professionals from the humanities and the social scientists contribute to the political debate with offering material from political, social history and the history of political thought. And the political philosopher side of me had better to listen to historians, like you,or my side of a historian of political thought, before the "should"-s are pronounced.

Good!

I will stick by my "can and must be" and affirm that - in my view - WWI was fully the product of European and Christian culture. It was Europe's Great War. Those in the Balkans who contributed to it were and are also European, in my view.

I hope you would notice the smiley face after my comment about your "should."

I will also stick to my point about Muslims being old Europeans - that is, I simply wanted to bring up the point that there are Muslims native to Europe other than the native-born children and grandchildren of Muslim migrants to Western Europe. Islam has been part of Bosnia since at least the mid-15th century, and there was massive conversion from Christianity there, as in the Albanian lands, to Islam. The Muslims there are native Europeans in every sense (unless you wish to exclude the Balkans from Europe - but then you have to deal, in some way, with the anomaly of the Schengen and Euro state, Greece)

To avoid any possible misunderstanding - of course, you didn't even come to mind when I brought up the extremist reaction to immigration in Europe. That has nothing to do with you - knowing you, I know that and would be happy to affirm it even from the top of the minarets in Érd or Pécs in any language you like. 

http://www.erdcenter.hu/pub/ec/erd/muemlekek/minaret.html

I brought up native (un)Christian European extremism because you brought up the issue of a potential threat to European culture posed by migrants. I should say here, I think fears of that are valid (I guess my view on this point might surprise you). There are and should be real concerns for European values. You alluded to that quite adequately.

I merely wanted to add to your observations that European culture is already being threatened from within - as it has been in the past (by l. and r. wing dis-utopian projects). Of course, American culture also carries within itself the germ of self-destruction. And that internal threat to our common judeo-christian heritage is raising its ugly head behind the guise of fears for European culture.

Again, I don't mean you: I mean specifically those engaged in hate speech against fellow humans - whether Muslim, black, or Mexican, or indeed Hungarians/Poles/Romanians-, in Britain, in Europe, and the US alike; speech that claims to be concerned with preserving "our values," and implies that those values cannot be learned and cannot shared by others.

P.S. My comment about the assumption that Islam would "go away" had nothing to do with your remarks. It was a criticism of historians working on this region (including myself!) and historical narrative on this region. It was an assumption I, too, very illogically have fallen into from time to time. I suspect that it is the position held by quite a lot of people - at least judging from a recent comment by a certain regional politician. We (including myself - I make no assumptions about you), tend to forget that there are old Muslim communities around Europe. How many people outside Poland and Lithuania even know that the Lipka Tatars exist, I wonder? How many people outside Bulgaria have ever heard of Pomaks? And how is it that we - again, incl. myself - so easily, and so obviously forget Bosnia and Albanian Muslims when we (well, some of us) say that Islam is foreign to Europe?

Dear Eric,

can I surprise you?

I -as I implied earlier  - Agree with your points on native Islam culture in the Balkan, and the possible inner threats of our culture- I recall people like Ortega and Norbert Elias, talking about this latter problem, as well as some others, like Spengler, etc., whose way of thinking I did not like so much. 

As for Pécs, however, and its minaret, I would not regard it as native there. And I allow myself the hypothesis that you, as an expert on Hungarian history, would agree with me on that point.

Thanks for the smiley - please notice that I also added one after qouting your "can and must be". :)

As for values and hate speech. Let me stick to the point  that a defence of our values should not be considered "hate speech", and I was sure you did not mean that. But I also call attention to empirical studies of non-integration of different cultures into European societies - of which - I still suppose - you know much more than me, as I myself was surely unaware of (for example) Lipka Tatars and Pomaks. But I think we both could share the view that one of the key values of Europe is this variety of (sub)cultures, which should not be given up for a EUropean "melting pot":

Can I also gently remind you once more that the issue here is not so much the particular political evaluation of the recent crisis but taking it as an example of the relationship of politcs, political thought (and feeling, perhaps) and the history of political thought (and feeling). I would be happy to hear your views on that particular problem, too, beyond the references you already gave to some secondary literature.

Best,

Ferenc

Philadelphia, PA

Dear All,

I came across the following article, on line, which may be of interest:

The Normative Terrain of the Global Refugee Regime

Alexander Betts | October 7, 2015

From Ethics and International Affairs:

http://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2015/the-normative-terrain-of-the-global-refugee-regime/

Here is a short quotation from the opening:

The underlying ethos of the refugee regime is a reciprocal commitment to the principle of nonrefoulement, that is, the obligation not to return a person to a country where she faces a well-founded fear of persecution. As the preamble to the 1951 Convention makes clear, the premise of the refugee regime is international cooperation; specifically, that states reciprocally commit to provide protection to refugees. The regime comprises two sets of obligations: asylum and burden-sharing. Asylum can be defined as the obligation that states have toward refugees who reach their territory; burden-sharing represents the obligation that states have toward refugees in the territory of other states, whether to financially support them or to resettle some of them on their own territory. The existing regime has a strongly institutionalized norm of asylum that is widely accepted; however, the norms related to burden-sharing are weak and largely discretionary.

---end quotation

H.G. Callaway

Dear H.G:

thanks for this interesting piece. I agree that burden-sharing might be a relevant issue, However, I also think that it is in the interest of all that asylum -seekers be settled as near to their own cultural environment as possible.

Best,

Ferenc

It really seems that a least 2 distinct queries are being pursued here by Ferenc.

The first is  a general question about the cause and effect of theory or ideas on politics and visa versa. To answer that question one needs to only do qualitative and quantitative analyses over time.  I think that theories are both embedded in politics and politics is nested in a group of ideas.  (Elsewhere, I would love to pursue examples of these set of relationships are multitudinous... even if I would just pursue topics that I am interested in, like federalism, democratic peace, and many cognitive theories.) 

The second, more specific question, appears to focus on a specific set of theories related to or nested in the issues of European Immigration practices in 2015--how we gotten here, what theories of world, justice, law and life are dominate in the debates and actions of various country actors--as well as Quo Vadis Europe in terms of immigration practices and growth from now onwards.

Theories of human rights, constitutional rights, and civil rights all affect politics on the ground and in public discussion. Moreover, religious and more secular beliefs about human role in the world also play a role.

From about 2000 onward, almost all European countries have had fortress European tendencies on the national and regional political scenes in much of Europe.  Now, the mass of refugees at the door and coming in has awoken Europeans to act and oppose various other beliefs and theories about norms of behavior and the vision of Europe has failed to catch up.

Kevin, thanks for clarifying my position. YOu are right, but please, add to it that I am also interested in the relationship of the general to the particular question.

Best,

Ferenc

The following comes from a review of a Wiki leaks release from the CIA on how the EU has functioned till now:

"Still, there is something in the CIA manuals that should indeed worry anyone who travels to or lives in Europe. The agency reveals that out of the 1 million people on the Schengen countries’ common watch-list, only 2.5 percent are there because of some criminal activity. The rest of the alerts have to do with immigration matters such as visa denials or expulsions.

The European entry control system, in other words, is geared to fight illegal immigration, not crime, terrorism or spying. That’s good for the agents traveling with fake identities — and also for terrorists. If Europe’s focus ever shifted to looking for more consequential security threats than potentially fraudulent welfare recipients, the CIA might be obliged to write manuals describing more complicated tradecraft than that found in the Wikileaks documents."

This statement or observation above reveals how ideas/philosophy of border controls is influenced by the ancient wisdom of wall-building taught in China and developed well in former east Germany--now seen in Israel, on Saudi border with Yemen, USA border with Mexico, Australia's island agreements and practices with PNG, etc. It reflects how the bureaucratic machinery and vision of old philosophies of states and regimes continues to play a  major role in the practices of modern Europe 2015.  Concepts of justice, humanity, democracy, and federalism will all need to be reworked and accepted if things are to truly change in Europe (and elsewhere).

Naturally, opposing forces are seeking political power.  Look at elections and party changes in UK, Spain, Greece, Australia and at least among the Democrats in the USA for a paradigm shift.

By the way, perhaps, Ferenc, you could add to this discussion by defining or using the word "paradigm[s]".

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-12-22/how-to-travel-like-a-cia-agent

Dear Kevin, thanks for your contribution once again.

As for the policy at the borders I am not an expert, but I have a guess that visa denials might be connected to security threats, too.

As for the walls, they indeed have very ugly reminiscences here in Hungary. However, when each day thousands acrross the border of your country illegally, there is a need to do something. ANd Europe has no idea what to do in this respect. So perhaps the wall can motivate European leaders to come up with some less ugly solutions.

For the concept of paradigm, certainly Kuhn is the chief target. But since his classic on scientific communnities philosophy of science is struggling hard, including the Hungary-born  philosopher, Imre Lakatos. I do not have strong views in this debate, but find it certainly important to look beyond the actual "objective facts", "data", into the way scientists communicate with each other and the external word.

In my country, one of the key problems is the difference between discourses, evaluation methods, and even forms of life between natural scientists and "scientists" of the humanities.

I wonder if that helps or not,

with kind regards,

Ferenc

Hi all, interesting following this thread.

I might add that a further issue involves whether to think of theory singular or theories plural. Perhaps that is where discussion of paradigm weighs in? Deciding whether / what kind of theoretic pluralism can be tolerated, how and why, was dealt with in a fantastic re-examination of theory in a 2013 special edition of the European Journal of International Relations. I attach the opening article of that Special edition for your reference...

Dear Adam, your point seems to me quite relevant. Indeed the status of what counts as theory, and what are the limits of theoretic pluralism is challenging. The more so, as the field IR is closely linked to my initial question. ANd yet, coming from philosophy, I see the field of the history of political thought a bit differently as compared to social scientists.

This is because I was brought up by (István Hont) and on (György Bence) the Cambridge School, who explicitly denied the notions of method, theory, etc.

So I guess if you provide a viable philoosphy of science to answer the question of paradigm(s), you have to be field-specific, otherwise you will have such diverse date that your own theory of theories will not have much explanatory power.

Best,

Ferenc

Dear Ferenc,

The World Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of Distraction

By Matthew B. Crawford

This book take a wide view on  the nature of politics as the capture of attention.  

Regards

Politics is thus inextricably linked to the phenomena of conflict and cooperation and approaches to politics are Behaviorism, Rational-choice theory, Institutionalism. Political thought is the study of the theories behind politics. These theories may be used to gain power or to justify its existence. In the Age of Enlightenment, political entities expanded from basic systems of self-governance and monarchy to the complex democratic and communist systems that exist of the Industrialized and the Modern Era. Most universities offer courses of lectures in what is called the History of Political Thought. The nature of these courses is fairly reflected in the books compiled on this subject; books written or edited by the lecturers and recommended without hesitation to their pupils. While the titles cataloged are numerous and varied, the books themselves are not dissimilar in contemporary. A study of these books, both texts and commentary, is held to constitute a sufficient grounding in history of political thought.