Agreed

There's a lot involved surrounding science. That's for sure. There's theory development, which is kind of a design thinking process. There's also the development of narrative, which helps us understand and explain our models. And finally there's the part that I generally think of as being science: the testing of theories, in an attempt to falsify and prioritize them. I'm certain that's science. I'm not sure about the rest.

But I do still generally consider science to be any high quality work, made available for public criticism, which adds to the body of scientific theory and evidence. It's one reason why I promote my idea of the Call to Research paper format so much: Preprint Call to Research: A need for a new paper format

Experiments should be / are an integral part of Science.

Dear Vincent Raphael Nyirenda

Certainly. IF AND WHEN POSSIBLE. Look at the lab; look at your setting there; look at the time frame; then, ask what is and is not possible to experiment on.

Brad Jesness,

If a theory cannot be tested through some kind of experiment, then it is not scientific. A scientific theory must be potentially falsifiable.

Dear Daniel Goldman

You say: " There's a lot involved surrounding science. That's for sure. There's theory development, which is kind of a design thinking process. There's also the development of narrative, which helps us understand and explain our models. " (end quote).

THEN you seem to discount all that and "honor" only experimentation. I think I know why. You have the empirical order of something out of place, indicated by "helps us understand and explain our models". Look: Decent and scientific models ONLY FOLLOW verified and agreed-upon OBSERVATIONS (with good inter-rater/inter-observer reliabilities) -- however those are obtained: OTHERWISE you are a priori asserting the nature of phenomenon. PERIOD. If you realize THIS, you would not so much discount all the other except experiments and you would NOT think only experiments are really important. You would not do anything remotely like that.

This idea that one should (or CAN) conjure up a model (perhaps based on informal observation(s)) and ONLY THEN look to verify it is absolutely un-empirical and unscientific (frankly, it is needlessly desperate, as well as un-empirical and unscientific). You can look at any of the established sciences to verify models "come second", to the content, to see convincingly for yourself, or for anyone else.

[ Philosophers used to do this kind of wrongful thinking -- sitting in their arm-chairs -- but ALL science and aspiring science should have left ANYTHING LIKE THAT BEHIND _AND_ UNUSED . ]

And: Daniel Goldman:

OBSERVATIONS are are as falsifiable as experiments -- it can be shown if they have OR lack high inter-observer reliablities (P.S.: p

Brad Jesness, this is a personal debate with myself. Not a philosophical position that I think others should necessary consider. I am at a personal impasse wrt what I would consider to be science, and what I would consider to be associated with science. The narrative aspect is subjective. To include it within science itself makes science subjective. That may be fine. I don't know. But one thing I will say on this matter is that scicomm is not science, and science is not scicomm.

Now, onto falsification: an observation is an observation. We compare observations against models in an attempt to falsify them (Popperian science). I do not accept Baconian science or a bastardization between Popperian and Baconian sciences.

"Proven" used in science is another issue that I have. Science is not able to prove things. If we could solve the problem of induction, things would be different. Then I could accept Baconian science or its derivatives.

Now, of course I don't mean that a theory has to be tested right away to be scientific, but we have to know how we could test and potentially falsify it in order for it to be a scientific theory. A mathematical model which does not present any method of falsification is a purely mathematical model, not a scientific one, for the time being. Closed timelike curves are probably a good example of this situation.

Dear Daniel Goldman

After many days, I have decided to address something you said in your last post, where you said: Quoting you: "Now, onto falsification: an observation is an observation. We compare observations against models in an attempt to falsify them ... " (end quote). This IS wrong in more than one major way, one basically being failing to appreciate that high inter-observer reliabilities are as strong a science finding as any p.01, etc. , i.e. experimental JUNK. (An observation is NOT in any way demeaned by "just being an observation" -- there is no "just" about it; in fact, REPLICABLE, reliable observations (just as they are) are THEMSELVES the bedrock and the foundation of all science. [ Go back and look at some classic science, like Newton -- and, by the way, the use of math gives no special status except showing the precision of observation (nothing else, no magic).]

Now, to address more details of the your extremely "off" views (which, unless rectified, seriously compromise any science views/understanding you have):

To compare observations against models is most certainly NOT the way to falsify OBSERVATIONS. (In fact, it is the other way around because legitimate models are well-based ON observations (well established principles may also be involved; otherwise, they are non-science). One might well first falsify a model and then PERHAPS the observations they were made on.)

Now, then, how are observations falsified? There are 2 ways, in 2 circumstances:

The first is VERY easy: falsification is simply failure to show inter-observer reliabilities when observations are re-done. This very truly and basically, failure of replication (with no different standing than in the case of experiments).

The other circumstance where observations may be falsified is when/where they make predictions (which turn out not to be true). Even if the original (starting point) observations are reliable (replicable), if this one set of observations [(including the very KEY parts as directly observable overt behaviors)], are supposed to be VERY REGULARLY FOLLOWED BY a second set of observations [(these, to be just as empirically defined in the KEY features to be seen as the first set)], finding this second set may not occur OR may not be found reliable/replicable -- again, perhaps "just" by failing to show good inter-observer reliability (OR, perhaps by an experiment, if doable, and its failure to show "significance").

That's it. This is the empirical position, the empirical, communicable, scientific reality.

Until we recognize the importance and centrality of observations, whatever "science" fails to do so is hopeless off track and also doomed to stagnation (for example, the entire 100-yr history of Psychology).