To talk of an argument between Peirce and Searle is somewhat anachronistic, since Peirce was basically a man of the 19th century and died about two decades before Searle was born. Ashkan Latifi has adequately described the Chinese Room scenario for present purposes so I won’t repeat that but move on to some related points. The Chinese Room is an imperfect analogy for strong AI but that has a dialectical purpose: if an intelligent conscious being that already understands many things can’t understand Chinese by merely manipulating symbols, what hope is there for a mere machine to acquire understanding by such manipulation?

A machine manipulates symbols. Well sort of. It processes on-off states (presence or absence of a charge or whatnot). These states can be interpreted as symbols, and the symbols in turn can be interpreted as representing something. Peirce probably would’ve found the idea of an uninterpreted symbol strange. For him an object or inscription becomes a symbol because of its use to symbolize, so symbolhood always has a semantic aspect. So, someone might argue, Peirce would not accept Searle’s conception of symbol manipulation for the Chinese Room. Moreover, for Peirce calculating machines already conveyed some aspects of human thought and thus of human understanding. However, this would be what Searle would call derived intentionality rather than intrinsic intentionality and thus would not count against his conclusion. Insofar as we the users interpret a machine's states as symbols and representations, the machine has intentionality derived from our intrinsic intentionality. According to Searle, derived intentionality is merely as-if intentionality.

both are modern critic. its provide a particular event specifics and detail of descriptions in support of a claim.it may be some time coupling or cohesive argument.

Thanks for C K Gomathy and Ashkan Latifi.

To talk of an argument between Peirce and Searle is somewhat anachronistic, since Peirce was basically a man of the 19th century and died about two decades before Searle was born. Ashkan Latifi has adequately described the Chinese Room scenario for present purposes so I won’t repeat that but move on to some related points. The Chinese Room is an imperfect analogy for strong AI but that has a dialectical purpose: if an intelligent conscious being that already understands many things can’t understand Chinese by merely manipulating symbols, what hope is there for a mere machine to acquire understanding by such manipulation?

A machine manipulates symbols. Well sort of. It processes on-off states (presence or absence of a charge or whatnot). These states can be interpreted as symbols, and the symbols in turn can be interpreted as representing something. Peirce probably would’ve found the idea of an uninterpreted symbol strange. For him an object or inscription becomes a symbol because of its use to symbolize, so symbolhood always has a semantic aspect. So, someone might argue, Peirce would not accept Searle’s conception of symbol manipulation for the Chinese Room. Moreover, for Peirce calculating machines already conveyed some aspects of human thought and thus of human understanding. However, this would be what Searle would call derived intentionality rather than intrinsic intentionality and thus would not count against his conclusion. Insofar as we the users interpret a machine's states as symbols and representations, the machine has intentionality derived from our intrinsic intentionality. According to Searle, derived intentionality is merely as-if intentionality.

Thanks for Karl Pfeifer's comments.