In my opinion, more than 70% of strong academic departments of philosophy have concentration on linguistic-analytic philosophy in some or another way. We cannot say that this school is perfect. What are its defects? How to improve its foundations?
To improve the foundations of linguistic-analytic philosophy, one possible approach would be to integrate insights and methods from other philosophical traditions, such as phenomenology, existentialism, and critical race theory. Additionally, expanding the scope of analysis beyond language and logic to other aspects of human experience could provide a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the world. To address the criticism of over-reliance on language, it may also be helpful to consider alternative forms of communication, such as art or embodied practices, in philosophical inquiry.
Regards,
Ajit Singh, thanks. I do agree with you to some extent. One difficulty to be pointed out is this: absorbing other forms of communications like art, embodied practices, etc. will not be easy, because philosophy (and the sciences) are intellectual work today, not Wisdom work. Now, to convert phil into a Wisdom work, we need to begin with intellectual work, continue with all these absorption points (like art, etc.) in an intellectual manner, and thus show the way to Wisdom as an intellectually valid mode of vision. This is the most difficult thing with respect to linguistic analytic phil...!
The proposed solution is to begin with intellectual work, continue with absorption of other forms of communication in an intellectual manner, and ultimately show the way to Wisdom as a valid mode of vision. However, the text notes that this is a challenging task when it comes to linguistic analytic philosophy.
Exactly because linguistic philosophies of all sorts convert linguistic and logical analysis into a kind of directly empirical science. But philosophy is an indirectly empirical science.
The self-approval that linguistic analytic philosophers give their own peers is for this reason. And they do also feel the pleasure of attempting to convert this school of philosophy into a science. In this manner they will get better funding from agencies, the industry, and governments, than other schools of philosophy! This is especially the case in the West.
Note also that analytic philosophy possesses only a metaphysics that treats of token entities and natural kinds of existents (which are otherwise processes), and not of Reality-in-total. Hence, analytic philosophy is a minor player in the explanation of Reality-in-total in terms of the Cateories that pertain to Reality-in-total, and not merely to tokens and natural kinds!
Please note that science in itself, or analytic philosophy becoming a science, is not bad in itself. But what about the difference between philosophy and science? At least as the agency for clarification of the theoretical foundations, methdologies, etc. of science, philosophy has a great value. In that case, no philosophy can be merely a pragmatic science. This is the aspect of Wisdom that I mentioned above.
Is it possible for a philosophy to define terms merely linguistically, according to its common use, without involving in the definition the physical and biologically physical processes that the terms represent? For example, definitions that determine the truth of a statement without recourse to the physical process that the statement represents!
I think it is impossible to define Causality in linguistic analytic philosophy. Whatever definition is given, it will strictly be an analysis of the language being used to explain what is causality. Some might claim that this criticism presupposes the old understanding of linguistic analytic philosophy. What then would be the new definition of the same?
What about the nature of the logic that linguistic-analytic philosophy sustains and uses? Is it the same as what logicians use, or different, at least in the foundations of logic?
Of course, projected as the method of all thought, logic seems to be unique and defined.
But in actual practice the definition and use of the foundational principles of logic in the various scientific disciplines and in various philosophical schools differ.
Moreover, the manner in which the sub-disciplines and sub-schools of the sciences and philosophy connect their versions of logic with the material object of research in these sub-disciplines seem to differ.
This difference, in my opinion, is due to (1) the difference of their perception of the suitability of the foundational principles and methods of logic and (2) the perceived level of applicability of such logical principles and methods to the material objects of the said sub-sciences and sub-philosophies.
IS IT POSSIBLE TO CHARACTERIZE LOGIC VIA THESE APPLICABILITY CONSTRAINTS OR VICE VERSA? CAN THIS SORT OF ALTERATIONS AFFECT ALSO THE LOGIC OF LINGUISTIC-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?
Friends, if possible put this question to analytic philosophers too. Their responses and critiques are important for the project of IMAGINING THE POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY CHANGES IN LINGUISTIC-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE FUTURE.
If any of you finds time, please take a look at the discussion between me and Jean-Louis Boucon in Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/s/084b0465db?source=work
It is not good to cite the whole conversation here. Too long!
Salvador Daniel Escobedo, thanks for the recommendation. If possible, please do also express your opinions. Please feel free.
Dear Raphael Neelamkavil
Thanks for the invitation.
In my opinion analytic philosophy has a main problem since its foundation by Moore. It is the excessive attention to language as an object of philosophical inquiry, reducing philosophy to the activity of "elucidation of language", as the second Wittgenstein pretended. I do not think like Karl Jaspers that "language is not of the incumbency of the philosopher". But I do think that analytic philosophy overestimates somehow the importance of it. For a rude comparison, I can't imagine physics spending much time in the analysis of the language in order to understand the physical reality. It wont render much progress, I guess.
Of course, some schools have attenuated this problems since the last century, but still I feel same attachment. Most of the problems discussed now are related somehow to language (theory of reference and theory of mind). Perhaps a synthesis with other philosophical approaches would result in progress for analytic philosophy, if it is done in the right way.
Salvador Daniel Escobedo, I liked your comment.
Let me put down here a set of paradigms.
(1) One way to start thinking of experience is as experience, without admitting the existence of "somethings" out there, not existing exactly as we define and attribute qualities to; and hence without thinking equally well -- and making ways to think so -- of the status of the objects of experience as objects out there.
In this manner of thinking, we have many philosophies -- all of which are the various shades of empiricism. Linguistic-analytic philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics etc. in recent history belong to this.
And even when they admit of the thinghood of things, this is being done as the experientially defined or presupposed substantiality of things as objects. They do not delve into the flux nature of these objects as "somethings with processuality". They may admit the processuality of these things out there, but they do not make space in their theory speak of them as processes always, without over-stressing their experience-based expression by humans.
(2) On the other hand, the sciences do not want to express experience in an experience-based manner, but instead, in terms of the things out there, ignoring the experience-based nature of the ways of expression, ways of definition, and ways of explanation that we have.
Mostly they are in the delirium wherein they take the objectuality of the objects of experience as somewhat purely substantial for all purposes, thus missing the processual nature of the objects completely and missing the experience-based nature of expression, definition, and explanation completely.
This is the case even in quantum physics, where the physicist is in a fix as to what to speak of the indeterminacy and locality of quanta. They get immersed in the statistical and linguistic inability of experience to express, define, and explain the difference between substances and processes.
(3) And take the case of the few philosophers of physics like A. N. Whitehead. He is today an old-school person due to the passage of time between him and us. But his effort to processualize everything existent and his insistence not to take the merely experiential manner of expression, definition, and explanation -- are noteworthy.
He and a few others seem to have taken the existence of the objects of experience seriously, as being independent of experience and its instruments, namely, language, interpretation, ideas, etc.
The sad state of linguistic-analaytic philosophy today is this: Even while speaking of existent things, they just want to stick to the linguistic stance. A pity! But the pride with which they do it, as if they have the power to dominate all philosophy, is symptomatic. It makes them look down upon all other philosophies, not permit space for others to critique them, or at least take some opportunity to grow in the academic circles.
They do also suppose that their school of philosophy has become a science as such, since the science-similarity that it has achieved due to the linguistic and logical manipulations they have achieved.
WHAT DO YOU FEEL OF THIS?
Dear Raphael Neelamkavil
Great comments on the actual situation of philosophy.
You touched a lot of points, but I will try to respond to the core of your reply.
For (1), yes, there is a artificial lack of "metaphysics" in the concepts of the analytic philosophers. And I said it is artificial because it hard to constantly avoid the natural tendency of experience to grasp the external object. I want to believe that the reason is that as the thinghood of things overflows the language, it cannot be studied with the same linguistic tools that they traditionally use. It's not fancy.
However that philosophical position has an historical explanation too.
On the other side (2) you have the scientific point of view that is frequently naïve regarding the substantiality of the objects. In my opinion this problem also has historical roots. It is the result of a constant conflict between science and philosophy. Scientists disregarded philosophy for long time, and some of them still doing it.
(1) and (2) are opposite worlds, but they share the language of logic and formalization methods, and that is related to your final comments.
I remember being in a congress where an analyst philosopher was talking about the marvels of analytic philosophy and how many developments could be used in physics there and there,... I asked him for a particular case where analytical philosophy would made a relevant contribution to physics. He could not mention a single one.
Analytic philosophy is weirdly sterile outside the realm of language, and that is something noticeable when you have so many sophisticated tools, and the reason is because what you were talking at (1).
About the pride... tell me about that! Some days ago I had a long discussion with an analytic epistemologist; clearly he was very proud of his h index (I wont say his name to protect his reputation). He wanted me to accept some definitions by authority, and as reply to my objections I got a lot of ad hominem arguments and the same ideas explained over and over again. As you can imagine, the discussion didn't end very friendly. In his last reply he stated that he has discussed those topics with Quine, before he dies.
-Big deal! I also would not agree with Quine!
Is needless to say that not all analytical philosophers are like that. But it is true that is a common attitude among them.
I will stop my reply here, but a lot about this can be written.
Salvador Daniel Escobedo, your point, that it is almost impossible to find an area in which analytic philosophy has or can contribute anything to physics, is really valid.
ANOTHER INTERESTING PROBLEMATIC AREA IN LINGUISTIC ANALYTIC PHIL:
The directly representational attempt by words. Frege has done this into a methodological science as he tried to found mathematics and logic in mere representationalism! That is what gave impetus to Russell and Moore, and then to Wittgenstein and his followers. Many philosopher-linguists of polish origin followed suit, although the Germans and many others were late entrants.
When they use a term, make it to represent an object, state of affairs, quality, set of qualities, etc., the metaphysical power of continuous but never-ending fathomability of (1) the meaning of words and (2) the explanatory reality achievable therewith, into the real nature of objects as finitely active and finitely stable processes, is being ended artificially.
This is one possible explanation of what you mentioned above as the artificial absence of metaphysics. Just as I read it now, I thought I will contribute this as one possible explanation.
In fact, I want to write one whole book on such matters, but now there are other projects running, and other studies to do too.
In fact, I have already started a work on Grounding Physics, Analytic Metaphysics, Language, and Social Science. it consists mostly of my own arguments. Citing from relevant authors and scientists and commenting further is always a later thing for me while writing a book or article.
I have left it for the time at about 150 pages, since another is currently on, on Causality in Physics, AI, Language, and Mind: Process Metaphysics of Space-Time, Unobservables, Universals, and Virtual Possible Worlds.
I think this our discussion could go on. We shall try each time to contribute new points and their explanations. I think this might create some awareness. I am mainly into the philosophy of physics, especially into its metaphysics. It is in this context that I approach linguistic-analytic philosophy.
Raphael Neelamkavil your research looks very interesting.
I have to say that we are in the same pursue, because my research approach is very similar.
For years I've been working in a philosophical formalization of ontology, but without the restrictions of analytic philosophy. Mereology and ontology of physics are the research lines that are the most interesting to me.
I am convinced of the possibility of a realistic-analytic philosophy (taking realistic not naïvely), that would actually synthesize the valuable propositions from classic philosophy, and put them into a formal rigorous framework. Noticing however that the formal models are just that, formal models. The important part is the underlaying ideas.
Language and logic also need to receive attention, but not all spotlights are for them.
One of the challenges is to find actually relevant results; my experience on this research makes me to be optimist in this regard.
Cosmology is also a target to me, also the study of causality, but by now I am working on the concept of movement advancing towards an Ontology of General Relativity.
After all, what many philosophers were tiring to find, is the philosophical method similar to that of mathematics and geometry. The Mathematica Universalis that Leibniz dreamed probably doesn't exist (nether for Physics), but a fix for analytical philosophy is possible for sure.
Salvador Daniel Escobedo, I find your comments very agreeable. Although not directly connected to our theme of discussion, I paraphrase here a physical-ontological direction that I have taken in my 2018 book in Germany, which was my second doctoral work.
In what follows, I suggest a slightly generalized shape of physical-ontological assumptions behind any cosmology in such a way that linguistic limitations can be bridged, at least to an extent, from obscuring the foundations of physics. HERE IS THE FIRST OF SUCH SUGGESTIONS (FOLLOWED BY A SECOND ONE, WHICH WAS FORMULATED AS A REPLY TO SOME QUESTIONS AND CRITIQUES BY A SCHOLAR IN RG -- BUT A STANCE WHICH I HAVE ASSUMED IN MY WORK OF 2018):
(1) I think the parameters to be assumed in a unified theory OF THE MANY THEORIES OF THE UNIVERSE will in any case be different from those of ordinary physics. Such a unification might need slightly different starting points or assumptions.
I have the following suggestion. Not elaborate enough to meet all possible questions on this, but a suggestion. WILL THESE DO ANY GOOD FOR THE FUTURE OF COSMOLOGY, IN TERMS OF FIXING THE ASSUMPTIONS AND FIRST PRINCIPLES OF COSMOLOGY?
Experimentally, observationally, and observational-theoretically, some of the generalizations of any physical ontology of cosmology may, strictly speaking, be non-verifiable and non-falsifiable.
But the empirical method of the sciences is continuous with the theoretical. Both, together, form part of "reason". Please note also this: Reason is not equivalent to logic. There are many sorts of logic. Reason is the general set, and the various logics are sub-sets or members.
From this viewpoint, would you admit that there seems to be the possibility of obtaining SOME REASON from the suggestion that a physical ontology of cosmology be constructed?
I have developed an MMM (maximal-medial-minimal) method, where the approachable values are zero, finite, and infinite -- all others being strictly of the realm of positive sciences. Zero, finitude, and infinity may be available in the positive sciences. But in the case of zero and infinity, the attitude is that of limiting values.
Finitude is a general term. In the positive sciences there must be specific values, not generally finite values!
Of course, we do not know of infinite values in the strictest sense of the term. But on the same count we do not also know zero value except as the absence of WHAT WE CONSIDER at a given instance.
I feel that a sort of "axiomatization" is perhaps possible -- at least as a physical ontology of the cosmos.
FROM WITHIN SUCH A THEORY, PERHAPS A UNIFICATION IS THINKABLE.
(2)
K S (the name of the person), let me first answer the 4 questions you asked. And on another day I will speak of a fifth, more important, question, which you did not ask me. ((This is yet to be formulated.)) I have written down as my thoughts proceeded. I did not take a second look at these paragraphs I wrote. Merely due to lack of time.
YOU:
My FIRST question is this:
CAN WE ASK THE PERENNIAL QUESTION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE COSMOS?
=== As long as we first ask whether there needs to be an origin. The question contains an assumption, leading the witness.
MY REPLY:
Why should there be anything wrong in asking the perennial question? The assumption could be conceived slightly differently too: If the inner-universe processes are all in Extension and Change and if such an existence of all existents may straightaway be termed Universal Causality, then we may ask whether the whole universe has (I) only finite content or (II) infinite content.
Then, in each case, the following inductions (not presuppositions) could be placed as queries.
Under (I), whether the finite-content universe is created or existent from eternity.
Under case (II), the following would be the sub-cases: the universe could have been (1) existent eternally from the past, (2) created wholly at one go, (3) been created partly at any given time with respect to the time of the universes that neighbour the one being created, (4) been created as matter or energy or matter-energy everywhere but finitely at every finite spacetime region, and so on.
SECONDLY, another question is imaginable:
If there is no creative Source in both the above cases of finite and infinite content, WHAT WOULD MEAN BY ETERNAL EXISTENCE?
=== No such thing in that case. And it would cease to exist to a spawned cosmos once the latter left the nest.
MY REPLY:
I do not understand what you mean by “a spawned cosmos” and “once the latter left the nest”. These are strange for me.
In case the finite-content universe or the infinite-content cosmos were existent from eternity, they would simply continue to exist! This is the apparent conclusion. But if further questions are asked?
For example, in any case, merely because we have formulated a few laws of thermodynamics on earth, the finite-content universe need not obey the second law by bring back all that energy at the outermost fringes of such a universe. What has been propagated is propagated and goes farther away.
If a later intensification of gravitation at the centre of the universe could have brought all those gravitational and non-gravitational propagations back into the body of the universe, it would be a miracle.
That is, most probably the energy at the fringes is lost forever. IF THIS IS TRUE, there is energy loss from the universe. If the universe had been uncreated, then the (by assumption above) finite-content universe would have exteriorized all its content in a finite time, and this is not the case as we know. In this scenario, in my opinion, a sole, finite-content, universe should have had a one-time creation. (I do not elaborate on this because of space crunch. If sensible questions from the readers appear further, I can try answering.)
NOW, A REQUEST TO THE READERS: (not only to Karl Sipfle; but I know Karl respects me enough as a human person who cannot answer everything in the world) PLEASE DO NOT ACCUSE ME OF HOLDING ANTIQUATED IDEAS. BEFORE ACCUSING, PLEASE READ MY BOOK OF 2018.
In place here one more suggestion to all the readers here: Just reading something there and making all sorts of claims and criticisms is not acceptable, because that work is the result of more than 30 years of study and reflection. (It is a new theory, for which I have undergone inexplicable sorts of misunderstanding from hundreds of friends, and as a result, I had to decide to do such a work as a doctoral work, and suffer poverty and penury for more than a decade, in Europe, i.e., away from my motherland. I hope, time will show the worth of that work.)
THIRDLY:
Can this question be avoided permanently by claiming that TIME AND ETERNITY EXIST ONLY WITH THE COSMOS, as if time were a thing that exists, or were an ontological predicate of the cosmos?
=== Arising quickly is recognizing other possibility spheres, a set of interrelated consents no with relationships to other spheres. Time appears to be local to and exist within one or more of these.
MY REPLY:
This question has been in vogue in philosophy at least from the time of Augustine. Of course, before Augustine too. But his refutation of the question by saying time did not exist before creation was motivated also by his concept of a timeless God which in turn was motivated by Platonic concepts of Ideas existing as timeless out there and most probably in the human mind, and hence permitting the conclusion that the human soul too is immortally existent…!
First of all, the ontological predicate / Category of time is Change. Time is only the measuremental, i.e., epistemic and cognitive category based on measurements. But Change is there as one of the most important two physical-ontological attributes of all existents. Extension is yet another. Without some extension and change, nothing can be. That is, without being causal, nothing can exist. Time is not a thing in which the universe exists. It is not even a physical-ontological attribute. It is merely epistemic. Similarly also space: it is the measuremental, epistemic, cognitive category of the physical-ontological Category, Extension.
Hence, TO CLAIM THAT PHYSICALLY AND MATHEMATICALLY THERE ARE ONLY SPACETIME CURVATURES AND NOT EXISTENT PHYSICAL PROCESSES IS A NONSENSE PERPETUATED BY EINSTEIN AND CO. BY THEIR QUICK-FIX ATTEMPTS TO MAKE THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY CONVINCED OF THE VALUE OF RIEMANNIAN GEOMETRY.
Time is local only measurementally. Change is local and universal in all physical-ontological senses.
NOW, YOU HAVE LEFT OUT ANOTHER CASE: IF THE UNIVERSE IS A VAST INFINITE OCEAN OF AN INFINITE NUMBER OF FINITE-CONTENT UNIVERSES? You did not ask this question. But my lead question includes that. Hence, I will treat of it later, after dealing with your next question.
FOURTHLY:
Suppose there is a Source. What would be the modalities by which such a Being could be thought to exist?
=== The simplest two options are a peer universe from which one under discussion was born, or a common background birthing all and wisper than any of them.
MY REPLY:
The simplest answer does not seem to be a peer universe creating ours. It will muddle the whole thought in paradoxes. Universes have only finite activity, and finite stability in the state of its finite activity. They cannot, in my opinion, create another or others from themselves and render them of as much or less or more matter-energy content than itself. And if this were possible each universe has already created an infinite number of such, which is creation out of nothing by the same finite-content and finite-activity-and-stability universes. This is at least rationally unacceptable.
If anyone wants to go on with this belief, it is like the faith in a god who just created once and is sitting idle “watching” the fun. It is against such a god that greats like Russell, Wittgenstein, Hawking, Dawkins, etc. have been ranting. Take any of their writings and you will find the background knowledge of such a god in them.
Corcoran characterizes pragmatic philosophies with the following general points within their outlook:
(1) The meaning of a proposition is to be identified with its experimental and practical meaning, i.e. with the totality of possible experience it predicts. (2) The truth of a proposition consists in the long-term realization (past, present, and future) of its meaning. (3) Belief in the truth of a proposition is warranted to the extent that it has been tested in practice and found to be satisfactory (by the person or community having the belief). [Corcoran 2019]
The one thing that Corcoran does not mention (nor does any other logician, scientist, or thinker so far, as my knowledge goes) is that pragmatists never include under ‘propositions’ the foundational propositions of systems. My question here is about the propositions in the form of possible pan-disciplinary foundational principles for all sciences and philosophy together. Pragmatic kinds of definition of the demands of ‘practical’ meaning, prediction, etc. are not to be found useful or realizable at the propositional formulations of the foundational Categories or of other first principles.
Not that no pragmatism is accessed to while attempting to find the foundational Categories of all sciences and philosophy. But the said kind of Categories have the least pragmatism at use. Before laughing at the attempt, one should at least recognize that such an attempt aims to reduce the element of pragmatism from science, thought and life.
Moreover, realization of the “working” demand as the condition for anything to possess rationality has been misused by sciences, technologies, cultures, and human individuals everywhere as a part-licence to justify what they have already been doing. Such pragmatism, encountered consistently everywhere, in all strata of human action, science, philosophy, society, etc., works for me as the major academic trigger to reflections on, and to plan an exciting but base-level reform of, the foundations of thought, sciences, and humanities – of course in the simple manner that I can. If such pragmatism were in principle an unexceptionally insuperable human fate, no science and thought would have grown in the foundations, methods, and results, the sciences as it was centuries ago would have sufficed for the human race today; and no other, more general, thinking would have taken shape and would exist.
Unfortunately for the various shades of pragmatism in scientistic thinking and its practice on human feeling, thinking, bodies, lives, society, politics, and finally on humanity as such and the environment, there does exist thought that is or attempts to be more general than the sciences. Would I be permitted to try the same in a different manner? Their very existence in whatever meagre capacity invalidates the lethargic conclusion and claim that pragmatism is an insuperable fate of humans. I do not now theorize on the unethical and inhuman aspects of pragmatic practices!
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Which_principles_of_logic_are_universal_And_why
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Acts_of_Feeling_Acts_of_Emotion_Thought_Epistemology_Value_Epistemology-Methodological_Foundations_for_New_Philosophy_Sciences_Institutions
Dear Raphael Neelamkavil
Very interesting dialogue with K. S.
As you know I am especially interested in the ontology of change and movement, and time is also a closely related concept. Your claim that time is epistemic is well founded. Those ideas (as you certainly know) have been around for a while. In the meddle age the concept of time as the measure of movement was already used (see for example Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ist, Q 46, 1).
From my point of view this is a very important notion for modern physics, since the problem of simultaneity in general relativity is related with the confusion of getting an ontological concept (simultaneity) defined by an epistemic concept (time). The problem of simultaneity in GR is an example where a ontological-analytical philosophy could give a satisfactory solution.
Salvador Daniel Escobedo, I admire your ability to perceive the implications of these notions. You have a strong academic future.
I have been reflecting on further elaborating the physical ontology of the concepts of the physical-ontological Categories of Extension and Change as the only and exhaustive implications of To Be. This, in my opinion, is new because all these millennia of metaphysics have been affirming To Be (defectively, "Being") as just To Be and implying nothing or everything -- thus rendering everything very volatile in thought.
Secondly, I am of the opinion that many physical paradoxes in Cosmology, GTR, QM, Statistical Physics, etc. can find conceptual solace in the said two Categories.
Please know also that I do not rest complacent assuming that my ideas are perfect or that they solve every problem. I keep myself open to critiques, especially if they are suggestive of broadening and deepening (in short, adequating) these concepts to further unthought realities and problems.
If any thought system takes Reality in terms of mind or of any mental product -- however direct or indirect a mental product it is --, that system of thinking must end somehow. This is a necessity of human experience.
Hence, linguistic philosophy must end someday in finding no takers. Why not precipitate the process?
Perceptive / cognitive / epistemic activities do not create the individuality of groups of processual entities. Individuality of any level is just processual, beyond all that minds are and create. Minds themselves, as processes with certain processual individuality, have their reality not because they are minds or due to the productes of minds.
Hence, any philosophy and science that make reality (instead of making the discourse of reality) to depend on thought, language, and symbols, even on mathematics and logic, do not do genuine philosophy and science.
The processually constructed and connected individuality of existents can merely be made to reflect in thought, language, symbols, mathematics, and logic. The discourse on this activity of reflecting too is not capable of constructing reality expect by indirectly insinuating the processes that cause the said activity.
The mistake of linguistic philosophy is to UNCONSCIOUSLY ACCEPT THE NATURE YIELDED BY THE REFLECTIVE ACTIVITY OF LANGUAGE AS IF THE REFLECTION WOULD REFLECT REALITY DIRECTLY AS GIVEN IN WORDS, TERMS, DEFINITIONS, ETC.
The localization of anything -- including the minds / persons that cognize -- has so far been done in terms of the epistemic / cognitive / mental categories of space and time, and then space and time have been attributed as such to existent processes as if they were existent in space and time.
The question of localizability in the sciences is coupled with the measuremental aspects of cognized location. Hence, space and time continue to be physical-ontological categories. But the paradox of attributing epistemic categories to existent things / processes continues to baffle all.
Hence, we need primarily the physical-ontological Categories: Extension and Change, and secondarily also the epistemic categories parallel to them, i.e., space and time.
Existence in Extension (having parts) and Change (causing impacts) is itself causality, because only extended things and their parts can impact any other.
Now, if a portion of Causality is understandable as the very freedom that some beings exercise, then freedom is the ever growing distance from certain naural influences due to the intensification of certain types of activities in the subject. That is, this too is causation, but in a slightly different sense, and free actions are fully causal actions -- with the only difference that the causation in such cases of certain actions are induced more from within the subject's actions than from outside.
If such is freedom, then freedom is fully causal. This fact might cause the oft-hoped-for integration of the various sciences together into parts of one and the same scientific (and philosophical) enterprise.
It is here that the possibility of epistemic possibilization of physical ontology appears necessary.
If our language is so important as the meanings, definitions, and theories of things outside, then the symbols, sounds etc. of animals must, for them, be important as the meanings, definitions, and theories of things outside.
There is much difference between the two sorts of language, but only a finite difference. Hence, our formulations are not very good representations of reality outside.
Hence, the only solution we have is to formulate realities in their processual aspects AS BEST AS POSSIBLE AND THAT TOO CONTINUOUSLY. So, linguistic philosophy, mathematics, logic, etc. need to find a manner of continuous augmentation of their meanings. HENCE, STRICT DEFINITIONS AS BEING FIXED AND USED IN LOGIC BY LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY SHOULD BE OVERHAULED.
MATHEMATICAL CONTINUITY IN NATURE Vs. CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN (PARTIALLY) DISCRETE "PROCESSUAL" OBJECTS. (Have patience to read till the end.)
Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature is a mere idealization. It expects nature to obey our idealization. This is what happens in all physical and cosmological (and of course other) sciences as long as they use mathematical idealizations to represent existent objects and processes.
But mathematically following nature in whatever it is in its part-processes is a different procedure in science and philosophy (and even in the arts and humanities). This theoretical attitude accepts the existence of processual entities as what they are.
This theoretical attitude accepts in a highly generalized manner that
(1) mathematical continuity (in any theory and in terms of any amount of axiomatization of physical theories) is totally non-realizable in nature as a whole and in its parts: because the necessity of mathematical approval in such a cosmology falls short miserably,
(2) absolute discreteness (even QM type, based on the Planck constant) in the physical cosmos (not in non-quantifiable “possible worlds”) and its parts is a mere commonsense compartmentalization (from the "epistemology of box-type thinking" -- Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Uni-Paderborn): because the aspect of the causally processual connection between any two quanta is logically and mathematically alienated in the physical theory of Planck’s constant, and
(3) hence, the only viable and thus the most reasonably generalizable manner of being of the physical cosmos and of biological entities is that of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS.
PHYSICS and COSMOLOGY even today tend to make the cosmos mathematically either continuous or defectively discrete or statistically oriented to epistemically logical decisions and determinations. Can anyone suggest here the existence of a different sort of physics and cosmology until today? A topology and mereology of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS, fully free of discreteness-oriented category theory and functional analysis, is yet to be born. Hence, causality in its deep roots in the very concept of To Be is yet alien to physics and cosmology till today.
LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY and even its more recent causalist child, namely, DISPOSITIONALIST ONTOLOGY are (1) overly discrete about “entities” without clearly reconciling the geometrical tendency to make every physical representation continuous, (2) comatose about the impossibility of linguistically definitional approach to the logical demands of existent physical objects without first analyzing and resolving the metaphysical implications of existent objects being irreducibly in EXTENSION and CHANGE, and (3) unable to get at the causally continuous nature of the partially discrete processual objects in the physical world.
PHENOMENOLOGY has done a lot to show the conceptual structures of ordinary reasoning, physical reasoning, mathematical and logical thinking, and reasoning in the human sciences. But due to its lack of commitment to building a physical ontology of the cosmos and its purpose as a research methodology, phenomenology has failed to show the nature of causal continuity (instead of mathematical continuity) in the only physically existent objects, namely processually discrete objects, in nature.
HERMENEUTICS has just followed the human-scientific aspect of Husserlian phenomenology and projected it. Hence, it was no contender to accomplish the fete.
POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHIES qualified all science and philosophy as being perniciously cursed to be “modernistic” – by thus monsterizing all compartmentalization, rules, laws, axiomatization, discovery of regularities in nature, logical rigidity, etc. as an insurmountable curse of knowing and as a synonym for all that are unapproachable in science and thought.
THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE SCIENCES seem today to follow the beaten paths of linguistic-analytic philosophy, physics, mathematics, and logic, which lack a FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPT OF CAUSALLY PROCESSUAL PHYSICAL EXISTENCE.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematical_Continuity_in_Nature_Vs_Causal_Continuity_between_Partially_Discrete_Processual_Objects_Have_patience_to_read_till_the_end
MATHEMATICS AND CAUSALITY:
A SYSTEMIC RECONCILIATION
Raphael Neelamkavil
What are the bases of the problem of incompatibility of causality with mathematics and its applications? I suggest that it is the dichotomy between mathematical continuity and discreteness on the one hand and the incompatibility of applying any of them directly on the data collected / collectible from some layers of phenomena from some layers of nature. I clearly point at the avoidance, by expressions like ‘from some layers of phenomena from some layers of nature’, of the centuries of epistemological foolishness, because this is the point at which phrases and statements involving ‘data from observation’, ‘data from phenomena’, ‘data from nature’ etc. are very gross, without epistemological and ontological astuteness.
If causal continuity between partially discrete “processual” objects is the case, then the data collected / collectible cannot be the very processual objects or provide all knowledge about the processual objects. But mathematics and all other research methodologies are based on human experience and thought based on experience. Hence, it is important to define the limits of applicability of mathematics to the physics of data is the only way to approximate beyond the data and the methodologically derived conclusions beyond the data.
The same may be said also about logic and language. Logic is the broader rational picture of mathematics. Language is the symbolic manner of application of both logic and its quantitatively qualitative version, namely, mathematics, with respect to specific fields of inquiry. Here I do not explicitly discuss ordinary conversation, literature, etc. We may do well to instantiate logic as the formulated picture of reason. But reason is limited to the procedures of reasoning by brains. What exactly is the reason that existent physical processes undergo? How to get at conclusion based on but beyond data and methods? If we may call the universal reason of Reality-in-total with a name, it is nothing but Universal Causality.
How to demonstrate this as the case? ((To be developed further.))
A caveat is in place here: When I write anything here, you have the right to ask me constantly for further justifications. And if I have the right to anticipate some such questions, I will naturally attempt to be as detailed and as systemic as possible in my formulation. Each sentence is merely a part of the formulation. After reading each sentence you may pose me questions, which certainly cannot all be answered well within the sentences or after the sentences in question.
Hence, I tend to be as systemic as possible in each of the following sentences. Please do not accuse me of being too complex in my expressions. Your (and our) mathematics, physics, and logic can be very complex and prohibitive for some. But would we all accuse these disciplines or the readers if the readers find them all complex and difficult? I do not create such a state of affairs in these few sentences, but there are complexities here too. Hence, I express my helplessness in case any one of you finds these statements complex.
Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature is a mere idealization. It expects nature to obey our merely epistemic idealization where processes outside are vaguely presented primarily by the processes themselves in a natural manner, represented by the epistemic activity of the brain in a natural manner, and idealized via concepts expressed in words and sentences by the symbolizing human tendency to capture the whole of the object by use of a part of the human body-mind. The symbolizing activity is based on data, but the data are not all we have.
Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature as a natural conclusion by application of mathematics to nature is what happens in all physical and cosmological (and of course other) sciences insofar as they use mathematical idealizations to represent existent objects and processes. Logic and its direct quantitatively qualitative expression as found in mathematics are powerful tools. But, as being part of the denotative function of symbolic language, they are tendentially idealizational. By use of the same symbolizing tendency, it is perhaps possible to a certain extent to de-idealize the same symbols in the language, logic, and mathematics being used to symbolically idealize representations.
Merely mathematically following physical nature in whatever it is in its part-processes is a debilitating procedure in science and philosophy (and even in the arts and humanities), if this procedure is not de-idealized effectively. If this is possible at least to a small and humble extent, why not do it? Our language, logic, and mathematics too do their functions although they too are equally unable to capture the whole of reality in whatever it is, wholly or in in parts, too far beyond the data and their interpretations!
This theoretical attitude of partially de-symbolizing the effects of human symbolizing activity by use of the same symbolic activity accepts the existence of processual entities as whatever they are. Perhaps such a generalization can give a slightly better concept of reality than is possible by the normally non-self-aware symbolic activity in language, logic, and mathematics!
This theoretical attitude facilitates and accepts in a highly generalized manner the following three points:
(1) Mathematical continuity (in any theory and in terms of any amount of axiomatization of logical, mathematical, physical, biological, social, and linguistic theories) is totally non-realizable in nature as a whole and in its parts: because (a) the necessity of mathematical approval of any sort of causality in such a cosmology and by means of its systemic physical ontology falls short miserably in actuality, and (b) logical continuity of any kind does not automatically make symbolized representation activity adequate enough to represent the processual nature of entities as derivate from data.
(2) Absolute discreteness in nature, which, as of today, is ultimately of quantum-mechanical type based on Planck’s constant, continues to be a mathematical and physical misfit in the physical cosmos and its parts (may not of course be so in non-quantifiable “possible worlds” due to their absolute causal disconnection) and is a mere common-sense mathematical compartmentalization: (1) because the aspect of the causally processual connection between any two quanta is logically and mathematically alienated in the physical theory of Planck’s constant, and (2) by reason of the “epistemology of box-type thinking” (see Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Uni-Paderborn) implied by the non-self-aware symbolic activity of body-minds.
(3) Hence, the only viable and thus the most reasonably generalizable manner of being of the physical cosmos and of biological entities is that of existence in an extended (having parts) and changing (extended entities and their parts impacting a finite number of others in a finite amount) manner. Existence in Extension-Change-wise manner is nothing but causation. Thus, every existent is causal. There is no minute measuremental iota of time wherein such causal existing ceases in any existent. this is CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS.
The attitude of treating everything as causal my also be characterized by the self-aware symbolic activity by symbolic activity itself, in which certain instances of causation are avoided or increased or avoided incrementally. This is at the most what may be called freedom. It is fully causal, but causal not in a specific set of manners and causal in some other specific set of manners.
PHYSICS and COSMOLOGY even today tend to make the cosmos either (1) mathematically presupposedly continuous, or (2) discrete with defectively ideal mathematical status for continuity and with perfectly geometrical ideal status for specific beings, or (3) statistically indeterministic, thus considered partially causal, or even considered non-causal in the interpretation of statistics’ orientation to epistemically logical decisions and determinations based on data. If not, can anyone suggest proofs for an alleged existence of a different sort of physics and cosmology until today?
A topology and mereological physical ontology of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS, fully free of discreteness-oriented category theory, geometry, functional analysis, set theory, and logic, are yet to be born. Hence, the fundamentality of Universal Causality in its deep roots in the very concept of the To Be (namely, in the physical-ontological Categories of Extension and Change) of all physically and non-vacuously existent processes, is yet alien to physics and cosmology till today.
LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY and even its more recent causalist child, namely, DISPOSITIONALIST CAUSAL ONTOLOGY (1) attribute an overly discrete nature to “entities” without ever attempting to touch the deeply Platonic (better, geometrically atomistic) shades of common-sense Aristotelianism, Thomism, Newtonianism, Modernism, Quantum Physics, etc., and without reconciling the diametrically opposite geometrical tendency to make every physical representation continuous, (2) logically comatose about the impossibility of linguistically definitional approach to the processual demands of existent physical objects without first analyzing and resolving the metaphysical implications of existent objects irreducibly being in finite EXTENSION and CHANGE, and (3) hence, unable to get at the CAUSALLY CONTINUOUS (neither mathematically continuous nor geometrically discontinuous) nature of the physical-ontologically “partially discrete” processual objects in the physical world.
PHENOMENOLOGY has done a lot to show the conceptual structures of ordinary reasoning, physical reasoning, mathematical and logical thinking, and reasoning in the human sciences. But due to its lack of commitment to building a physical ontology of the cosmos and due to its purpose as a research methodology, phenomenology has failed to an extent to show the nature of causal continuity (instead of mathematical continuity) in physically existent, processually discrete, objects in nature.
HERMENEUTICS has just followed the human-scientific interpretative aspect of Husserlian phenomenology and projected it as a method. Hence, it was no contender to accomplish the said fete.
POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHIES qualified all science and philosophy as being perniciously cursed to be “modernistic” – by thus monsterizing all compartmentalization, rules, laws, axiomatization, discovery of regularities in nature, logical rigidity, etc. as an insurmountable curse of the human project of knowing and as a synonym for all that are unapproachable in science and thought. The linguistic-analytic philosophy in later Wittgenstein too was no exception to this nature of postmodern philosophies – a matter that many Wittgenstein followers do not notice. Take a look at the first few pages of his Philosophical Investigations, and the matter will be more than clear.
THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE SCIENCES seem today to follow the beaten paths of extreme pragmatism in linguistic-analytic philosophy, physics, mathematics, and logic, which lack a FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPT OF CAUSALLY CONCRETE AND PROCESSUAL PHYSICAL EXISTENCE.
Hence, it is useful for the growth of science, philosophy, and humanities alike to research into the CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE “PROCESSUAL” OBJECTS.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematical_Continuity_in_Nature_Vs_Causal_Continuity_between_Partially_Discrete_Processual_Objects_Have_patience_to_read_till_the_end
I believe it is common knowledge that mathematics and its applications cannot prove causality directly. What are the bases of the problem of incompatibility of physical causality with mathematics and its applications in the sciences and in philosophy? The main but general explanation could be that mathematical explanations are not directly about the world but are applicable to the world to a great extent. Hence, mathematical explanations can at the most only show the ways of movement of the processes and not demonstrate whether the ways of the cosmos are by causation.
No science and philosophy can start without admitting that the cosmos exists. If it exists, it is not nothing, not vacuum. Non-vacuous existence means that the existents are non-vacuously extended. This means they have parts. Every part has parts too, ad libitum, because each part is extended. None of the parts is an infinitesimal. They can be near-infinitesimal. This character of existents is Extension, a Category directly implied by To Be.
Similarly, any extended being’s parts are active, moving. This implies that every part has impact on some others, not on infinite others. This character of existents is Change. No other implication of To Be is so primary as these. Hence, they are exhaustive.
Existence in Extension-Change is what we call Causality. If anything is existent, it is causal – hence Universal Causality is the trans-science physical-ontological Law of all existents. By the very concept of finite Extension-Change-wise existence it becomes clear that no finite space-time is absolutely dense with existents. Hence, existents cannot be mathematically continuous. Since there is change and transfer of impact, no existent can be absolutely discrete in its parts or in connection with others.
Can logic show the necessity of all existents being causal? We have already discussed how, ontologically, the very concept of To Be implies Extension-Change and thus also Universal Causality.
What about the ability or not of logic to conclude to Universal Causality? In my argument above and elsewhere showing Extension-Change as the very exhaustive meaning of To Be, I have used mostly only the first principles of ordinary logic, namely, Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and then argued that Extension-Change-wise existence is nothing but Universal Causality if everything existing is non-vacuous in existence. For example, does everything exist or not? If yes, let us call it non-vacuous existence. Hence, Extension as the first major implication of To Be. Non-vacuous means extended, because if not extended the existent is vacuous. If extended, everything has parts.
A point of addition now has been Change. It is, so to say, from experience. Thereafter I move to the meaning of Change basically as motion or impact. Naturally, everything in Extension must effect impacts. Everything has further parts. Hence, by implication from Change, everything causes changes by impacts. Thus, we conclude that Extension-Change-wise existence is Universal Causality. It is thus natural to claim that this is a pre-scientific Law of Existence.
In such foundational questions like To Be and its implications we need to use the first principles of logic, because these are the foundational notions of all science and no other derivative logical procedure comes in as handy. In short, logic with its fundamental principles can help derive Universal Causality. Thus, Causality is more primary to experience than the primitive notions of mathematics.
Do Merely Counterfactual Worlds Exist? Or, Are They a Logical and Analytic-Philosophical Eyewash?
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Do_Merely_Counterfactual_Worlds_Exist_Or_Are_They_a_Logical_and_Analytic-Philosophical_Eyewash
The ontological notion of an object or even of an event in its unity forecloses consideration of the process nature of each such unity within, on par with interactions of such units with one another. (summarizing David Lewis, Parts of Classes, p. vii) This is very much the case in his counterfactual notion of existing worlds too.
„Sprache, die für dich dichtet und denkt“ [“Language that verses and thinks for you“] (Friedrich Schiller), ceremonial address, Ann. meeting Gesetzlose Gesellschaft, Berlin, Nov. 6, 2015; http://www.gesetzlose-gesellschaft.de/vortraege/2015.pdf
Peter Enders, vielen Dank! Ich werde es herunterladen und lesen. Sehr schön! Ich spreche Deutsch. Seit langem.
Raphael
THE FOLLOWING SORT OF PROCESSUAL THINKING IS WHAT IS ALMOST COMPLETELY ABSENT IN LINGUISTIC ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY:
All impact transfers within and between entities are extended-changing. Impact transfer is nothing but the activity called Causation. Existents are in extended-changing causal process. The relation of one impact transfer process towards the constitution of another is Causality. Hence, everything is in causal process. If anything non-causal exists, it must lose contact with causal processes and cannot be connected with anything else so to result from causal processes or non-causal processes.
That is, Causality is a derivative Category pertaining to all existents. It is derived from putting together Extension and Change. Causality (the relation) and causation (the action / activity) are act-based. In general, without direct reference to the causal aspect, and with direct reference to the entity-aspect, one can say denotatively: everything is an extended-changing process. (“Everything is in process” means adjectivally: “Everything is processual”) In fact, Causation and Processuality are interchangeable; the manner of definition alone differs. But a unit process is a set of cause and effect.
To help obtain some more clarity on what we discuss here, I think the following discussion will be of use -- especially the question by Richard Marker and my reply:
https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Irrefutable_Argument_for_Universal_Causality_Any_Opposing_Position
Richard Marker: One more point:
So far we have been speaking of the various laws of science / natural laws. Just one among them was causality. Now, if the very physical existence is Extension-Change-wise, and if Extension-Change-wise existence is itself Causality, then every existent must be causal. This is Universal Causality, and it becomes a pre-scientific Law. I call it a metaphysical / physical-ontological Law because IT IS THE LAW OF THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF BEING TAKEN AS PHYSICALLY EXISTENT. Extension and Change are the only and the exhaustive meanings of To Be. In that case, these two Categories must have a superior Categorial position in both philosophy and the sciences.
DOES LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY HAVE ANYTHING SO FOUNDATIONAL AS THESE?
Existents have some Activity and Stability. This is a fully physical fact. These two categories may be shown to be subservient to Extension-Change. Pure vacuum (non-existence) is absence of Activity and Stability. Thus, entities, irreducibly, are active-stable processes in Extension-Change. Physical entities / processes possess finite Activity and Stability. Activity and Stability together belong to Extension; and Activity and Stability together belong to Change too. That is, Stability is not merely about space; and Activity is not merely about time. But the tradition still seems to hold so. We consider Activity and Stability as sub-categories, because they are based on Extension-Change, which together add up to Universal Causality; and each unit of cause and effect is a process.
These are not Categories that belong to merely imaginary counterfactual situations. The Categories of Extension-Change and their sub-formulations are all about existents. There can be counterfactuals that signify cases that appertain existent processes. But separating these cases from useless logical talk is near to impossible in linguistic-analytically tending logic, philosophy, and philosophy of science.
Today physics and the various sciences do something like this in that they indulge in particularistically defined terms and procedures, blindly thinking that these can directly represent the physical processes under inquiry. Concerning mathematical applications too this is the majority attitude among scientists. Hence, without a very general physical ontology of Categories that are applicable to all existent processes, all sciences are in gross handicap.
The best examples are mathematical continuity and discreteness being attributed to physical processes, which are continuous and discrete only in their Causality. This is nothing but Extension-Change-wise discrete causal continuity. At any time causality is present in anything, hence there is causal continuity. But this is different from mathematical continuity and discreteness.
PLEASE SEE THIS CONVERSATION BETWEEN ME AND ANOTHER:
Andrew Powell added a reply
38 minutes ago
Sorry I did not reply earlier Raphael Neelamkavil Are you saying that there is something wrong or incomplete about the sense/reference distinction? Frege's view in my understanding is in the Kantian tradition that making a judgment involves synthesising content of a(n in general quantified) proposition and judging the content to be true or false, so that a proposition has sense (the synthesis) and reference (the objects True and False). I am not saying that view does not have problems, some of which stem from Frege's views on objects, but what is your alternative thesis? Personally I don't like "meaning is use", which can lead to abandoning truth altogether. I would much rather see a focus on programming languages and mathematics, where judgements can be stated with a clear semantics.
There is a sense in which humans do construct the world through language. We write computer programs, construct machines and generally change the world around us. Natural language is one way in which we communicate with other humans, and we use it to record our ideas and proposals. Is that idealism? Probably not because there is reason humans cannot sense the world the way it really is (particularly with the array of sensing equipment that is readily available for purchase).
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Raphael Neelamkavil added a reply
14 minutes ago
Andrew Powell,
Being able to state a clear semantics does not solve the problem. Even Frege did it in his own way, which today need not be accepted as such. But the direct-reference concept of objects that he has and hence also the concept of direct reference are not physical-ontologically to be granted as such, since the True / False system being used for quick-fix references and definitions like in the Fregean semantics are not unique. Not unique in the sense that any other more complex objects too may be referenced and defined in the same manner, and there is no reason why his reference system becomes unique.
For uniqueness, we need a manner of justification of the uniqueness of application of the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle in the special cases.
For this, we need an adequate ontology that not only fixes the problem of continuous change of theory and at the same time facilitates change of theory. I know this is difficult to understand at this level.
I believe that this is easy to understand from the viewpoint of a system in which the primary concepts of objects derive directly from the very concept of existence and existents. For more on this, please visit the other discussion sessions (questions) that I have put up here in RG and the continuing discussion generated by friends there.
MOST ANALYTIC THINKERS TAKE THEIR DISCIPLINE FOR HAVING BECOME A SCIENCE ITSELF. This is acceptable if their foundational principles are primarily scientific, and not primarily philosophical. Is this the case? Now, I presuppose that some readers might ask me, 'Who are you to criticize analytic philosophy?' I will only smile at them. My attitudes to analytic philosophy is not unique. I am not the one who can solve all problems in the world. But I try my little best.
(((As I was in MA philosophy, I was assigned as my course assignment paper topic [Course: Wittgenstein] a study of a certain concept in Wittgenstein. I wrote a detailed critique on that concept in Wittgenstein. After reading it, the prof (from a good Canadian Uni) asked me: Who are you to criticize Wittgenstein? We have not dared to do it! But I kept quiet because I would not have enough time to write on another topic. I knew he would give me very little points for this. It happened -- but at the final exam for the said course! But I was the one who helped almost of my companions in their assignments, and I knew the level of what I wrote. His reduced marks would not do me harm.)))
NOW TO LINGUISTIC IDEALISM:
The proponent/s of this new theory may or may not try or like to interact with me on this. But my arguments are very clear.
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Raphael Neelamkavil added a reply
8 minutes ago
Andrew Powell, please note also this important question: Can we include in one semantic meaning-determination as many other aspects of the concept of the object as possible? If the answer is No, then our duty is to inquire into ways of doing that....
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Epistemology_of_Pushing_the_Systemic_Axioms_Ever_Backwards
Logically Complex and Systematic Language Analysis of the Sciences or of Experience Is Not Philosophy: For the above, denotative notions are recognized as interrelated by concatenation, which produces sensation, thought, language, etc., and their symbolic base. All of it (concatenations) is done in linguistic-analytic philosophies merely at the directly denotative meaning-stratum of symbols, notions, terms, sentences, scientific theories, and theories of the sciences.
Then they speak of being systematic from that level, which too is complex enough, but not metaphysically (physical-ontologically) fundamental enough. Logic can be very complex here, and systematic too. But this is no system that can involve Reality-in-total in its To Be. That is, not even attempts to demonstrate that analytic philosophy is not merely denotative at base would not save it.
How to philosophize? How to philosophize in the sciences?
https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_philosophize_How_to_philosophize_in_the_sciences
Scientific Metaphysical Categories beyond Heidegger
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Scientific_Metaphysical_Categories_beyond_Heidegger
I believe that relativising induction and deduction and connecting them with one another under some very general framework of thought will be a grand starting point to revolutionize the foundations of the whole of philosophy and science, and of logic and linguistic analytic philosophy in particular.
Induction or Deduction: Mutually Exclusive in Logic, Science, Mathematics, and Philosophy of Science?
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Induction_or_Deduction_Mutually_Exclusive_in_Logic_Science_Mathematics_and_Philosophy_of_Science
Under the viewpoint of linguistic analytic phil, is it possible to differentiate between the general concept of freedom in the humanities and that in the physical sciences? Can these two sorts of the concept be synthesized into one? Or, is there human freedom at all, according the various schools of linguistic analysis?
Have you heard or read psychologists, neuroscientists, medical doctors, etc. discussing some symptoms and their causes? A book in psychology says: 'According to the bio-psycho-social approach in psychopathology, one mental disturbance CAN have many causes.' But a person trained and enthusiastic about philosophy (also of the philosophy of the sciences) would wonder why there should not be many causes, at least some of which one could seek to find....! Finding out "only the immediate, exact and unique cause" is not their work because any reason can tell us that nothing in this world has an exact cause.
This directs our attention to a basic nature of philosophy: Not that a philosopher should only generalize. But a philosopher should study any specific thing only in terms of the most generalizable notions. Here 'generality' does not directly indicate only abstraction. It demonstrates the viewpoint that philosophy always takes. Hence, speaking only of the linguistic formulation of notions and arguments, formulating arguments only of life-related events in order to prove general principles that belong to the whole of Reality, etc. are not philosophical. The philosophically trained reader can recognize which recent trends in philosophy I have in mind here.
A Trans-Pragmatic Truth Paradigm for Science, Technology, and Philosophy
https://www.researchgate.net/post/A_Trans-Pragmatic_Truth_Paradigm_for_Science_Technology_and_Philosophy
I have been revising this short discussion paper of mine in RG. It is an attempt to correct some basic attitudes in physics. Just now I have written an introduction to it. Please read it here. In a few days I shall upload the whole lead-text of this discussion for your reading and comments. Here please find only the introduction:
FOUNDATIONS OF AXIOMATIC PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
I get surprised each time when some physicists tell me that either the electromagnetic (EM) or the gravitational (G) or both the forms of energy do not exist, but are to be treated or expressed as waves or particles propagated from material objects that of course exist. Some of them put in all their energies to show that both EM and G are mere mathematical fields, and not physically existent fields of energy propagations from bodies.
This is similar in effect to Newton and his followers thinking honestly and religiously that gravitation and other energies are just miraculously non-bodily actions at a distance without any propagation particles / wavicles.
Even in the 21stcentury, we must be sharply aware that from the past more than 120 years the General Theory of Relativity and its various versions have succeeded in casting and maintaining the power of a terrifying veil of mathematical miracles on the minds of many scientists – miracles such as the mere spacetime curvature being the meaning of gravitation and all other sorts of fields.
A similar veil has been installed on the minds of many physicists by quantum physics too. We do not discuss it here. Hence, I have constructed in four published books a systemic manner of understanding these problems. I do not claim perfection in any of my attempts. Hence, I keep perfecting my efforts in the course of years. The following is a very short attempt to summarize in this effort one important point in physics and in the philosophy of physics.
How to Ground Science and Philosophy Together Axiomatically?
https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_Ground_Science_and_Philosophy_Together_Axiomatically
Symmetry: A Subset of Universal Causality. The Difference between Cause and Reason
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Symmetry_A_Subset_of_Universal_Causality_The_Difference_between_Cause_and_Reason
This discussion-text is just 2.5 pages, but intense. Meant for those who are interested in a clear presentation of what symmetry and symmetry breaking are, and of how physicists and mathematicians tend to misunderstand and/or misuse these concepts.
The Universally Causal context of the concept of symmetry is explained in terms of a solidly founded system of differentiation between cause and reason.
The Fallacies of Space, Time, and Spacetime in Physics
https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Fallacies_of_Space_Time_and_Spacetime_in_Physics
Physical and Exact Sciences and Axiomatic Philosophy: Introducing Grounding (long text)
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Physical_and_Exact_Sciences_and_Axiomatic_Philosophy_Introducing_Grounding_long_text
Causality and Statistics: Their Levels of Effect and of Explanation
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Causality_and_Statistics_Their_Levels_of_Effect_and_of_Explanation
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Non-Locality: Is Einstein a Monist?
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen_Paradox_and_Non-Locality_Is_Einstein_a_Monist
Spacetime Curvatures, Gravitational Waves, Gravitons, and Anti-Gravitons: Do They All Exist?
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Spacetime_Curvatures_Gravitational_Waves_Gravitons_and_Anti-Gravitons_Do_They_All_Exist
The Fate of “Source-Independence” in Electromagnetism, Gravitation, and Monopoles
https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Fate_of_Source-Independence_in_Electromagnetism_Gravitation_and_Monopoles
If anyone wants to read about a fantastic concept of the existence of consciousness and non-existence of the cosmos, see the comments till today here, by L Kurt Engelhart.......!!! Here you can learn the meaning of solipsism.... similar to mathematical platonism creating ideas / notions into objects.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_philosophize_How_to_philosophize_in_the_sciences
Essential Reason in Physicists’ Use of Logic: And in Other Sciences Too!
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Essential_Reason_in_Physicists_Use_of_Logic_And_in_Other_Sciences_Too
Preprint ESSENTIAL REASON IN PHYSICISTS' USE OF LOGIC: IN OTHER SCIENCES TOO
How Does Physics Know? The Epistemology Presupposed by Physics and Other Sciences
https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_Does_Physics_Know_The_Epistemology_Presupposed_by_Physics_and_Other_Sciences
Preprint MATHEMATICAL SOURCE OF FLAWS IN COSMOLOGICAL THEORIES: MATHE...
Preprint THE EPISTEMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES R...
PHYSICAL-PROCESSUAL REPRESENTATION OF IRRATIONAL NUMBERS
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Physical-Processual_Representation_of_Irrational_Numbers
THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS
3.1. Traditional Physical Categories
https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Ontology_behind_Physics
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Grounded_Physical-Ontological_Categories_behind_Physics
Grounded (New) Physical-Ontological Categories behind Physics
Preprint THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS: CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL PHYSICA...
A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS: Beyond the Two Millennia
https://www.researchgate.net/post/A_SIMPLE_GAME-CHANGER_CAUSALITY_FOR_PHYSICS_Beyond_the_Two_Millennia
https://www.researchgate.net/post/DEFINITION_OF_THE_ONTOLOGY_BEHIND_PHYSICS_5_Paragraphs
DEFINITION OF THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS (5 Paragraphs)
THE ANOMALY IN MATHEMATICAL / THEORETICAL PHYSICS (Short Text)
https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_ANOMALY_IN_MATHEMATICAL_THEORETICAL_PHYSICS_Short_Text
Here a serious and somewhat complex matter to discuss:
NON-FOUNDATIONS OF ‘WAVICLES’ IN EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PARADOX: Bases for Quantum Physics to Evolve (Maybe a physical-ontological Breakthrough)
https://www.researchgate.net/post/NON-FOUNDATIONS_OF_WAVICLES_IN_EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN_PARADOX_Bases_for_Quantum_Physics_to_Evolve_Maybe_a_physical-ontological_Breakthrough
Preprint A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS Beyond the Two Millennia
AGAINST COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION, etc.: A Critique of Identity, Simultaneity, Cosmic Repetition / Recycling, etc.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/AGAINST_COSMIC_ISOTROPY_CONFORMAL_CYCLIC_COSMOS_ETERNAL_INFLATION_etc_A_Critique_of_Identity_Simultaneity_Cosmic_Repetition_Recycling_etc
Preprint ESSENTIAL LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS, ...
WHAT IS THE MYSTERIOUS STUFF OF INFORMATION? A Short but Clear Definition
https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_THE_MYSTERIOUS_STUFF_OF_INFORMATION_A_Short_but_Clear_Definition
Preprint COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION:...
THE PLANCK ERA / QUANTUM ERA and “DISAPPEARANCE” OF PHYSICAL CAUSALITY: “OMNIPOTENCE” OF MATHEMATICS
https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_PLANCK_ERA_QUANTUM_ERA_and_DISAPPEARANCE_OF_PHYSICAL_CAUSALITY_OMNIPOTENCE_OF_MATHEMATICS
Preprint PLANCK ERA or QUANTUM ERA,and ”DISAPPEARANCE” OF CAUSALITY. ...
Preprint CAUSAL HORIZONAL RESEARCH: A METHODOLOGY IN PHYSICS Raphael ...
https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_INFORMATION_WHAT_IS_ITS_CAUSAL_OR_NON-CAUSAL_CORE_A_Discussion
https://www.researchgate.net/post/LINGUISTIC_HERESY_BEHIND_SELF-ORGANIZATION_SELF-REFERENCE_INTENTIONALITY_PHYSICAL_AND_BIOLOGICAL_SELF-INTERACTION_etc
Deleted research item The research item mentioned here has been deleted
Preprint LINGUISTIC HERESY OF DENOTATIVE ABSOLUTISM: PHYSICAL-BIOLOGI...
https://www.researchgate.net/post/ONTOLOGICAL_DIFFERENCES_OF_CHARACTERISTICS_OF_ARTIFICIAL_AND_BIOLOGICAL_INTELLIGENCE_ALGORITHMS_AND_PROCEDURES_Against_Exaggerations
“If perception is input from the world to the mind and action is output from the mind to the world, then the mind as distinct from the world is what the input is to and what the output is from. So, despite the web of causal relations between organisms and environments, we suppose the mind must be in a separate place, within some boundary that sets it apart from the world.” [Susan L. Hurley, Consciousness in Action, 1998: 2]
And can consciousness / mind be of the same status as information? I doubt.
https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHY_EXACTLY_THE_WAVE-PARTICLE_DUALITY_Phenomenal_Ontological_Commitment_POC_as_the_Solution
https://www.researchgate.net/post/UNTENABLE_REIFICATION_OF_CONCEPTS_IN_PHYSICS_With_Examples
https://www.researchgate.net/post/DOES_CONSCIOUSNESS_EXIST_OR_IS_IT_LIKE_INFORMATION_A_Very_Short_Text_for_Discussion
Preprint WHY EXACTLY WAVE-PARTICLE DUALITY? Phenomenal Ontological Co...
https://www.researchgate.net/post/DO_PHYSICAL_QUANTA_EXIST_Why_Should_CONSCIOUSNESS_Be_Treated_Quantum-Biologically
https://www.researchgate.net/post/HEIDEGGER_How_a_Philosopher_Destroys_His_Own_Thoughts_Coherence_and_Adequacy
Preprint UNIVERSAL CAUSALITY AND THE PHYSICAL-ONTOLOGICAL DEFECT OF N...
Preprint DIFFERENCES IN THE CONCEPTS OF CAUSALITY IN METAPHYSICS AND ...
Preprint BEYOND CAUSAL ITERATION QUANTIFIABILITY IN LINGUISTIC SPACE-TIME
Preprint BEYOND THE CAUSAL ITERATION METHOD. Short Text (Beyond Judea Pearl)
Preprint REFERENCE, APPLICABILITY, AND ADEQUACY OF UNIVERSALS, INFORM...
Preprint DENOTATIVE ABSOLUTISM. A 20TH CENTURY LOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC HERESY
Preprint INEVITABILITY OF COSMOLOGICAL, ONTOLOGICAL, AND EPISTEMOLOGI...
Preprint Introducing GRAVITATIONAL COALESCENCE PARADOX: COSMOGENETIC CAUSALITY
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