Hello Daniel Sharp,

You have certainly broached up a very insightful question. SDT reflects an innate tendency assuming that all individuals inherently have the natural tendency to persevere and fulfill their potentials in order to attain their expected goals . Such autonomous motivation, however, has been criticized. The following file can hopefully provide you with the targeted literature in this regard.

Best of luck,

R. Biria

Dear Daniel,

As you certainly know, Ed. Deci's self-determination theory is a theory about motivation and it is often invoked in the educational domain. The distinction between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation is the core aspect of self-determination theory. For example, if a student studies because of his/her intellectual curiosity and desire to know the unknown, then s/he is intrinsically motivated. On the contrary, if a student studies because s/he wants to get, for example, an external reward, then s/he considered an extrinsically-motivated student. Even though self-determination theory is a prevalent motivational theory, namely in the field of education, it does not go without some problems and criticisms.

(1) It makes sense to distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. This distinction, however, has not to be seen as an "either-or" distinction. Suffice it to say that an individual can be intrinsically motivated in a certain domain of knowledge, psychology, for example, and extrinsically motivated in another domain of knowledge, mathematics, for instance. Thus, the same individual can be at the same time intrinsically and extrinsically motivated.

(2) Accordingly, it seems that it makes more sense to speak about predominantly intrinsic or extrinsic motivated individuals than intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivated individuals.

(3) Self-determination theory clearly lacks a developmental focus in that it does not look at the above mentioned distinction in developmental terms. Those who are acquainted with the developmental literature know quite well that the more a child is young the more s/he is focused on external outcomes, not on internal motives. Thus, it is likely that intrinsic motivation increases with increasing age. To think of an intrinsically motivated baby seems to deify our imagination. The same might be said of, for example, a 4-year-old child as far as metacognition is concerned. I cannot imagine such a child engaged in the following chain of thinking: "I know that you know what I know about you".

Daniel, in your question you refer to counter-theories to SDT. Skinner's (1969) theory of learning is one of them. It is difficult to imagine a self-determined or motivated individual in this theory. It suffices to say that, according to Skinner, the variables of which human (and animal) behavior is a function are in the environment. Bandura's (1977) social learning theory is mainly a behaviorist theory and hence a counter-theory to Deci's theory of self-determination. Because Bandura's (1986) social cognitive theory focus on both external outcomes and cognitive variables (e.g., self-efficacy) this theory is partly consistent with SDT and partly inconsistent with it. For example, it seems more than natural to associate self-determined individuals with individuals who have a high sense of self-efficacy, and individuals with a low sense of self-efficacy with extrinsically-motivated individuals. My answer, however, is a short answer to your question.

I hope that I has got your question and post, and that this helps.

Best regards. Orlando

Orlando, SDT absolutely acknowledges that individuals can have different quality of motivation for different tasks, and have a different mix of causality orientations in different contexts (work vs. school, for instance).

Additionally, SDT distinguishes among forms of extrinsic motivation, placing some of these equivalent in quality to intrinsic motivation. To say that someone is "extrinsically motivated" doesn't tell me whether that's a good or a bad thing; if it's controlled regulation, it's low quality, but if it's integrated regulation, it's high quality.

Next, children are absolutely intrinsically motivated. Toddlers do most of what they do for the sheer enjoyment of it; they are curious about the world and eager to explore it for the sake of exploring it.

SDT acknowledges that babies, who don't have much control of their faculties yet, exist in a state of nonregulation. As they grow, they become able to respond to rewards and punishments (external regulation), and around the age of 4, I believe, can internalize authority figures in the form of feelings of pride and shame, for instance (introjected regulation).

I've been thinking about this question, and I have a few answers, perhaps none particularly satisfying for your aims, but I'll try them out on you.

One of my profs had pointed out that SDT researchers haven't consulted the extensive body of literature on autonomy (in philosophy, for instance) in defining that construct for themselves.

I'm critical of SDT, but not in the sense that I think it's wrong; folks have done a really great job of backing up their assertions with evidence. I think that's why sometimes critiques are hard to come by; they've really done their due diligence. There's a lengthy paper on the Five Mini-Theories that outlines this process.

My critiques fall more along these lines:

1) It's a theory that I agree has critical and liberatory potential (see Ryan and Niemiec, 2009), but it hasn't been practiced that way.

a. SDT research has been conducted almost exclusively in traditional settings; it describes what is, and not necessarily what could be. It's similar to critiques of machine learning, in a sense. If you study the way people already largely behave, you're going to reproduce the same biases and inequalities. For instance, peers can be a tremendous source of autonomy support for each other, but you won't see that in most classrooms because they're not set up that way, so the theory doesn't incorporate that.

b. SDT still largely situates students as objects of liberation, rather than agents in their own right (Freire's "liberating with and not for"). It doesn't challenge power relations in the way that critical pedagogy does. The addition of agentic engagement (see Reeve and Tseng, 2011) is a step in the right direction. I bring in Fielding's ideas around radical collegiality to address this.

c. It claims allegiance with student voice, but you can't do that if you base everything in empirical-analytic approaches that force students to choose among pre-determined options.

2) SDT has forged alliances with other empirically-based theories, but not other literatures (like Benjamin Levin's work on democratic education) that could give it some philosophical gestalts that can inform and guide practice.

3) Almost no one is doing qualitative research in this space. That limits what SDT can learn (see 1a).

4) Some of its favorite outcomes aren't aligned with what it preaches. Academic achievement is an extrinsic goal. SDT says extrinsic goals thwart need satisfaction. I understand why this outcome is used -- it's a great sales pitch -- but it's theoretically inconsistent and should be used with caveats.

Further to my earlier response to Orlando regarding children's motivation, I'm rereading Deci & Ryan's Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior and came across this:

"Children learn through behaving -- through thinking and acting -- and much of this behavior, as well as the integrative process itself, is intrinsically motivated.

Children's natural curiosity leads them to engage in a wide range of exploratory, manipulatory, and experimental behaviors. Without prods or incentives, indeed frequently in the face of open discouragement, children work determinedly to figure out how things go together or what actions produce what effects. They are fascinated by the novel, and persistent in their attempts to make it familiar. Learning has often been said to be the central business of childhood.

Closely related to curiosity-based behaviors, in the sense of being active and natural, is play. Although play serves an important adaptive function, adaptation is not the goal of play. Indeed, a defining characteristic of play is precisely its absence of any goals (Garvey, 1977). Play is compelling and satisfying in its own right; it is, as Csikszentmihalyi (1975) put it, autotelic. It needs neither direction nor reinforcement; in fact, if it is not self-determined it is not play. Flavell (1977) said that to ask why a child plays is akin to asking why a child breathes. Children play for enjoyment, but this activity often has the side benefit of developing competencies."

Tierney,

I have a question. You said that achievement motivation is an extrinsic goal, but it depends on what you define as achievement. I mean if the student wants better grades or social recognition is extrinsic (since his behavior is driven by an external contingency) but if the student wants to learn more, or wants to master a domain of knowledge, that’s intrinsic or better: integrated regulation. So, I don’t understand why Edwin Locke wrote elsewhere that a “serious problem is the confounding of intrinsic and achievement motivation”. Of course, they are not the same but that doesn’t mean that there is a confusion.

Jaime,

I get what you're saying. That students achieve academically doesn't tell us why they do: it could be a byproduct of authentic learning, or it could be an end unto itself. The former is good; the latter is not.

My critique is specific to the use of academic achievement as a research measure.

SDT has demonstrated, over and over again, that the use of grades negatively impacts autonomy and motivation by moving the locus of causality externally. We could assume, in an ideal world according to SDT, we wouldn't use grades at all. And yet SDT researchers use grades all the time as a measure of positive outcomes, even though we know they don't always indicate high-quality motivation. It's a poor proxy, but an excellent selling point to parents, administrators, and teachers.

Would students want good grades for themselves? Or do they only want them because parents, teachers, and administrators want them? That's what I mean by academic achievement as an extrinsic goal. My participants wanted to learn things that were interesting, relevant, and useful to them. That was sometimes at odds with academic achievement; they had questions they couldn't pursue because their time was eaten up pursuing grades.

Contrast academic achievement with an outcome like psychological well-being, which I think we can all agree that students would want for themselves. My participants certainly did. They hated the feelings of distress that came with more controlling academic environments. And, a crucial point: they achieved well in these environments even as they were being made psychologically and sometimes physically sick by them.

Here are two relevant excerpts from my thesis:

"Fielding cautions against what he refers to as the “personal. . . for the sake of the functional” (2010, p. 66), in which relationships are used instrumentally for the purpose of increasing organizational performance. When SDT researchers examine externally defined outcomes such as retention and academic achievement, they run the risk of buttressing these sorts of instrumental aims. For Fielding, “the functional is for the sake of and expressive of the personal” (2010, p. 66); the purpose of education is learning “how we lead good lives together.” When SDT researchers examine eudaimonic outcomes like intrinsic goal contents – of which community, relationships, and personal growth are examples (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008) – they fall more in line with this latter approach."

"A great deal of SDT research employs academic achievement as one of its positive outcomes for SDT-based interventions. Low achievement does seem to be a reliable indicator that something is wrong, but the experiences of participants in the current study indicate that high achievement is not necessarily an indicator things are right. Additionally, academic achievement would seem, in many cases, to fall along the lines of an extrinsic goal, since it is frequently used as an external indicator of worth. As such, there is a conflict between the types of goals SDT promotes as offering greater opportunities for need satisfaction and well-being, and the outcomes it measures. I propose that, although it may be advantageous to retain academic achievement as an outcome from a promotional aspect, that we do so with caveats, and indicate a preference for intrinsic outcomes."

I hope that helps?

Now, as for Edwin's comment, I'm not sure I understand why he made it, because he didn't really elaborate. Again, I can pursue excellence for a variety of reasons: to meet external standards, or to stretch and flex my own capabilities.

Thank you Tierney for your detailed answer. I see your point and I agree completely. Academic achievement is a proxy variable that doesn’t equal well-being nor autonomous motivation. I’d say students want good grades because of someone else, making it an extrinsic goal. I think you’ve identified a very serious objection about the use of grades as an indicator of an optimal motivation process. Grades by its very nature are controlling.

Follow this link may be helpful

https://www.ukessays.com/essays/education/the-self-determination-theory-education-essay.php

regards

Hi Ian Cunningham

I'm not familiar with strengths-based approaches, but I'll do some thinking-out-loud in an attempt to address your question.

The language that appears in my thesis is "ameliorative reforms," which is a term I got from Michael W. Apple's book Ideology and Curriculum.

Fielding and Moss also talk about this in helpful ways in their book Radical Education and the Common School: A Democratic Alternative. For instance:

"Prefigurative practice is thus not about ameliorative processes or faddish palliatives for the running sores of social injustice and impoverished expectation. Whilst radical change can be cumulative and incremental, it has also to address and challenge ‘the basic arrangements of a society’, not just its surface features or relational conventions. We are mindful of Quintin Hoare’s cautionary remarks in this regard:

"'The idea that Daily Express – or for that matter Times – journalists, if they controlled the paper democratically, would produce a ‘democratic’ newspaper ignores the obvious fact that social institutions of this kind – schools or press – produce the men to fit them. (Hoare, 1965, p. 51)' "

In the work that I consult about transformation (Jack Mezirow), transformation is more of a process of resolving dissonance. It's recognizing that tensions are unresolvable within current ways of thinking (which he refers to as meaning perspectives). In some sense, it resembles the processes of integration that SDT describes: regulations remain compartmentalized until we assimilate them into the self structure, or we realize we can't because they are contrary to who we are -- our needs, values, and so on.

So maybe yes, in a sense. I think we're speaking two different languages, or at least dialects, but maybe the common ground is that there's something good at the core (which you refer to as strengths, consistent with an SBA approach, and which I refer to as things like values and needs, consistent with an SDT approach) that we use as a unifying and (re)organizing principle?

And for Mezirow, transformation could be incremental or epochal, but I think the crucial thing for him is that there *is* a guiding principle.

Need support could very much be that, if we looked at schools and asked ourselves, for example, "What would school *really* look like if we wanted to create ample opportunities for need satisfaction? What would it look like if we truly honored students' autonomy?"

(I'm tagging in William S. Davis as well, because he and I are thinking together about these kinds of questions.)

Hi Ian Cunningham

Following up with what Tierney Wisniewski wrote, I have concerns that the need-supportive teaching practices and teacher dispositions described in the literature do not do justice to the transformative potential of SDT in schools. While I believe that practices such as taking the students' perspectives, listening to students, providing rationale for activities and learning materials, and building on students' interests (among many others) are undoubtedly beneficial to students in terms of their learning, engagement, and well-being, I also think that truly autonomy, competence, and relatedness-supportive (and potentially "beneficence" — see Martela & Ryan, 2015) learning environments would provide students with much more direct control over their education than has been described in SDT literature.

Whereas need-supportive practices often seem to be "sprinkled" on top of teacher-centered, traditional approaches to teaching, SDT has the potential of fully transforming classrooms by informing the development of the curriculum which further influences how one teaches. If a curriculum abandons the notion that the instructor has some transcendent knowledge that must be transmitted to the students, then what is left is a classroom much more aligned with the theory: people exploring, sharing, and building on each others’ perspectives, beliefs, and cultural backgrounds where no one interpretation is forced, where students may follow their learning wherever it takes them, and where the teacher becomes a facilitator and another individual in the community of learners. I think the first step in this process is to shift away from skills and knowledge as the sole outcomes of schools toward the well-being and healthy development of children. SDT has done a fantastic job at this by examining the effects of need satisfaction and frustration on both learning outcomes and well-being of people of all ages, cultures, levels of learning, and disciplines.

Finally, the recent work by Martela and colleagues (Martela & Ryan, Martela & Riekki) on beneficence (i.e. benevolence) as a candidate 4th need is fantastic and has huge implications for teaching. They have shown that the feelings arising from helping others have an independent significant effect on well-being, suggesting that students should be engaged in activities in school in which they are supporting the welfare of others. It also suggest that service learning may be a powerful tool in maximizing the well-being and development of children.

William

Ian Cunningham

I was at that session, too! I remember someone mentioned at the end that he should consider re-operationalizing beneficence frustration. I have more to write but I thought I would send you a message instead of potentially pulling this question off course.

So, I live in a well-off suburb with an overwhelming majority of professional class families... many many with some kind of post-graduate degree. The idea that anything about the experience kids have at school could be intrinsic or extrinsic in a fashion discrete from their wider patterns of socialization, the characteristics of their class cohort, the relative satisfaction of their teachers, the quality of the resources, buildings and recreational facilities, and the neurotic fears of their parents that the over-scheduled children will be downwardly mobile in our changing society strikes me as bizarre.

On top of that, I grew up in a kind of similar community in another state - but in the 70s - when schools had money, there were no high stakes tests to speak of, most everyone who wanted to go to college could feel confident that, coming out the other side, the employment reward would quickly compensate any debt they accrued, and that the employment would likely be life-long, have regular promotions, cost-of-living increases, etc.

Not only is the motivational structure of my cohort radically different than that of my kids but the structure of my kids and their friends is quite a bit different than most of those in the neighboring post-industrial city perpetually in fiscal crisis, much less the rural districts to our north. If this approach wholly brackets - basically - the whole field of sociology it is assuming away reams of variables, factors, contexts, etc., isn't it?

Alan, there are two chapters in the latest SDT book on Pervasive Social Influences, one on Cultural Contexts and another on Economic and Political Systems. There's a whole stream of research on teachers and the top-down influences on their own need satisfaction. SDT research may not yet cover everything you'd like it to, but a lot of the things you're critiquing are, in fact, there, at least in nascent form.

Thanks Tierney! I've got a student looking at activists and sustained motivations. The way they are drawing on this literature separates individuals from organizational and institutional embeddedness and support systems - I'll have the student check this out.

I have a sincere question for the SDT crowd: When it comes to motivation, would you consider substituting the word "direct" for "intrinsic," and "instrumental" for "extrinsic"?

Making this change might clear up a key semantic confusion at the heart of the theory. The problem is that "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" have multiple, sometimes contradictory meanings in SDT.

Back in 1971, when SDT co-founder Ed Deci first used "intrinsic" to describe motivation in a published study, he meant "intrinsic to the behavior" (my words), motivation for activities without any evident external reward (Deci, 1971; Pink, 2009, p. 5-9; Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 113). "Extrinsic" similarly meant "extrinsic to the behavior"—doing something for outside reasons, as opposed to doing something for its own sake.

Perhaps in imitative opposition to behaviorism, Deci (1971) defined both intrinsicism and extrinsicism in terms of observable behavior. "It is not the purpose of this study to deal with the specific nature of, or development of, intrinsic motivation," he wrote (p. 105).

From there, in the 1970s and '80s, "intrinsic motivation" became increasingly synonymous with theorized aspects of such reward-free behavior, starting with hedonic satisfaction from a task, then moving on to constructs such as interest, play, exploration, curiosity, growth, optimal challenge, and (most important) support for competence and autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 123-157). Eventually, "intrinsic" came to refer not just to the intrinsicity of one's motivation to a task, but to the intrinsicity of interest and other motivational pathways to a task (e.g. "intrinsic interest"; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Meanwhile, the theory that "intrinsic motivation" is autonomous by definition somehow became axiomatic (Ryan & Deci, 2011).

In 1985, Deci and Rich Ryan formally introduced SDT, with the key sub-theory that autonomy and competence are basic psychological needs, support for which is also "intrinsic" to human flourishing (Deci & Ryan, 1985). By 2000, relatedness was added to complete the triad of needs that has stood up to falsification in SDT ever since (Ryan & Deci, 2000).

The idea that these three needs are universal and complexly interrelated—and that autonomy is not synonymous with independence—may be the great humanist insight of self-determination theory. But these "intrinsic needs" introduced still more ambiguity to the term "intrinsic motivation," which could now be understood to mean not just motivation intrinsic to a task, but motivation derived from intrinsic human needs.

That's a big difference: Instrumental or "extrinsic" motivation—pursuing a behavior as a means to an end—arguably plays a critical role in supporting intrinsic needs (for autonomy, competence, and relatedness). Anyone who has changed a diaper, watered a plant, or memorized a times table intuits as much without needing to be told. We cannot support intrinsic needs without extrinsic motivation.

At the same time, as SDT has explored, motivation intrinsic to a behavior can support needs intrinsic to well-being in the short run, but thwart them in the long term, or even sooner, as in the case of so many volitional yet unhealthy behaviors—for example, video game overuse (Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 521-525). If motivation in SDT was the doorway for understanding basic psychological needs better, needs in this theory arguably became a doorway for understanding motivation better.

Confusing matters still further, by 1999, SDT researchers began labeling beliefs or desires directly supportive of intrinsic needs "intrinsic values" (or goals, priorities, or aspirations), no matter how autonomously held they may be, while calling beliefs or desires not supportive of those needs—or supporting them only indirectly, or thwarting them—"extrinsic values" (or goals, priorities, or aspirations; Kasser, 2002; Kasser & Ryan, 1993; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 123-157; Ryan, Cherkov, & Little, 1999; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008).

This was another important step in the theory's development, arguably: My favorite SDT book, besides Wendy Grolnick's 'The Psychology of Parental Control' (2002), is Larry Gonick and Tim Kasser's 'Hypercapitalism' (2018). Like "intrinsic motivation" (from Harry Harlow in 1950), "intrinsic values" also drew on a terminology far predating self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 123-157).

But this expansion brought even more ambiguity to motivation nomenclature: Now "intrinsic" could mean not just motivation derived from a behavior itself or motivation satisfying intrinsic needs, but also motivation guided by intrinsic values. Correspondingly, "extrinsic" could mean not just motivation treating a behavior instrumentally or motivation neglecting intrinsic needs, but also motivation guided by extrinsic values.

More confusing still—and this may be the key point to make—while SDT has long emphasized that all intrinsic motivation is autonomous but not all autonomous motivation is intrinsic, many (if not all) practitioners, journalists, and lay people gloss this distinction, routinely conflating "intrinsic" with "autonomous" (or "internal") and "extrinsic" with "controlled" (or "heteronomous," or "external"). Popular advocates or interpreters of the theory, such as David Brooks (2016), Daniel Pink (2009), and my dad's old friend Alfie Kohn (2008), leave this distinction unmade.

In contrast, SDT identifies three kinds of autonomous motivation, and only one of them is intrinsic: (a) intrinsic motivation—doing something for its own sake, (b) "identified" extrinsic motivation—doing something you don't want to because it's important, and (c) "integrated" extrinsic motivation—doing something you don't especially want to, but as integrally as if you did—at that same level of "cognitive flexibility, depth of processing, and creativity" as intrinsic motivation (Rigby, Deci, Patrick, & Ryan, 1991, p. 169-171; see Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 233). SDT further identifies two kinds of controlled motivation, both extrinsic: (d) "external" extrinsic motivation—doing something to please someone else—and (e) "introjected" extrinsic motivation—doing something because you've compartmentalized that someone else's view (Rigby, Deci, Patrick, & Ryan, 1991, p. 169-171; see Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 233).

All of the above are separate dimensions of motivation, of course, meaning they can all describe motivation for the same behavior simultaneously. Yet that point is similarly glossed, especially among new teachers (in my experience), who will often worry about reducing extrinsic motivation to increase intrinsic motivation, and thus increase all academic motivation. In contrast, as Jere Brophy (2010) argued in a review of SDT education research, the theory's implications for "encouraging identified regulation" may be more applicable to classroom practice than the theory's implications for intrinsic motivation (p. 177).

Finally, and more controversially, I do not see how SDT researchers have attempted to falsify the claim that intrinsic motivation is autonomous by definition. In other words, to my knowledge, they have not tested the alternative hypothesis, that intrinsic motivation can also be heteronomous, or controlled.

How would this work, theoretically? Two ways, in my view—both having to do with harm. First, one can thwart one's own needs, those of others, or those of the world more generally, for intrinsic satisfaction, compartmentalizing an introject by definition, given SDT's definition of autonomy as not just volition but volition with integrity—acting in accordance with one's "true self" (Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 59-60). Can anyone be true to themselves and also do harm for its own sake? Ryan and Deci (2017) imply the contrary, in their brief review of malevolent aggression (p. 639-640).

Second, one can do such harm subconsciously, automatically, or even unknowingly, which is heteronomous for the same reason, even without malevolence—harming the body you are a part of, and thus contributing to its compartmentalization. How can this be intrinsic? By deriving intrinsic satisfaction from acceding to an introject.

These theories are my own—and rough-draft versions (I just came up with them today)—but have a basis in SDT, as I read it. For example, Ryan and Deci (2017) review SDT work that investigates a range of unhealthy behaviors found to involve introjection, such as compulsive gambling, substance abuse, eating disorders, and aggression (p. 224, 403-411, 454-480). At one point, they argue that even "behaviors that are automatic may be regulated by either autonomous or controlled motivations," and give the example of seeing a cigarette ad after quitting, then reaching for a cigarette anyway, whereupon, "Once committing the act, one marker of... heteronomy would be the guilt or self-recrimination that followed that smoking" (p. 77).

But if introjection can include inducement to a pleasurable act followed by guilt, I don't see why it cannot also include such inducement without the guilt, or why the pleasure of the act cannot also include subconscious accession to the introject, pleasure that then becomes intrinsic to the act itself. In other words, one might smoke because a parent smoked, and derive pleasure from this association, without even being aware of it.

To review these definitions and conflations, then, the "intrinsic" in "intrinsic motivation" can be taken variously to mean:

My suggestion is that SDT explicitly reject all but the first meaning, and do so by substituting "direct"/"instrumental" for "intrinsic"/"extrinsic," when it comes to motivation. I also suggest SDT test the theory that direct motivation cannot be heteronomous.

I look forward to reading others' views on this!

~ Peter S. Scholtes

(References to come!)

what is the main criticism of SDT ?

that it isn't a revolutionary socialist theory, mostly.