The critical rationalist would hold that it is rational to accept a theory that has been severely tested and survived the tests. As for sceptical empiricism, much depends on what this is. If the position is constructive empiricism of the kind defended by van Fraassen, then acceptance of a theory would not extend to the truth of the theory's claims about unobservable theoretical entities. It would only involve accepting that the theory is empirically adequate, which is to say true at the level of observation.
One might consider Popper a skeptic, or at least skeptic towards induction. Under his interpretation nothing might be "true" and only corroborated till a better explanation comes along to falsify the previous.
Indeed, in van Fraasens words, emperically adequate describes a model that "saves the phenomenon". While I some sense I do feel attracted to his attitude the idea of emperically adequate leaves some vageness hanging around. Which seem justified by van Fraassen.
Actually, van Fraasen suggested, our language should be literal construed, but the theories do not need to be “true” or “good”. But most theories are not literally construed, because that would mean people would use words in such a way they would actually know what they are talking about. But, words such as know (or knowledge), facts, truth, cause, effect, counterfactuals, important, value and meaningful, are then out.
Unless one downgrades knowledge to the level of information. For example, I remember reading van Fraassen and wrote down: our language should be literal construed, but the theories do not need to be “true” or “good”, but I might just as well fool myself believing he did (I think Wittgenstein wrote something similair)
Agrippa trilema provides a reasonable introduction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCnchhausen_trilemma