I should note: that I am talking about NEW aspects of behavior patterns (I have no argument with the idea that things-known can be "put together", though not in qualitatively new ways).
Truly NEW learnings (as in qualitative changes) must be concrete : EVEN the inception of the most 'abstract' types of representation and thought (and learnings). [( Though it used to be said that we can deal with 7 + or - 2 "chunks", lately there is a consensus developing that: for significant processing/learning, working memory uses only about 4 "chunks". )]
If you accept the results on our types of memory (about the strongest and most reliable and clearest results in all psychology) and if you have any reasonable (and common) definition of thinking and of specific progress occurring with that thinking, you must believe that EVERYTHING mental (covert) and reliable must have (at least at its inception) directly observable concrete proximate cause(s) in aspect(s) of a clear and present environment.
Much of the learning that occurs would likely require this just based on CAPACITY issues; in any case, it should also be clear that without this being the way it is, it is not likely learning would reliably reflect our environment (errors, like those that do occur would occur "all over the place" -- or tell me why this wouldn't be the case).
Accept all this and BONUS: You are an empiricist !! [ Here is perhaps another interesting thing to think about, if you are an empiricist: If concrete aspects of the present environment would (sometimes?) not need to be involved in significant NEW learnings, THEN the person would have to successfully remember such the "things" that are involved -- AND somehow develop and involve the new type of learning, as well. Perhaps some think this is what some old-time philosophers did, BUT they had already developed adult thinking, thus all the major qualitative changes -- in learning and thinking -- had ALREADY occurred (and see my first statement, at the top of this page). ]
Go ahead and try of describe 4 "chunks" (some with NEW content AND EVERYTHING PROCESSED properly) which does not hinge on direct experience in the environment ! (Do not try to describe the case with the environment as somehow being represented in 'sensori-motor' type responses, and THEN with those going forward -- this last part BEGS THE QUESTION, don't you see?; "Embodied 'theory'" is not only not well-founded but obviously incomplete on how behavior change can move forward, thus begging the question; and this is not to mention the 'evidence' is poor, outrageously indirect, and the theory has been shown useful for nothing and there is no reason to believe it has any promise -- there is no reason to 'believe it' at all, unless perhaps you fear a professor. SEE: https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13423-015-0860-1)
(1) Given what is not possible, just indicated, you need to change in some ways: it is not likely that it is fruitful or useful to think in terms of single behavior (or sets you define) but in terms of BEHAVIOR PATTERNS (discovered); (2) you must accept there is some not-yet-commonly-recognized guidance for perception/attention/learning: INNATE guidance, even very late in ontogeny; (3) that it is highly unlikely that it is adequate to try to delineate only the simplest learnings (classical and operant) AND the vague "social learnings" (otherwise) as the only learnings we type and classify; I see that we do this as another sign that psychology has not yet hardly even begun; (4) You, related to (1) - (3), need to accept something like Ethogram Theory -- which rather well justifies itself and provides a way to define what must be defined and sees things in terms of the way they must be (or sometimes perhaps, in part, describes the way "things" could be, while remaining utterly directly empirical); it also shows all the major theories as clearly flawed (and convincing so, EACH in very similar ways). It is time for "out with the old and in with the new". (I have other essays here on researchgate for explication, describing other related perspectives and implications and ramifications.)
[ In short: with the brief, clear indications of a good argument, above, you a NEED a new way of thinking, such as I describe in "A Human Ethogram ... ". ]
Article A Human Ethogram: Its Scientific Acceptability and Importanc...
Behavior is concrete even when abstraction drives it. So change of behavior is also concrete, even though abstraction may drive it.
Dear Jerry Decker
I do like your attitude (in a way), but we must be careful. Your response does make me have to address some important issues (though I have very briefly addressed them before).
I do not believe behaviors always have unique, measurable concrete aspects: covert behaviors, like thoughts at times, have (at most) very, very subtle behavioral manifestations -- again, which I doubt are measurable (OR at least not uniquely measurable) . I also believe that non-unique overt response(s) may characterize learning (e.g. putting together combinations) involving the well-established behavioral representations.**
ON THE OTHER HAND: What I do submit and argue does have clear (and unique) concrete aspects (and MUST, for an empiricist) is completely NEW (or at least the qualitatively different and new) responses to aspects of an environment. These, I believe, MUST have CLEAR concrete directly observable overt aspects (proximate causes) which characterize THEM, in particular, at least at their inception; BUT these too can be rather subtle, for example, they may be perceptual/attentions shifts, clearly detectable only with new eye-tracking technologies, etc. (and that IS what I have argued in "A Human Ethogram ..." -- MANY years ago, but with the hypotheses only NOW researchable). THIS unique overt direct observablity IS TRUE EVEN AT THE INCEPTION OF NEW 'abstraction' capabilities -- so, Jerry Decker, I am to AN EXTENT "with" you.
Again, though, I do not think ALL behaviors have clear (uniquely measurable) overt aspects. All of psychology has long abandoned the idea that all behavior is overt (or that all that is worth studying is overt) -- and part of what I have expressed is surely part of what 'they' meant when abandoning the idea that 'all behavior is overt' (thus, they have decided not even to stick to just-overt-behaviors in what they try to address, explain, and measure (indirectly) -- otherwise they would have remained like Skinner and just looked at obviously overt behavior, thinking that was at least adequate to explain all behavior).
** FOOTNOTE: I believe the well-established learnings that include and ARE our representations (AND even some learnings involving these) may have behavior aspects as subtle as, for example, "pausing to think" -- and one pause may look quite a lot like other pauses, though for a variety of reasons. I have little to no doubt that one person can "pause to think" (e.g. 2 seconds) and another person can "pause to think" (e.g. 2 seconds) and their thinking may be very different and not even about related things; the pauses (in several different environments or the same environment) may have to do with very different things (or occasionally somewhat the same things).
Something else: One problem I have with your statement is your thinking that abstract thought can "drive behavior" (though I suppose at times it may); but positing a particular such DRIVE is not necessary and may make one miss when the organism has completely new (though related) interests -- the direction and "drive", then, is different.
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