Friedrich Wilhelm Grafe,

Is it not strange that philosophy that attempts to study all that exists has to study all in terms of analysis of the language used to explicate Reality? How can we stop short of admitting the existence of Reality-in-total, then say that we need to analysis the language of our discourse, and then claim that we are doing philosophy? If Reality does exist, DO WE HAVE ONLY LANGUAGE AS THE SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY?

This question has disturbed me a lot, and what about you?

With respect, but I do not think that academic philosophy is relevant for anybody except for academic philosophers. Once upon a time I wrote the following text about Ludwig W.

* One of the most famous philosophers of the twentieth century deals mainly with language and knowledge. I call him by the figurative name Cryptic, because this concept describes the contents and style of his discourse quite well. His aim is to make discourse clear and precise, and to teach people how to speak in the proper way. This is a commendable aim and a demanding task, but Cryptic failed in his endeavour ...

* Cryptic argues that the task of philosophy is not to produce "philosophical propositions", but to deal with the logical clarification of propositions, especially of those which aim to express knowledge. ... The task of philosophy is not to produce philosophical propositions about life and death, but "to make propositions clear". ... This is commendable aim and endeavour; but, by his own writings, Cryptic did not contribute to the realization of this endevour. His Tractatus consists of trivial or vague statements, without relevant contents, expressed in a cryptic and dramatic way ...

* The first sentenceof the main text of the Tractatus runs as follows: "The world is everything that is the case". This does not look like a clear discourse. The second sentence runs as follows: "The world is the totality of facts, not of things". This sentence does not make the discourse clearer. Explanations such as "The facts in logical space are the world" do not help much. Cryptic again: "Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be said can be said clearly". Perhaps it really can; but Cryptic himself, by his discourse, did not contribute to the clarity which he preached. In the Preface of the book, he says: "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent". This is the best proposition in that book, but Cryptic forgot this good principle while he was writing the rest of the book.

* AND SO FORTH.

* "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them", says Cryptic. He must "throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it". He must "surmount these propositions", and then "he sees the world rightly". This famous statement does not say anything substantial, and it is not new. The venerable Buddha preaches that his discourse is a raft that aims to carry people over the river, to the other shore; those who reached the other shore do not need the raft any more; the raft becomes a burden for them, and they must discard and abandon it. For the one who reached the enlightenment, all words and discourses become irrelevant, meaningless and superfluous. So spoke the venerable Buddha twenty-five centuries before Cryptic.

* Cryptic's other famous book, Philosophical Investigations, does not contain any relevant substance. His discourse about the meaning of words does not bring much novelty or clarity.

AND SO FORTH

* By his mystical discourse about the clarification of language, Cryptic did not achieve anything useful. He contributed to the expulsion of relevant issues of people's lives and behaviour from the scope of philosophical discourse. The clarity of discourse is needed, but this fact must not displace relevant contents from the sphere of philosophical activities. Besides promoting clarity, philosophical discourse must seek and raise essential questions about life, death, society and global relationships and tendencies. Philosophy may not manage to give answers to those questions alone, but it should at least raise questions that matter.

Mario Radovan, great! You have said it all very clearly.

Now the most interesting part of the game is that linguistic analysts adore Wittgenstein and Frege like gods. None should criticize the foundational concepts of these gods. If you do, it should be on some peripheral aspects.

My own professor on Wittgenstein gave us all assignments to write critical papers on this philosopher; and as I wrote about 15 pp. of critique -- which even today is good enough in my opinion -- he shouted at me: WHO ARE YOU TO CRITICIZE WITTGENSTEIN?

You know how devoted Heideggerians are to Heidegger. But thy jeer at Wittgenstein. This is not the way in which I speak of Wittgenstein. I think it is time to re-evaluate the whole tradition of linguistic analysis as a philosophy and its derivative discourses like linguistic-analytic metaphysics (how can it exist if it cannot analyse existent processes?)

I invite further comments.

"WHO ARE YOU TO CRITICIZE WITTGENSTEIN?" - This is not a philosophical discourse (attitude); the one who said this, was a professor, but not a philosopher. Everything can be criticized, and should be examined, as Socrates used to say. Heidegger and Wittgenstein are not my "sympathies"; I appreciate Russel and Popper; nobody is impeccable, but some people deal with relevant issues.

Very good. The attitude of Wittgensteinians, Heideggerians, Husserlians, etc. that permits them acquire exclusive rational rights for their guide author, should first vanish.

Secondly, the philosophical attitude of concentrating on language alone, interpretation alone, conceptual activity alone, etc. should also vanish. Russell, but, had the Wittgensteinian attitude both in logic and in philosophy. Popper was better because he has also a philosopher of science. But the attitude by which one becomes scientistic is equally bad. Russell had it a lot, and Popper too.

If science had all the rational rights on truth/s, the conceptual foundation, methods, etc. -- at least -- that are had access to in the various sciences would have been perfect. That is, philosophy could function in the very least as clarifier of the conceptual foundation, methods, etc. of the sciences -- and more. But the Russellian scientism has kept his philosophy strictly within the bounds of linguistic analysis, of which he was one of the founders along with Frege and Wittgenstein!

Now, what could philosophy be and do, if not mere linguistic analysis?

What about the nature of the logic that linguistic-analytic philosophy sustains and uses? Is it the same as what logicians use, or different, at least in the foundations of logic?

Of course, projected as the method of all thought, logic seems to be unique and defined.

But in actual practice the definition and use of the foundational principles of logic in the various scientific disciplines and in various philosophical schools differ.

Moreover, the manner in which the sub-disciplines and sub-schools of the sciences and philosophy connect their versions of logic with the material object of research in these sub-disciplines seem to differ.

This difference, in my opinion, is due to (1) the difference of their perception of the suitability of the foundational principles and methods of logic and (2) the perceived level of applicability of such logical principles and methods to the material objects of the said sub-sciences and sub-philosophies.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO CHARACTERIZE LOGIC VIA THESE APPLICABILITY CONSTRAINTS OR VICE VERSA? CAN THIS SORT OF ALTERATIONS AFFECT ALSO THE LOGIC OF LINGUISTIC-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?

Friends, if possible put this question to analytic philosophers too. Their responses and critiques are important for the project of IMAGINING THE POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY CHANGES IN LINGUISTIC-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE FUTURE.

If any of you finds time, please take a look at the discussion between me and Jean-Louis Boucon in Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/s/084b0465db?source=work

It is not good to cite the whole conversation here. Too long!

Let me put down here a set of paradigms.

(1) One way to start thinking of experience is as experience, without admitting the existence of "somethings" out there, not existing exactly as we define and attribute qualities to; and hence without thinking equally well -- and making ways to think so -- of the status of the objects of experience as objects out there.

In this manner of thinking, we have many philosophies -- all of which are the various shades of empiricism. Linguistic-analytic philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics etc. in recent history belong to this.

And even when they admit of the thinghood of things, this is being done as the experientially defined or presupposed substantiality of things as objects. They do not delve into the flux nature of these objects as "somethings with processuality". They may admit the processuality of these things out there, but they do not make space in their theory speak of them as processes always, without over-stressing their experience-based expression by humans.

(2) On the other hand, the sciences do not want to express experience in an experience-based manner, but instead, in terms of the things out there, ignoring the experience-based nature of the ways of expression, ways of definition, and ways of explanation that we have.

Mostly they are in the delirium wherein they take the objectuality of the objects of experience as somewhat purely substantial for all purposes, thus missing the processual nature of the objects completely and missing the experience-based nature of expression, definition, and explanation completely.

This is the case even in quantum physics, where the physicist is in a fix as to what to speak of the indeterminacy and locality of quanta. They get immersed in the statistical and linguistic inability of experience to express, define, and explain the difference between substances and processes.

(3) And take the case of the few philosophers of physics like A. N. Whitehead. He is today an old-school person due to the passage of time between him and us. But his effort to processualize everything existent and his insistence not to take the merely experiential manner of expression, definition, and explanation -- are noteworthy.

He and a few others seem to have taken the existence of the objects of experience seriously, as being independent of experience and its instruments, namely, language, interpretation, ideas, etc.

The sad state of linguistic-analaytic philosophy today is this: Even while speaking of existent things, they just want to stick to the linguistic stance. A pity! But the pride with which they do it, as if they have the power to dominate all philosophy, is symptomatic. It makes them look down upon all other philosophies, not permit space for others to critique them, or at least take some opportunity to grow in the academic circles.

They do also suppose that their school of philosophy has become a science as such, since the science-similarity that it has achieved due to the linguistic and logical manipulations they have achieved.

WHAT DO YOU FEEL OF THIS?

Those of you who are interested in an interesting EVALUATION of LINGUISTIC ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, could read this discussion:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Linguistic-Analytic_Philosophy_is_more_than_130_years_old_How_to_improve_this_school_of_thought/2

Corcoran characterizes pragmatic philosophies with the following general points within their outlook:

(1) The meaning of a proposition is to be identified with its experimental and practical meaning, i.e. with the totality of possible experience it predicts. (2) The truth of a proposition consists in the long-term realization (past, present, and future) of its meaning. (3) Belief in the truth of a proposition is warranted to the extent that it has been tested in practice and found to be satisfactory (by the person or community having the belief). [Corcoran 2019]

The one thing that Corcoran does not mention (nor does any other logician, scientist, or thinker so far, as my knowledge goes) is that pragmatists never include under ‘propositions’ the foundational propositions of systems. My question here is about the propositions in the form of possible pan-disciplinary foundational principles for all sciences and philosophy together. Pragmatic kinds of definition of the demands of ‘practical’ meaning, prediction, etc. are not to be found useful or realizable at the propositional formulations of the foundational Categories or of other first principles.

Not that no pragmatism is accessed to while attempting to find the foundational Categories of all sciences and philosophy. But the said kind of Categories have the least pragmatism at use. Before laughing at the attempt, one should at least recognize that such an attempt aims to reduce the element of pragmatism from science, thought and life.

Moreover, realization of the “working” demand as the condition for anything to possess rationality has been misused by sciences, technologies, cultures, and human individuals everywhere as a part-licence to justify what they have already been doing. Such pragmatism, encountered consistently everywhere, in all strata of human action, science, philosophy, society, etc., works for me as the major academic trigger to reflections on, and to plan an exciting but base-level reform of, the foundations of thought, sciences, and humanities – of course in the simple manner that I can. If such pragmatism were in principle an unexceptionally insuperable human fate, no science and thought would have grown in the foundations, methods, and results, the sciences as it was centuries ago would have sufficed for the human race today; and no other, more general, thinking would have taken shape and would exist.

Unfortunately for the various shades of pragmatism in scientistic thinking and its practice on human feeling, thinking, bodies, lives, society, politics, and finally on humanity as such and the environment, there does exist thought that is or attempts to be more general than the sciences. Would I be permitted to try the same in a different manner? Their very existence in whatever meagre capacity invalidates the lethargic conclusion and claim that pragmatism is an insuperable fate of humans. I do not now theorize on the unethical and inhuman aspects of pragmatic practices!

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Will_a_reconciliation_of_Causation_and_Freedom_unify_and_axiomatize_the_Physical_Natural_and_Social_Sciences

If any thought system takes Reality in terms of mind or of any mental product -- however direct or indirect a mental product it is --, that system of thinking must end somehow. This is a necessity of human experience.

Hence, linguistic philosophy must end someday in finding no takers. Why not precipitate the process?

Perceptive / cognitive / epistemic activities do not create the individuality of groups of processual entities. Individuality of any level is just processual, beyond all that minds are and create. Minds themselves, as processes with certain processual individuality, have their reality not because they are minds or due to the productes of minds.

Hence, any philosophy and science that make reality (instead of making the discourse of reality) to depend on thought, language, and symbols, even on mathematics and logic, do not do genuine philosophy and science.

The processually constructed and connected individuality of existents can merely be made to reflect in thought, language, symbols, mathematics, and logic. The discourse on this activity of reflecting too is not capable of constructing reality expect by indirectly insinuating the processes that cause the said activity.

The mistake of linguistic philosophy is to UNCONSCIOUSLY ACCEPT THE NATURE YIELDED BY THE REFLECTIVE ACTIVITY OF LANGUAGE AS IF THE REFLECTION WOULD REFLECT REALITY DIRECTLY AS GIVEN IN WORDS, TERMS, DEFINITIONS, ETC.

If our language is so important as the meanings, definitions, and theories of things outside, then the symbols, sounds etc. of animals must, for them, be important as the meanings, definitions, and theories of things outside.

There is much difference between the two sorts of language, but only a finite difference. Hence, our formulations are not very good representations of reality outside.

Hence, the only solution we have is to formulate realities in their processual aspects AS BEST AS POSSIBLE AND THAT TOO CONTINUOUSLY. So, linguistic philosophy, mathematics, logic, etc. need to find a manner of continuous augmentation of their meanings. HENCE, STRICT DEFINITIONS AS BEING FIXED AND USED IN LOGIC BY LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY SHOULD BE OVERHAULED.

MATHEMATICAL CONTINUITY IN NATURE Vs. CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN (PARTIALLY) DISCRETE "PROCESSUAL" OBJECTS. (Have patience to read till the end.)

Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature is a mere idealization. It expects nature to obey our idealization. This is what happens in all physical and cosmological (and of course other) sciences as long as they use mathematical idealizations to represent existent objects and processes.

But mathematically following nature in whatever it is in its part-processes is a different procedure in science and philosophy (and even in the arts and humanities). This theoretical attitude accepts the existence of processual entities as what they are.

This theoretical attitude accepts in a highly generalized manner that

(1) mathematical continuity (in any theory and in terms of any amount of axiomatization of physical theories) is totally non-realizable in nature as a whole and in its parts: because the necessity of mathematical approval in such a cosmology falls short miserably,

(2) absolute discreteness (even QM type, based on the Planck constant) in the physical cosmos (not in non-quantifiable “possible worlds”) and its parts is a mere commonsense compartmentalization (from the "epistemology of box-type thinking" -- Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Uni-Paderborn): because the aspect of the causally processual connection between any two quanta is logically and mathematically alienated in the physical theory of Planck’s constant, and

(3) hence, the only viable and thus the most reasonably generalizable manner of being of the physical cosmos and of biological entities is that of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS.

PHYSICS and COSMOLOGY even today tend to make the cosmos mathematically either continuous or defectively discrete or statistically oriented to epistemically logical decisions and determinations. Can anyone suggest here the existence of a different sort of physics and cosmology until today? A topology and mereology of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS, fully free of discreteness-oriented category theory and functional analysis, is yet to be born. Hence, causality in its deep roots in the very concept of To Be is yet alien to physics and cosmology till today.

LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY and even its more recent causalist child, namely, DISPOSITIONALIST ONTOLOGY are (1) overly discrete about “entities” without clearly reconciling the geometrical tendency to make every physical representation continuous, (2) comatose about the impossibility of linguistically definitional approach to the logical demands of existent physical objects without first analyzing and resolving the metaphysical implications of existent objects being irreducibly in EXTENSION and CHANGE, and (3) unable to get at the causally continuous nature of the partially discrete processual objects in the physical world.

PHENOMENOLOGY has done a lot to show the conceptual structures of ordinary reasoning, physical reasoning, mathematical and logical thinking, and reasoning in the human sciences. But due to its lack of commitment to building a physical ontology of the cosmos and its purpose as a research methodology, phenomenology has failed to show the nature of causal continuity (instead of mathematical continuity) in the only physically existent objects, namely processually discrete objects, in nature.

HERMENEUTICS has just followed the human-scientific aspect of Husserlian phenomenology and projected it. Hence, it was no contender to accomplish the fete.

POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHIES qualified all science and philosophy as being perniciously cursed to be “modernistic” – by thus monsterizing all compartmentalization, rules, laws, axiomatization, discovery of regularities in nature, logical rigidity, etc. as an insurmountable curse of knowing and as a synonym for all that are unapproachable in science and thought.

THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE SCIENCES seem today to follow the beaten paths of linguistic-analytic philosophy, physics, mathematics, and logic, which lack a FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPT OF CAUSALLY PROCESSUAL PHYSICAL EXISTENCE.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematical_Continuity_in_Nature_Vs_Causal_Continuity_between_Partially_Discrete_Processual_Objects_Have_patience_to_read_till_the_end

MATHEMATICS AND CAUSALITY:

A SYSTEMIC RECONCILIATION

Raphael Neelamkavil

I believe it is common knowledge that mathematics and its applications cannot prove causality directly. What are the bases of the problem of incompatibility of causality with mathematics and its applications? The main but general explanation could be that mathematical explanations are not directly about the world but are applicable to the world to a great extent. Hence, it can only show the ways of movement of the processes and not demonstrate whether the ways are by causation.

But can logic show the necessity of all existents being causal? We have already discussed how, ontologically, the very concept of To Be implies Extension-Change and thus also Universal Causality. We shall encounter the logical aspect of the question later.

I suggest that the crux of the problem here is the dichotomy between mathematical continuity and mathematical discreteness on the one hand and the incompatibility of applying any of them directly on the data collected / collectible / interpretable from some layers of the phenomena which are from some layers of nature or of the reality in question. Not recognizing this is an epistemological foolishness.

I point at the avoidance of the problem, by the centuries of epistemological foolishness, by reason of the forgetfulness of the ontological and epistemological relevance of expressions like ‘from some layers of phenomena from some layers of the reality’. This is the point at which it is time to recognize the gross violence against reason behind phrases and statements involving ‘data from observation’, ‘data from phenomena’, ‘data from nature / reality’ etc., without epistemological and ontological astuteness.

The whole of what we used to call space is not filled with matter-energy. Hence, if causal continuity between partially discrete “processual” objects is the case, then the data collected / collectible cannot be the very processual objects and hence cannot provide all knowledge about the processual objects. But mathematics and all other research methodologies are based on human experience and thought based on experience.

Hence, it is important to define the limits of applicability of mathematics to the physics of data (under the species of various layers of their origin). This is the only way to approximate beyond the data and the methodologically derived conclusions beyond the data.

The same may be said also about logic and language. Logic is the broader rational picture of mathematics. Language is the symbolic manner of application of both logic and its quantitatively qualitative version, namely, mathematics, with respect to specific fields of inquiry. Here I do not explicitly discuss ordinary conversation, literature, etc.

We may do well to instantiate logic as the formulated picture of reason. But human reason is limited to the procedures of reasoning by brains. What exactly is the reason that existent physical processes constantly undergo? How to get at conclusions based on this reason and thus transcend at least to some extent the limitations set by data and methods?

If we may call the universal reason of Reality-in-total by a name, it is nothing but Universal Causality. It is possible to demonstrate that Universal Causality is a trans-physical, trans-scientific Law of Existence. This argument needs clarity. How to demonstrate this as the case?

A caveat is in place here about the complexity one may experience in the formulation: When I write anything here, you have the right to ask me constantly for further justifications. And if I have the right to anticipate some such questions, I will naturally attempt to be as detailed and as systemic as possible in my formulation. Each sentence is merely a part of the formulation. After reading each sentence you may pose me questions, which certainly cannot all be answered well within the sentences or after the sentences in question.

Hence, I tend to be as systemic as possible in each of the following sentences. Please do not find the arguments being too complex. We do not purposely make anything complex. Our (and your) characterizations of meanings in mathematics, physics, philosophy, and logic can be complex and prohibitive for some. But would we all accuse these disciplines or the readers if the readers find them all complex and difficult? I do not create such a state of affairs in these few sentences, but there are complexities here too. Hence, I express my helplessness in case any one of you finds these statements complex.

Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature is a mere idealization. It expects nature to obey our merely epistemic sort of idealizations (in ideal cases, based mostly on the brain-interpreted data from some layers of phenomena, which are from some layers of the reality under observation). The processes outside are vaguely presented primarily by the processes themselves, but highly indirectly, in a natural manner. This is represented by the epistemic activity of the brain in a natural manner, and then idealized via concepts expressed in words, connectives, and sentences (not merely linguistic but also mathematical, computerized, etc.) by the symbolizing human tendency to capture the whole of the object by use of a part of the human body-mind. The symbolizing activity is based on data, but the data are not all we have.

Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature as a natural conclusion by application of mathematics to nature is what happens in all physical and cosmological (and of course other) sciences insofar as they use mathematical idealizations (another version of linguistic symbolization and idealization) to represent existent objects and processes and extrapolate further beyond them. Logic and its direct quantitatively qualitative expression as found in mathematics are, of course, powerful tools.

But, as being part of the denotative function of symbolic language, they are tendentially idealizational. By use of the same symbolizing tendency, it is perhaps possible to a certain extent to de-idealize the side-effects of the same symbols in the language, logic, and mathematics being used in order to symbolically idealize representations.

Merely mathematically following physical nature in whatever it is in its part-processes is a debilitating procedure in science and philosophy (and even in the arts and humanities), if this procedure is not de-idealized effectively. If this is possible at least to a small and humble extent, why not do it? Our language, logic, and mathematics too do their functions well although they too are equally unable to capture the whole of reality in whatever it is, wholly or in in parts, far beyond the data and their interpretations! Why not de-idealize the side-effects of mathematics too?

This theoretical attitude of partially de-idealizing the effects of human symbolizing activity by use of the same symbolic activity accepts the existence of processual entities as whatever they are. This is what I call ontological commitment – of course, different from and more generalized than those of Quine and others. Perhaps such a generalization can give a slightly better concept of reality than is possible by the normally non-self-aware symbolic activity in language, logic, and mathematics.

This theoretical attitude facilitates and accepts in a highly generalized manner the following three points:

(1) Mathematical continuity (in any theory and in terms of any amount of axiomatization of logical, mathematical, physical, biological, social, and linguistic theories) is totally non-realizable in nature as a whole and in its parts: because (a) the necessity of mathematical approval of any sort of causality in the sciences and by means of its systemic physical ontology falls short miserably in actuality, and (b) logical continuity of any kind does not automatically make linguistic or mathematical symbolized representation activity adequate enough to represent the processual nature of entities as derivate from data.

(2) The concept of absolute discreteness in nature, which, as of today, is ultimately of the quantum-mechanical type based on Planck’s constant, continues to be a mathematical and physical misfit in the physical cosmos and its parts (may not of course be so in non-quantifiable “possible worlds” due to their absolute causal disconnection) and is a mere common-sense mathematical compartmentalization: (a) because the aspect of the causally processual connection between any two quanta is logically and mathematically alienated in the physical theory of Planck’s constant, and (b) because the epistemology of unit-based thinking (not, of course, based on quantum physics) is implied by the almost unconscious tendency of symbolic activity of body-minds.

(3) The only viable and thus the most reasonably generalizable manner of being of the physical cosmos and of biological entities is that of existence in an extended (having parts) and changing (extended entities and their parts impacting a finite number of others in a finite amount) manner. Any existence in Extension-Change-wise manner is nothing but causal activity. Thus, insofar as everything is existent, every existent is causal. There is no time (i.e., no minute measuremental iota of Change) wherein such causal manner of existing ceases in any existent. This is causal continuity between partially discrete processual objects. This is non-mathematizable.

The attitude of treating everything as causal may also be characterized by the self-aware symbolic activity by symbolic activity itself, in which certain instances of causation are avoided or increased or avoided, all incrementally, not absolutely. This, at the most, is what may be called freedom. It is fully causal – causal not in a specific set of manners, but causal in some other specific set of manners.

Physics and cosmology even today tend to make the cosmos either (1) mathematically presupposedly continuous, or (2) discrete with defectively ideal mathematical status for causal continuity and with perfectly geometrical ideal status for specific beings, or (3) statistically indeterministic, thus compelled to consider everything as partially causal, or even non-causal in the interpretation of statistics’ orientation to epistemically logical decisions and determinations based on data. If not, can anyone suggest proofs for an alleged existence of a different sort of physics and cosmology until today?

The statistician does not even realize (1) that Universal Causality is already granted by the very existence of anything, and (2) that what they call non-causality is merely a specific process’ not being the cause, or not having been discovered as the cause, of a specific set of selected data or processes. Such non-causality is not with respect to all existents.

A topology and mereologically clean physical ontology of causal continuity between partially discrete processual objects, fully free of absolutely continuity-oriented or discreteness-oriented category theory, geometry, functional analysis, set theory, and logic, are yet to be born. Hence, the fundamentality of Universal Causality in its deep roots in the very concept of the To Be (namely, in the physical-ontological Categories of Extension and Change) of all physically and non-vacuously existent processes, is yet alien to physics and cosmology till today.

With respect to what we have been discussing, linguistic philosophyand even its more recent causalist child, namely, dispositionalist causal ontology have even today the following characteristics:

(1) They attribute an overly discrete nature to “entities” without ever attempting to touch the deeply Platonic (better, geometrically atomistic) shades of common-sense Aristotelianism, Thomism, Newtonianism, Modernism, Quantum Physics, etc., and without reconciling the diametrically opposite geometrical tendency to make every physical representation continuous.

(2) They are logically comatose about the impossibility of the exactly referential definitional approach to the processual demands of existent physical objects without first analyzing and resolving the metaphysical implications of existent objects, namely, being irreducibly in finite Extension and Change and thus in Universal Causality.

(3) Hence, they are unable to get at the causally continuous (neither mathematically continuous nor geometrically discontinuous) nature of the physical-ontologically “partially discrete” processual objects in the physical world.

Phenomenology has done a lot to show the conceptual structures of ordinary reasoning, physical reasoning, mathematical and logical thinking, and reasoning in the human sciences. But due to its lack of commitment to building a physical ontology of the cosmos and due to its purpose as a research methodology, phenomenology has failed to an extent to show the nature of causal continuity (instead of mathematical continuity) in physically existent, processually discrete, objects in nature.

Hermeneutics has just followed the human-scientific interpretative aspect of Husserlian phenomenology and projected it as a method. Hence, it was no contender to accomplish the said fete.

Postmodern philosophies qualified all science and philosophy as being perniciously cursed to be “modernistic” – by thus monsterizing all compartmentalization, rules, laws, axiomatization, discovery of regularities in nature, logical rigidity, etc. as an insurmountable curse of the human project of knowing and as a synonym for all that are unapproachable in science and thought. The linguistic-analytic philosophy in later Wittgenstein too was no exception to this nature of postmodern philosophies – a matter that many Wittgenstein followers do not notice. Take a look at the first few pages of his Philosophical Investigations, and the matter will be more than clear.

The philosophies of the sciences seem today to follow the beaten paths of extreme pragmatism in linguistic-analytic philosophy, physics, mathematics, and logic, which lack a foundational concept of causally concrete and processual physical existence.

Hence, it is useful for the growth of science, philosophy, and humanities alike to research into the causal continuity between partially discrete “processual” objects.

I believe it is common knowledge that mathematics and its applications cannot prove causality directly. What are the bases of the problem of incompatibility of physical causality with mathematics and its applications in the sciences and in philosophy? The main but general explanation could be that mathematical explanations are not directly about the world but are applicable to the world to a great extent. Hence, mathematical explanations can at the most only show the ways of movement of the processes and not demonstrate whether the ways of the cosmos are by causation.

No science and philosophy can start without admitting that the cosmos exists. If it exists, it is not nothing, not vacuum. Non-vacuous existence means that the existents are non-vacuously extended. This means they have parts. Every part has parts too, ad libitum, because each part is extended. None of the parts is an infinitesimal. They can be near-infinitesimal. This character of existents is Extension, a Category directly implied by To Be.

Similarly, any extended being’s parts are active, moving. This implies that every part has impact on some others, not on infinite others. This character of existents is Change. No other implication of To Be is so primary as these. Hence, they are exhaustive.

Existence in Extension-Change is what we call Causality. If anything is existent, it is causal – hence Universal Causality is the trans-science physical-ontological Law of all existents. By the very concept of finite Extension-Change-wise existence it becomes clear that no finite space-time is absolutely dense with existents. Hence, existents cannot be mathematically continuous. Since there is change and transfer of impact, no existent can be absolutely discrete in its parts or in connection with others.

Can logic show the necessity of all existents being causal? We have already discussed how, ontologically, the very concept of To Be implies Extension-Change and thus also Universal Causality.

What about the ability or not of logic to conclude to Universal Causality? In my argument above and elsewhere showing Extension-Change as the very exhaustive meaning of To Be, I have used mostly only the first principles of ordinary logic, namely, Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and then argued that Extension-Change-wise existence is nothing but Universal Causality if everything existing is non-vacuous in existence. For example, does everything exist or not? If yes, let us call it non-vacuous existence. Hence, Extension as the first major implication of To Be. Non-vacuous means extended, because if not extended the existent is vacuous. If extended, everything has parts.

A point of addition now has been Change. It is, so to say, from experience. Thereafter I move to the meaning of Change basically as motion or impact. Naturally, everything in Extension must effect impacts. Everything has further parts. Hence, by implication from Change, everything causes changes by impacts. Thus, we conclude that Extension-Change-wise existence is Universal Causality. It is thus natural to claim that this is a pre-scientific Law of Existence.

In such foundational questions like To Be and its implications we need to use the first principles of logic, because these are the foundational notions of all science and no other derivative logical procedure comes in as handy. In short, logic with its fundamental principles can help derive Universal Causality. Thus, Causality is more primary to experience than the primitive notions of mathematics.

Do Merely Counterfactual Worlds Exist? Or, Are They a Logical and Analytic-Philosophical Eyewash?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Do_Merely_Counterfactual_Worlds_Exist_Or_Are_They_a_Logical_and_Analytic-Philosophical_Eyewash

The ontological notion of an object or even of an event in its unity forecloses consideration of the process nature of each such unity within, on par with interactions of such units with one another. (summarizing David Lewis, Parts of Classes, p. vii) This is very much the case in his counterfactual notion of existing worlds too.

THE FOLLOWING SORT OF PROCESSUAL THINKING IS WHAT IS ALMOST COMPLETELY ABSENT IN LINGUISTIC ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY:

All impact transfers within and between entities are extended-changing. Impact transfer is nothing but the activity called Causation. Existents are in extended-changing causal process. The relation of one impact transfer process towards the constitution of another is Causality. Hence, everything is in causal process. If anything non-causal exists, it must lose contact with causal processes and cannot be connected with anything else so to result from causal processes or non-causal processes.

That is, Causality is a derivative Category pertaining to all existents. It is derived from putting together Extension and Change. Causality (the relation) and causation (the action / activity) are act-based. In general, without direct reference to the causal aspect, and with direct reference to the entity-aspect, one can say denotatively: everything is an extended-changing process. (“Everything is in process” means adjectivally: “Everything is processual”) In fact, Causation and Processuality are interchangeable; the manner of definition alone differs. But a unit process is a set of cause and effect.

Richard Marker: One more point:

So far we have been speaking of the various laws of science / natural laws. Just one among them was causality. Now, if the very physical existence is Extension-Change-wise, and if Extension-Change-wise existence is itself Causality, then every existent must be causal. This is Universal Causality, and it becomes a pre-scientific Law. I call it a metaphysical / physical-ontological Law because IT IS THE LAW OF THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF BEING TAKEN AS PHYSICALLY EXISTENT. Extension and Change are the only and the exhaustive meanings of To Be. In that case, these two Categories must have a superior Categorial position in both philosophy and the sciences.

DOES LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY HAVE ANYTHING SO FOUNDATIONAL AS THESE?

Existents have some Activity and Stability. This is a fully physical fact. These two categories may be shown to be subservient to Extension-Change. Pure vacuum (non-existence) is absence of Activity and Stability. Thus, entities, irreducibly, are active-stable processes in Extension-Change. Physical entities / processes possess finite Activity and Stability. Activity and Stability together belong to Extension; and Activity and Stability together belong to Change too. That is, Stability is not merely about space; and Activity is not merely about time. But the tradition still seems to hold so. We consider Activity and Stability as sub-categories, because they are based on Extension-Change, which together add up to Universal Causality; and each unit of cause and effect is a process.

These are not Categories that belong to merely imaginary counterfactual situations. The Categories of Extension-Change and their sub-formulations are all about existents. There can be counterfactuals that signify cases that appertain existent processes. But separating these cases from useless logical talk is near to impossible in linguistic-analytically tending logic, philosophy, and philosophy of science.

Today physics and the various sciences do something like this in that they indulge in particularistically defined terms and procedures, blindly thinking that these can directly represent the physical processes under inquiry. Concerning mathematical applications too this is the majority attitude among scientists. Hence, without a very general physical ontology of Categories that are applicable to all existent processes, all sciences are in gross handicap.

The best examples are mathematical continuity and discreteness being attributed to physical processes, which are continuous and discrete only in their Causality. This is nothing but Extension-Change-wise discrete causal continuity. At any time causality is present in anything, hence there is causal continuity. But this is different from mathematical continuity and discreteness.

PLEASE SEE THIS CONVERSATION BETWEEN ME AND ANOTHER:

Andrew Powell added a reply

38 minutes ago

Sorry I did not reply earlier Raphael Neelamkavil Are you saying that there is something wrong or incomplete about the sense/reference distinction? Frege's view in my understanding is in the Kantian tradition that making a judgment involves synthesising content of a(n in general quantified) proposition and judging the content to be true or false, so that a proposition has sense (the synthesis) and reference (the objects True and False). I am not saying that view does not have problems, some of which stem from Frege's views on objects, but what is your alternative thesis? Personally I don't like "meaning is use", which can lead to abandoning truth altogether. I would much rather see a focus on programming languages and mathematics, where judgements can be stated with a clear semantics.

There is a sense in which humans do construct the world through language. We write computer programs, construct machines and generally change the world around us. Natural language is one way in which we communicate with other humans, and we use it to record our ideas and proposals. Is that idealism? Probably not because there is reason humans cannot sense the world the way it really is (particularly with the array of sensing equipment that is readily available for purchase).

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Raphael Neelamkavil added a reply

14 minutes ago

Andrew Powell,

Being able to state a clear semantics does not solve the problem. Even Frege did it in his own way, which today need not be accepted as such. But the direct-reference concept of objects that he has and hence also the concept of direct reference are not physical-ontologically to be granted as such, since the True / False system being used for quick-fix references and definitions like in the Fregean semantics are not unique. Not unique in the sense that any other more complex objects too may be referenced and defined in the same manner, and there is no reason why his reference system becomes unique.

For uniqueness, we need a manner of justification of the uniqueness of application of the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle in the special cases.

For this, we need an adequate ontology that not only fixes the problem of continuous change of theory and at the same time facilitates change of theory. I know this is difficult to understand at this level.

I believe that this is easy to understand from the viewpoint of a system in which the primary concepts of objects derive directly from the very concept of existence and existents. For more on this, please visit the other discussion sessions (questions) that I have put up here in RG and the continuing discussion generated by friends there.

MOST ANALYTIC THINKERS TAKE THEIR DISCIPLINE FOR HAVING BECOME A SCIENCE ITSELF. This is acceptable if their foundational principles are primarily scientific, and not primarily philosophical. Is this the case? Now, I presuppose that some readers might ask me, 'Who are you to criticize analytic philosophy?' I will only smile at them. My attitudes to analytic philosophy is not unique. I am not the one who can solve all problems in the world. But I try my little best.

(((As I was in MA philosophy, I was assigned as my course assignment paper topic [Course: Wittgenstein] a study of a certain concept in Wittgenstein. I wrote a detailed critique on that concept in Wittgenstein. After reading it, the prof (from a good Canadian Uni) asked me: Who are you to criticize Wittgenstein? We have not dared to do it! But I kept quiet because I would not have enough time to write on another topic. I knew he would give me very little points for this. It happened -- but at the final exam for the said course! But I was the one who helped almost of my companions in their assignments, and I knew the level of what I wrote. His reduced marks would not do me harm.)))

NOW TO LINGUISTIC IDEALISM:

The proponent/s of this new theory may or may not try or like to interact with me on this. But my arguments are very clear.

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Raphael Neelamkavil added a reply

8 minutes ago

Andrew Powell, please note also this important question: Can we include in one semantic meaning-determination as many other aspects of the concept of the object as possible? If the answer is No, then our duty is to inquire into ways of doing that....

IN:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Can_linguistic_idealism_the_position_that_language_determines_the_world_hold_in_any_sense_of_the_term_world_If_yes_in_which_sense/2

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Epistemology_of_Pushing_the_Systemic_Axioms_Ever_Backwards

The philosophy of language for Analytic Philosophers has been concerned with four central problems: the nature of meaning, language use, language cognition, and the relationship between language and reality.

Chuck A Arize, very good. But the relationship between language and reality being discussed by them has become reality in terms of terms and meanings in language, without seeking means of getting at reality. But on the other side they would also accept that math and science can very well get at reality directly!!!!!!!

Logically Complex and Systematic Language Analysis of the Sciences or of Experience Is Not Philosophy: For the above, denotative notions are recognized as interrelated by concatenation, which produces sensation, thought, language, etc., and their symbolic base. All of it (concatenations) is done in linguistic-analytic philosophies merely at the directly denotative meaning-stratum of symbols, notions, terms, sentences, scientific theories, and theories of the sciences.

Then they speak of being systematic from that level, which too is complex enough, but not metaphysically (physical-ontologically) fundamental enough. Logic can be very complex here, and systematic too. But this is no system that can involve Reality-in-total in its To Be. That is, not even attempts to demonstrate that analytic philosophy is not merely denotative at base would not save it.

How to philosophize? How to philosophize in the sciences?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_philosophize_How_to_philosophize_in_the_sciences

Scientific Metaphysical Categories beyond Heidegger

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Scientific_Metaphysical_Categories_beyond_Heidegger

Under the viewpoint of linguistic analytic phil, is it possible to differentiate between the general concept of freedom in the humanities and that in the physical sciences? Can these two sorts of the concept be synthesized into one? Or, is there human freedom at all, according the various schools of linguistic analysis?

Have you heard or read psychologists, neuroscientists, medical doctors, etc. discussing some symptoms and their causes? A book in psychology says: 'According to the bio-psycho-social approach in psychopathology, one mental disturbance CAN have many causes.' But a person trained and enthusiastic about philosophy (also of the philosophy of the sciences) would wonder why there should not be many causes, at least some of which one could seek to find....! Finding out "only the immediate, exact and unique cause" is not their work because any reason can tell us that nothing in this world has an exact cause.

This directs our attention to a basic nature of philosophy: Not that a philosopher should only generalize. But a philosopher should study any specific thing only in terms of the most generalizable notions. Here 'generality' does not directly indicate only abstraction. It demonstrates the viewpoint that philosophy always takes. Hence, speaking only of the linguistic formulation of notions and arguments, formulating arguments only of life-related events in order to prove general principles that belong to the whole of Reality, etc. are not philosophical. The philosophically trained reader can recognize which recent trends in philosophy I have in mind here.

A Trans-Pragmatic Truth Paradigm for Science, Technology, and Philosophy

https://www.researchgate.net/post/A_Trans-Pragmatic_Truth_Paradigm_for_Science_Technology_and_Philosophy

I have been revising this short discussion paper of mine in RG. It is an attempt to correct some basic attitudes in physics. Just now I have written an introduction to it. Please read it here. In a few days I shall upload the whole lead-text of this discussion for your reading and comments. Here please find only the introduction:

FOUNDATIONS OF AXIOMATIC PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

I get surprised each time when some physicists tell me that either the electromagnetic (EM) or the gravitational (G) or both the forms of energy do not exist, but are to be treated or expressed as waves or particles propagated from material objects that of course exist. Some of them put in all their energies to show that both EM and G are mere mathematical fields, and not physically existent fields of energy propagations from bodies.

This is similar in effect to Newton and his followers thinking honestly and religiously that gravitation and other energies are just miraculously non-bodily actions at a distance without any propagation particles / wavicles.

Even in the 21stcentury, we must be sharply aware that from the past more than 120 years the General Theory of Relativity and its various versions have succeeded in casting and maintaining the power of a terrifying veil of mathematical miracles on the minds of many scientists – miracles such as the mere spacetime curvature being the meaning of gravitation and all other sorts of fields.

A similar veil has been installed on the minds of many physicists by quantum physics too. We do not discuss it here. Hence, I have constructed in four published books a systemic manner of understanding these problems. I do not claim perfection in any of my attempts. Hence, I keep perfecting my efforts in the course of years. The following is a very short attempt to summarize in this effort one important point in physics and in the philosophy of physics.

How to Ground Science and Philosophy Together Axiomatically?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_Ground_Science_and_Philosophy_Together_Axiomatically

Symmetry: A Subset of Universal Causality. The Difference between Cause and Reason

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Symmetry_A_Subset_of_Universal_Causality_The_Difference_between_Cause_and_Reason

This discussion-text is just 2.5 pages, but intense. Meant for those who are interested in a clear presentation of what symmetry and symmetry breaking are, and of how physicists and mathematicians tend to misunderstand and/or misuse these concepts.

The Universally Causal context of the concept of symmetry is explained in terms of a solidly founded system of differentiation between cause and reason.

The Fallacies of Space, Time, and Spacetime in Physics

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Fallacies_of_Space_Time_and_Spacetime_in_Physics

Physical and Exact Sciences and Axiomatic Philosophy: Introducing Grounding (long text)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Physical_and_Exact_Sciences_and_Axiomatic_Philosophy_Introducing_Grounding_long_text

Causality and Statistics: Their Levels of Effect and of Explanation

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Causality_and_Statistics_Their_Levels_of_Effect_and_of_Explanation

Causality and Statistics: Their Levels of Effect and of Explanation

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Causality_and_Statistics_Their_Levels_of_Effect_and_of_Explanation

Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Non-Locality: Is Einstein a Monist?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen_Paradox_and_Non-Locality_Is_Einstein_a_Monist

The Fate of “Source-Independence” in Electromagnetism, Gravitation, and Monopoles

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Fate_of_Source-Independence_in_Electromagnetism_Gravitation_and_Monopoles

If anyone wants to read about a fantastic concept of the existence of consciousness and non-existence of the cosmos, see the comments till today here, by L Kurt Engelhart.......!!! Here you can learn the meaning of solipsism.... similar to mathematical platonism creating ideas / notions into objects.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_philosophize_How_to_philosophize_in_the_sciences

Essential Reason in Physicists’ Use of Logic: And in Other Sciences Too!

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Essential_Reason_in_Physicists_Use_of_Logic_And_in_Other_Sciences_Too

Preprint ESSENTIAL REASON IN PHYSICISTS' USE OF LOGIC: IN OTHER SCIENCES TOO

How Does Physics Know? The Epistemology Presupposed by Physics and Other Sciences

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_Does_Physics_Know_The_Epistemology_Presupposed_by_Physics_and_Other_Sciences

Preprint MATHEMATICAL SOURCE OF FLAWS IN COSMOLOGICAL THEORIES: MATHE...

Preprint THE EPISTEMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES R...

PHYSICAL-PROCESSUAL REPRESENTATION OF IRRATIONAL NUMBERS

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Physical-Processual_Representation_of_Irrational_Numbers

THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS

3.1. Traditional Physical Categories

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Ontology_behind_Physics

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Grounded_Physical-Ontological_Categories_behind_Physics

Grounded (New) Physical-Ontological Categories behind Physics

Preprint THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS: CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL PHYSICA...

A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS: Beyond the Two Millennia

https://www.researchgate.net/post/A_SIMPLE_GAME-CHANGER_CAUSALITY_FOR_PHYSICS_Beyond_the_Two_Millennia

https://www.researchgate.net/post/DEFINITION_OF_THE_ONTOLOGY_BEHIND_PHYSICS_5_Paragraphs

DEFINITION OF THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS (5 Paragraphs)

THE ANOMALY IN MATHEMATICAL / THEORETICAL PHYSICS (Short Text)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_ANOMALY_IN_MATHEMATICAL_THEORETICAL_PHYSICS_Short_Text

Here a serious and somewhat complex matter to discuss:

NON-FOUNDATIONS OF ‘WAVICLES’ IN EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PARADOX: Bases for Quantum Physics to Evolve (Maybe a physical-ontological Breakthrough)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/NON-FOUNDATIONS_OF_WAVICLES_IN_EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN_PARADOX_Bases_for_Quantum_Physics_to_Evolve_Maybe_a_physical-ontological_Breakthrough

Preprint A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS Beyond the Two Millennia

AGAINST COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION, etc.: A Critique of Identity, Simultaneity, Cosmic Repetition / Recycling, etc.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/AGAINST_COSMIC_ISOTROPY_CONFORMAL_CYCLIC_COSMOS_ETERNAL_INFLATION_etc_A_Critique_of_Identity_Simultaneity_Cosmic_Repetition_Recycling_etc

Preprint ESSENTIAL LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS, ...

WHAT IS THE MYSTERIOUS STUFF OF INFORMATION? A Short but Clear Definition

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_THE_MYSTERIOUS_STUFF_OF_INFORMATION_A_Short_but_Clear_Definition

Preprint COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION:...

THE PLANCK ERA / QUANTUM ERA and “DISAPPEARANCE” OF PHYSICAL CAUSALITY: “OMNIPOTENCE” OF MATHEMATICS

https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_PLANCK_ERA_QUANTUM_ERA_and_DISAPPEARANCE_OF_PHYSICAL_CAUSALITY_OMNIPOTENCE_OF_MATHEMATICS

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Preprint CAUSAL HORIZONAL RESEARCH: A METHODOLOGY IN PHYSICS Raphael ...

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_INFORMATION_WHAT_IS_ITS_CAUSAL_OR_NON-CAUSAL_CORE_A_Discussion

https://www.researchgate.net/post/LINGUISTIC_HERESY_BEHIND_SELF-ORGANIZATION_SELF-REFERENCE_INTENTIONALITY_PHYSICAL_AND_BIOLOGICAL_SELF-INTERACTION_etc

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Preprint LINGUISTIC HERESY OF DENOTATIVE ABSOLUTISM: PHYSICAL-BIOLOGI...

https://www.researchgate.net/post/ONTOLOGICAL_DIFFERENCES_OF_CHARACTERISTICS_OF_ARTIFICIAL_AND_BIOLOGICAL_INTELLIGENCE_ALGORITHMS_AND_PROCEDURES_Against_Exaggerations

“If perception is input from the world to the mind and action is output from the mind to the world, then the mind as distinct from the world is what the input is to and what the output is from. So, despite the web of causal relations between organisms and environments, we suppose the mind must be in a separate place, within some boundary that sets it apart from the world.” [Susan L. Hurley, Consciousness in Action, 1998: 2]

And can consciousness / mind be of the same status as information? I doubt.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHY_EXACTLY_THE_WAVE-PARTICLE_DUALITY_Phenomenal_Ontological_Commitment_POC_as_the_Solution

https://www.researchgate.net/post/UNTENABLE_REIFICATION_OF_CONCEPTS_IN_PHYSICS_With_Examples

https://www.researchgate.net/post/DOES_CONSCIOUSNESS_EXIST_OR_IS_IT_LIKE_INFORMATION_A_Very_Short_Text_for_Discussion

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