Neuroscientists have obsessed over the hard problem of consciousness for over two decades (Chalmers 1995, 1997; Koch and Chalmers 2023): namely, can the physical organization of the brain ever explain one’s subjective experiences given, for example, that we can never know whether two individuals experience the color ‘red’ the same way. Evolutionary theory teaches us that the environment selects the progeny of organisms according to their survivability (Darwin 1859). Survivability of a species depends on both genetic and experiential variability. What this means is that there can never be any such thing as two identical individuals and this holds true for all biological organisms. Thus, the hard problem is irrelevant since we can never expect two individuals to have the same appreciation of the color ‘red’, for their physical world based on genetics and experience will always be different. The best organisms can do is to establish a behavioral consensus about the color ‘red’: when it is red stop the car and when it is green go!!!
The realization that the hard problem is irrelevant was highlighted by Noam Chomsky in 2007/8, when he delivered a lecture at MIT on the status of the neurophysiology of the brain and language. He declared that even though tremendous progress had been made in determining the sensory-motor properties of the brain, after surveying many fMRI images pertaining to the study of language there was (in his view) never any consistency across the scanning patterns of individuals performing the same linguistic task (also see: Finn et al. 2015; Gratton et al. 2018; Salehi et al. 2018). His conclusion: ‘neuroscience has failed linguistics’.
I would suggest, on the contrary, that neuroscience as it relates to language confirms what Darwin already understood that no two organisms can ever be the same given their genetic and experiential uniqueness, which is a hallmark of the evolutionary process. It is for this reason that the brains of Einstein, Kasparov, and Pelé are configured differently, and it would therefore be impossible to convert one into another. Even identical twins, in the end before their death, are varied since their experience is varied.
So, how does the brain deal with the reality of uniqueness? The neocortex and cerebellum of humans together represent over 95% of the neurons in the brain (Herculano-Houzel 2011), and together they reinforce this uniqueness by being able to store 4.4 x 10^14 bits of experiential information over a human’s lifetime (Hueng 2008; Tehovnik, Hasanbegović, Chen 2024). Especially at the level of the cerebellum, one’s uniqueness is well-represented. When studying the grey matter volume of the cerebellum in athletes it was found that ballet performers had an enhancement of the posterior lobe including the vestibular circuitry (Dordevic et al. 2018), sprinters had an augmentation of the anterior lobe which subserve lower limb locomotion (Wenzel et al. 2014), and basketball players had a potentiated mediolateral lobe which subserves eye-hand, object coordination (Park et al. 2009). Thus, by imaging the connectivity of the neocortex and cerebellum (see Figures 1 and 2), we may be able to establish the degree of auto-conscious similarity between two individuals. ‘Auto’ stands for automaticity, which is central to one’s consciousness (see: Tehovnik, Hasanbegović, Chen 2024). Indeed, it has been concluded by the originator of the concept ‘the hard problem’ that neural “systems with the same organization have the same conscious experience.” (Chalmers 1995, pp. 86).
Footnote 1: Here Chomsky was referring to the many breakthroughs on the sensorimotor front in his adopted Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT.
Figure 1: Shown are connectivity profiles between the neocortex and cerebellum (a flat map) using the resting-state connectivity method of Buckner et al. (2011). The common colors indicate common connectivity. Data from Fig. 5 of Diedrichsen et al. (2019).
Figure 2: Shown are the connectivity profiles of two individuals. Note the difference between the individuals (from Fig. 10 of Xue, Buckner et al. 2021). Whether doing a fine-grain analysis on the connectivity can sort subjects according to their auto-conscious similarity, awaits clarification.