Its not necessary to have a general equilibrium model in order to include the carbon taxation in the analysis. This is what I am working on it in one of my current studies.

I believe that this scientific contribution can help clarify your doubts. I hope it is very useful.

• The Economic and Budgetary Impact of Climate Policy in Portugal: Carbon Taxation in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with Endogenous Public Sector Behavior

By: Pereira, Rui M. ; Pereira, Alfredo M.

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to study taxation in its dual role as a climate and fiscal policy instrument using a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Portuguese economy which highlights the mechanisms of endogenous growth and incorporates a detailed modeling of public sector behavior and accounts. In addition to the conventional marginal abatement cost curve, we present a pair of complementary marginal abatement cost curves which highlight the impact taxation has on economic performance and public debt and are therefore directly relevant to the terms of the policy debate. These marginal abatement cost curves provide an effective tool for understanding the rate at which the environmental effectiveness, economic costs, and budgetary effects change with the tax level. Our results indicate that taxes can be an important policy instrument for reducing emissions and promoting fiscal consolidation, although this will come at a cost in terms of economic performance. Simulation results suggest that a tax of 17.00 Euros per can satisfy existing climate policy targets. The tax revenue effects, together with reductions in public spending, yield a 4.8 % reduction in public debt. These desirable outcomes come at the cost of a 1.3 % reduction in GDP over the long term. Our analysis highlights that limiting public consumption expenditures can contribute to larger reductions in public debt, albeit at a marginally greater cost to economic activity. In turn, reducing public investment, although effective in reducing public debt, produces a much larger negative economic impact. This evokes an important trade-off, particularly pronounced in the present debates regarding austerity measures in the EU, between fiscal consolidation efforts and efforts to promote convergence to EU standards of living. These results further highlight that modeling assumptions with respect to public spending decision are not innocuous. An exogenous trajectory for public spending suggests substantially smaller GDP effects and substantially larger public debt effects for any given emissions target.

For more info regarding your question, kindly have a look at this read. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz055

Optimal Dynamic Carbon Taxes in a Climate–Economy Model with Distortionary Fiscal Policy

Thanks to all

Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary

Thank you Dr. Taghizadeh. It sounds very interesting.

he literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes. However, when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes, carbon levies have fiscal impacts. While they raise revenues directly, they may shrink the bases of other taxes (e.g. by decreasing employment). This article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate–economy model with distortionary fiscal policy. First, this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income. This link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital: they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output. Consequently, this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments. Second, this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub-optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels. Third, this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal DICE approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes, such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts (e.g. on agriculture) and direct utility impacts (e.g. on biodiversity existence value). The central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8–24% lower when there are distortionary taxes, compared to the setting with lump-sum taxes considered in the literature.