Obserwuje zjawisko x i opisuje je jako “x” to czy opisuje je adekwatnie zależy od mojej zdolności inferencji i bogactwa językowego, im bogatszy mam język tym lepiej mogę opisać zjawisko ‘x’ lecz nie chodzi nam o kwiecistość języka a adekwację. aby “x” = x, czyli poznać świat, opisać zjawisko czyli podać tezę. Widzę ze p to “p” a gdy p nie równa się “p” czyli źle rozpoznaje zjawisko to wpadam w iluzję. Jak zatem poznać zjawisko. Zjawiska poznajemy poprzez zmysły i opisujemy je przez rozum który może je opisać matematycznie, logicznie i językowo. Matematycznie opisują świat fizycy, logicznie np. ontologicznie filozofowie, językowo wszyscy wcześniejsi i pisarze. Epistemolog zastanawia się jak poznać świat Ci powyżsi korzystając z rad epistemologa dokonują jego, świata, opisu. Aby poznać świat mogę dokonać: obserwacji wzrokiem, dotykiem, smakiem, węchem, słuchem, synidezą, mogę wyczuć sens świata jego sfery ontycznej, lecz lepiej różnicować niż syntetyzować robiąc synidezę czy wyczuwając sens świata, sens w rozumieniu Twardowskiego z jego pism o psychice czyli wyczuwając introcepcję bytu. Reasumując, matematyk, logik, naukowiec, pisarz uzbrojeni w narzędzia dane im przez epistemologa dokonują wiwisakcji świata i opisują rzeczy oczywiste, czyli mówią nam prawdę, choć w literaturze jest miejsce na fantazję i tak zakończyłbym spór z postmodernizmem, nie wszystko jest literaturą choć jest sztuką piśmienniczą bo literat może fantazjować a reszta nie ma do tego prawa.
This 'empiricist' or 'Cartesian' position you seem to adhere to was widely regarded as having been made untenable by the 'later' Wittgenstein - who demonstrated (very much like Kant through to Hegel on the Continent), that between the world of symbols that we use to communicate and the world of objects that they 'denote' there is what in the 'Continental' tradition is called a 'category' distinction - leading to the vast literature on the 'dialectic' between the two ... (Even Kolakowsky, with his visceral and entirely justified dislike of what the Russians had made of this doesn't dispute this in the least.)
He observes the phenomenon x and describes it as "x", whether or not I describe it adequately depends on my ability to inference and linguistic richness, the richer my language, the better I can describe the phenomenon of 'x' but we do not mean the flowery of the language but the adequacy. in order to "x" = x, that is to know the world, to describe the phenomenon, or to give a thesis. I see that p is "p" and when p is not equal to "p", that is, I misdiagnose the phenomenon, I fall into an illusion. How then to know the phenomenon. We recognize phenomena through our senses and we describe them through a mind that can describe them mathematically, logically and linguistically. Physicists describe the world mathematically, logically, for example ontologically philosophers, linguistically all earlier ones and writers. An epistemologist wonders how to get to know the world. Those above, using the advice of an epistemologist, describe the world of it. In order to get to know the world, I can make: observation by sight, touch, taste, smell, hearing, synidosis, I can sense the sense of the world of its ontic sphere, but it is better to differentiate than synthesize by making synides or sensing the meaning of the world, meaning in the understanding of Twardowski from his writings on the psyche, i.e. sensing the introception of being. To sum up, a mathematician, logician, scientist, writer armed with the tools given to them by an epistemologist vivisates the world and describes the obvious, that is, they tell us the truth, although there is room for fantasy in literature and this is how I end the dispute with postmodernism, not everything is literature, although it is art because the writer can fantasize and the rest have no right to do so.
I think there is a lot of confusion here about what it is that we mean when we say that phenomenon 'x' has been described and what we mean when we say that this description is true. It's not really possible to conduct a discussion of this type without a prior understanding of the difference between empiricism and rationalism, for a start. A sentence like 'x'=x can have both meanings: in the meaning of a sensualist description of what it is that can be observed, and in the sense of a 'transcendental deduction' of the type: 'there are two swans'. ('Two-ness' is not a property of what it is that's being observed in the least - that's 'Wittgenstein 1.0'.) I don't understand why a discussion like this should fall back beyond a level established long ago - these kinds of issues were discussed in depth for the whole of the last century; it's there in all the standard text-books.
We got 76 another types of truth. By this Type of truth we assune adequacy of sensen wchih is next rationalized hence described if senses is well done then we assune that is True as refrence in to relevant field of logic. This is empirical rationalism.
I've just translated and uploaded this paper by René Buchholz: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347984444_translation_Rene_Buchholz_%27Grand_Hotel_Abyss%27_On_the_Actuality_of_Theodor_W_Adorno%27s_Critical_Theory
Discussion and comments are invited on the forum opened for this important paper:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_relevant_is_the_Critical_theory_of_the_Frankfurt_School_for_an_understanding_of_politics_today