There may also be an "imaginative" form of working memory that interacts with recall working memory. You might want to check out Andrey Vyshedskiy's book, On the Origin of the Human Mind. His concept of "mental synthesis" might also help if you are not already aware of it. A concept such as imaginative working memory might bridge the gap between phenomenal and working memory.

Thanks Dr. Jobe. It is very nice to hear after such a long time. My email-Id is [email protected].

It seems that we have working or short term-memory (WM: with small capacity but long time-scale), which stores information needed to recall in the subsequent seconds, minutes, or hours. WM can be used for various purposes, such as mental imagery (which I guess, you are referring as imaginative form of WM).  As per (Vyshedskiy, 2014), visual-recall activates a mental image of the object (his Fig 1.4, Section 1.3). WM is for access consciousness, which is reportable; it needs time to process information.

Iconic (or sensory) memory (IM: with high capacity but short time-scale) refers to the visual image a subject holds onto after briefly looking at an object. Iconic memory is by nature fleeting.  The site of visual iconic memory might be visual areas (Lamme, 2003), which appears to be essential for retaining information for phenomenal consciousness (Rowlatt, 2009) because there is not enough time for the top-down attention to act on it. 

However, recently (Vandenbroucke, Sligte, & Lamme, 2011) suggested ‘fragile’ short-term memory (FM: with large capacity and a lifetime of several seconds) between iconic memory (with high capacity but short time-scale) and WM (with small capacity but long time-scale). It is easily overwritten by new stimulation. This may be used by the non-reportable phenomenal consciousness.

There is still debate between IM vs. FM for the non-reportable phenomenal consciousness.  My question is: which kind of memory (IM or FM) is used for the phenomenal consciousness.

Thanks.

Kind regards,

Ram

11/12/15

Lamme, V. A. (2003). Why visual attention and awareness are different. Trends Cogn Sci, 7(1), 12-18.

Rowlatt, P. (2009). Consciousness and Memory. Journal of Consciousness Studies: Special Issue on Defining consciousness (Ed. Chris Nunn), 16(5), 68-78.

Vandenbroucke, A. R., Sligte, I. G., & Lamme, V. A. (2011). Manipulations of attention dissociate fragile visual short-term memory from visual working memory. Neuropsychologia, 49(6), 1559-1568.

Vyshedskiy, A. (2014). On The Origin Of The Human Mind (second ed.): Createspace Independent Pub.

Hi Ram,

I have enjoyed following your important work. I am not really up on the consciousness research enough to be of much help. My thought would be that iconic memory would be used for phenomenal consciousness because of the very short time duration and large capacity. I will think more about it however.

best

TJ

Thanks Dr. Jobe.

There is a reason for considering fragile memory (FM) for non-reportable phenomenal consciousness. Some of the data do not fit in with iconic memory (IM).

As per (van Boxtel & Tsuchiya, 2015), “The second line of studies investigated the nature of the contents of iconic memory using a change blindness paradigm (Landman, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2003; Phillips, 2011; Sligte, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008; Vandenbroucke, Barrett, Seth, Fahrenfort, & Lamme, 2014; Vandenbroucke et al., 2011). Subjects were briefly shown a set of 4–32 stimuli, which was followed by a blank period of up to several seconds, and a second set of stimuli (Figure 4b). Subjects had to report if a cued item had changed. Subjects were relatively poor at this task when they relied on working memory via a cue presented after the onset of the second stimulus (which erased the fragile memory trace of the previous stimulus), and they were of course very good when the item was cued at the moment the first set of items was shown. However, subjects were also remarkably good when the item was cued in between the two sets of stimuli, even when retinal afterimages were erased, which presumably forces subjects to rely on fragile memory. Based on this and other findings, Lamme and colleagues (Vandenbroucke, Sligte, & Lamme, 2011) proposed that phenomenal consciousness is closely related to the contents of a fragile memory system that lasts longer than iconic memory but has a larger capacity than short-term (or working) memory. Fragile memory is more stable than iconic memory, in that it is only erased by a new visual input when that input is at the same location (Pinto, Sligte, Shapiro, & Lamme, 2013). It is also notable that the representation in fragile memory is introspectively accessible to the same degree as working memory, as is measured via the accuracy of metacognition (Vandenbroucke et al., 2014). […] 3.2 Iconic and/or fragile memory  Some researchers claim that we are conscious of all the contents of iconic memory, making it a de facto carrier of consciousness (Lamme, 2010). Others believe that only those objects in iconic memory that are attended to are stored in short-term (or working) memory and are consciously perceived (Rensink, 2002). This latter framework assumes that attention and the memory system are tightly coupled, which has been supported by both empirical and modeling work (Deco & Rolls, 2005; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999; Jonides et al., 2008; Oberauer, 2002). In section 2.3.3 we discussed studies that investigated the contents of iconic memory. The overall data supports the idea that iconic memory can contain a large amount of visual data, but is perhaps not limitless. Interestingly, iconic memory seems to capture the gist of an unattended scene as well as the specific information in an attended stimulus (see section 2.3.3; de Gardelle et al., 2009). Does the fact that one has an iconic memory of stimulus S, guarantee that he or she consciously perceives that stimulus S? We do not know the answer to this question, and the sufficiency of iconic memory for phenomenal consciousness is currently hotly debated (Block, 2011; Brown, 2011; Lamme, 2010; Phillips, 2011; Vandenbroucke et al., 2014).”

Perhaps, we need to design a few experiments that clearly reject one of them (IM or FM).

Kind regards,

Ram

van Boxtel, J. J. A., & Tsuchiya, N. (2015). De-confounding the neural constitution of phenomenal consciousness from attention, report and memory . In S. M. Miller (Ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory [Advances in Consciousness Research 92] (Vol. 92, pp. 81–103). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company

Dear Ram, your comments assume that cognitive processing as STM is necessary for consciousness, but non-reportable phenomenal consciousness does not have to be cognitive - for instance, you have a vague feeling that a headache is coming (the "aura") - how is STM necessary for this conscious experience?

Dear Alfredo,

Thanks for the comments.

I agree with you that cognitive processing such as (a) STM working memory (WM-STM) with small capacity but long time-scale and (b) both endogenous and exogenous attention (along with other conditions) are necessary for reportable access consciousness. I also tend to think that non-reportable phenomenal consciousness should not involve cognitive processing. However, it is controversial if (a) IM/FM and (b) exogenous attention are necessary for phenomenal consciousness (such as “there is something that it is like to be …” (Nagel, 1974)). It is unclear if IM involves cognitive processing. FM is considered as a part of STM. Perhaps, FM-STM and exogenous attention involve cognitive neural processing. What do you think?

Regards,

Ram

Dear Ram, in my view all these processes are cognitive and largely unconscious. What makes them conscious (or not) is a feeling that is (or is not) attached to the cognitive process. Our cells exchange signals unconsciously. You can call these signals iconic or fragile WM (or sensory memory - information about stimuli that is processed in primary sensory regions). Only when they elicit a feeling they become conscious.

Dear Alfredo,

Thanks.

To avoid confusion, I should first define a few terms: The necessary conditions for consciousness are those conditions that must be satisfied in order to have consciousness, i.e., if any of them is missing then the entity is not conscious. The sufficient conditions for consciousness are conditions, if satisfied, guarantee that the entity is conscious.

Implicitly, I guess, you are implying that how consciousness finally arises depends on a foundational (metaphysical) framework. From your Triple-Aspect Monism  (TAM: (Pereira Jr., 2013)), a necessary condition for consciousness is that a related feeling (or subjective experience) must somehow be attached with related cognitive process (call it ‘attachment mechanism’ or you may like to use more appropriate term). Is this correct? Is this also sufficient condition for consciousness? 

Furthermore, other conditions are also needed, even if processing is unconscious.

So far, in the extended Dual-Aspect Monism (eDAM) (Vimal, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015a, 2015b), my working hypothesis is as follows:

The necessary conditions for access (reportable) consciousness are as follows:

(1) The formation of neural-networks;

(2) Wakefulness;

(3) Reentrant interactions among neural populations;

(4) Fronto-parietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness;

(5) Working memory;

(6) Integrated information (F) at or above threshold level;

(7) Stimulus contrast at or above threshold;

(8) Neural-network proto-experiences that are superposed potential subjective experiences (SEs) embedded in a neural-network as pre-cursors of SEs;

(9) Self and self-related neural network; and

(10) Matching (between feed forward signals and cognitive feedback signals) and selection mechanisms for selecting a specific subjective experience that is experienced by the self.

The necessary conditions for phenomenal (non-reportable) consciousness are (1)-(3) above, (4’) exogenous attention, (5’) iconic/fragile memory, and (6)-(10) above.

In the eDAM framework, condition (10) makes the unconscious processing conscious. In your TAM, the condition (10) would be “a related feeling (or subjective experience) must somehow be attached with related cognitive process.” Other conditions for eDAM and TAM are same or similar. What do you say?

I am still working on the followings:

1. Is neural synchrony (Engel, Fries, Konig, Brecht, & Singer, 1999) necessary for consciousness?

2. Is intrinsic (resting-state) activity (Northoff, 2014) necessary for consciousness?

3. Is proto-self (Northoff, 2014) necessary for consciousness

Kind regards,

Ram

11/13/15

References

Engel, A. K., Fries, P., Konig, P., Brecht, M., & Singer, W. (1999). Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness. Conscious Cogn, 8(2), 128-151.

Northoff, G. (2014). Unlocking the Brain: Volume 2: Consciousness. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Pereira Jr., A. (2013). Triple-Aspect Monism: A Conceptual Framework for the Science of Human Consciousness. In A. Pereira Jr. & D. Lehmann (Eds.), The Unity of Mind, Brain and World: Current Perspectives on a Science of Consciousness (pp. 299-337). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2008). Proto-experiences and Subjective Experiences: Classical and Quantum Concepts. J Integr Neurosci [Available at ; Latest update: ], 7(1), 49-73.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2010). Matching and selection of a specific subjective experience: conjugate matching and subjective experience. J Integr Neurosci [], 9(2), 193-251.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2013). Emergence in Dual-Aspect Monism. In A. Pereira Jr. & D. Lehmann (Eds.), The Unity of Mind, Brain and World: Current Perspectives on a Science of Consciousness (pp. 149-181). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [Longer version is available for comments: ].

Vimal, R. L. P. (2015a). Necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness: Extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: ] [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1587.9124], 7(1), 1-28.

Vimal, R. L. P. (2015b). Segregation and integration of information: extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: ] [DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1974.3445], 7(2), 1-39.