Ok, so I'd like to ask: What is the rationale behind using the epoche to study other people's experiences?

This is a question that has plagued much of my research. In the end I decided that epoche, in the Husserlian sense of 'scientific' phenomenology, can be an interference in itself. My view is that one is only able to consider one's position as researcher when one has entered into a dialogue and one is able to find those personal aspects that are interfering with the possible outcome. The 'object' of the research can at times reveal itself better if allowed to counter the researcher's position.

These thoughts are a result of doing psychotherapy during which I challenged my patient's position - sort of 'devil's-advocate'-ish...

Thank you Sera and Neal for both your inputs. it seems to me from your descriptions that what you are attempting to do when you are about to conduct phenomenological research is what Husserl calls the neutrality modification, where one simply suspends judgment making and or acts. While this is indeed described by Husserl's phenomenology, it occurs around the doxic - thetic level which is already several iterations above the phenomenological reduction, which is more about an active 'doubting' as opposed to suspension (this is just my opinion, as I am for the first time getting feedback on my own understanding of Husserl). In my review of other psychologists who are inspired from Husserlian phenomenology (most notably Ashforth and Giorgi, but also Groenwald and Nelson) they, too, seem to adopt the mode of neutrality for the epoche, which is, in my opinion, a misinterpretation of Husserl. Now does this mean to say that the results of this research is without merit? Of course no. I found it fascinating, but not surprising, that Giorgi's phenomenological analysis of learning falls cleanly into my eidetically reduced algorithm of learning I presented and published at a conference just a month ago.

Learning = L{Sub(i)} = When the [Sub (s-)] is constructed by perceiving the [t:Sub(i+)] of the {Sub(i)}’s [q:Sub(s+)]

[Now, one is obviously not supposed to be able to understand the meaning of the above algorithm, and that is fine, because the point that I want to make is that I can convert every single explanation of Giorgi's model(s) of learning into the above model. And I can show how Giorgi's intended "general" explanation of learning is not "general" nor "eidetic", but rather, in fact, specific and positional.]

That being said, it was fascinating that Giorgi's explanation was consistent with mine, because it was my prejudice that he was studying the phenomenon incorrectly (thus his confirming results threw me into a bit of a crisis as I could not understand how that could be so). That means to say, that perhaps their methods are phenomenological and that I simply need to keep reading. I am fine with that. But for me, from my understanding of Husserl and the purpose of phenomenology is that it wields a "technology" that can help us understand how we can come to know things. For example, in my presentation at the conference I endeavored to exemplify this technology by way of the above algorithm and how it can be applied to any number of definitions of learning and remain consistent; and moreover this definition is able to be used as a way to deconstruct learning processes, and see internal dynamics/cycles at play.

My goal with this response is to juxtapose what I believe to be are two understandings of the epoche and its use in research. Though I am having a difficult time coming to terms with the phenomenological methods that Giorgi and Ashforth present, I, however, am beginning to see the role they serve and how the two methods can possible be connected in the future. I do not intend to critique the methods one chooses to pursue, but rather raise the point that while phenomenological psychology may be sure to contribute to human knowledge, it is not resolving the issues outlined by Husserl; that phenomenological psychology intends something distinct from phenomenology. I hope that this does not serve to make one feel attacked for whatever work one has done along the lines of Giorgi and Ashforth (for I truly believe there is merit in that kind of work), but rather serve as a peripheral suggestion that there is reason to "doubt" one's knowledge of phenomenology, and well... according to the epoche... "doubt" everything for that matter.

It is my view, Matthew, that you have hit the nail on the head. To me phenomenology is a touch like 'grounded theory'; in other words, the researcher is open to previous views, open to the present project, and aware of any interference from Self.

Again to me, phenomenology allows room for manoeuvre in trying to get to the essence of the phenomenon. The joy for me is that the research 'object' can so often dictate the course of the research and one can end up in a different destination to that envisaged in the beginning.

I also rather like the idea of you producing an algorithm for testing - this is the heart of research and pro-jection into the world.

Well, as a sociological phenomenologist, Husserl's idealistic view of epoche (although its pureness is open to debate of course) is impossible in practice, as we can never bracket fully our socio-cultural situatedness and understandings or stand completely outside of language. I have though often used a form of reflexive sociological bracketing in an attempt to approach the phenomenon/a with a fresh perspective. Happy to send on any articles where I've used this approach, and if of interest to you. Excellent question for debate...

One aim of phenomenological research is to disclose and describe the various lived structures and dynamics of the natural attitude and lifeworld—for example, the mostly unnoticed importance of the lived body and places in peoples’ daily lives. In working toward a self-conscious understanding of the lifeworld and natural attitude, Husserl aimed toward the possibility of epoché—a liberated mode of encountering and understanding whereby we realize that experience and the world of that experience might be otherwise, both for ourselves and for others with similar or vastly different lifeworlds and natural attitudes. Phenomenological psychologist James Morley suggested that the epoché is ‘a profoundly challenging and painfully difficult undertaking’, the aim of which is to ‘hold back our existential commitment to the very existence of the world, i.e., the reality-positing power at the very core of consciousness itself”.

Morley provides one of the best answers to your question. The reference is:

J Morley, ‘It’s Always about Epoché’, in T Cloonan and C Thiboutot (eds), The Redirection of Psychology ( Interdisciplinary Circle of Phenomenological Research, University of Quebec, Montreal 2010) 293-305 at 301.

I should have included the following: The intellectual device Husserl developed to circumvent the natural attitude and thereby to bring lifeworlds to more articulated presence is the phenomenological reduction, which refers to ways to facilitate understanding whereby the phenomenon of interest can be spotlighted in stronger and stronger light. On one hand, Husserl spoke of eidetic reductions, whereby one suspends as completely as possible all assumptions about the phenomenon or considers its nature from a particular thematic or disciplinary point of reference. On the other hand, Husserl spoke of a broader, deeper, lived understanding of the phenomenon—what he called the transcendental reduction, whereby I seek to suspend my taken-for-granted standpoint as a cognizant being and place myself in a more comprehensive and empathetic encounter with all phenomena and with my own existence as I live it.

Again, I recommend the Morley article as a starting point. Also good is Linda Finlay's PHENOMENOLOGY FOR THERAPISTS (2011) and Max van Manen's PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRACTICE (2014).