Dear Oscar, as a born social constructivist of course I appreciate Luhmann's work very much. I am not sure if Law as such is a social system itself, but it is important that it is a result from interactions in a social system (which causes the problem that Law is per definition outdated, because law-making takes so much time that the perception of what is a problem and what may be an appropriate solution may have changed). Law-making can also be a social process that solves problems even before there is a law established, just because the process brings together many actors (ah, not always the case, of course) on one agenda. Non-legal solutions may spring of that process. This reminds me of the Swiss referendum processess, where most referendum proposals do not lead to a vote because the initiative is already enough signal for politicians that something has to be done.

I see, and these matters you intend to investigate in this project? Very interesting, especially taking into account different traditions and legal systems.

Hello Oscar,

I have applied Luhmann's theory to a study of corporate regulation. I'm looking at a reasonably high level at politics, law, economics, organisations and protest movements, and how they all come together in this particular view of corporate regulation. I've found Luhmann's work to be incredibly useful. Happy to discuss. Book comes out next month:  https://www.routledge.com/Meta-Regulation-in-Practice-Beyond-Morality-and-Rationality/Simon/p/book/9781138233720.

Looks very interesting! Thanks.

I have a question. Does it make sense to apply the constitutional principle of “epistemic subsidiarity” to the relation between science and law in different transnational regimes? It works on the assumption that the relation between science and politics is highly context-dependent and thus changes from context to context. Jasanoff has shown that the science/politics-relation in the context of the European Union differs considerably from the same relation in different nation states. This is so because epistemic legitimacy is not entirely a matter of scientific input; it is also based on the values, interests, and preferences of local and national communities. Epistemic subsidiarity has been suggested as a constitutional principle that balances the relations between science and politics on those different levels.

Now, I wonder whether the principle of epistemic subsidiarity could be expanded and applied not only to different nation states, but also to different transnational functional regimes. Before the background of functional differentiation it might be plausible that each transnational regime needs to develop its specific legitimation by the interaction of issue-specific expertise and social protest, stakeholder’ and members’ interests. For such a regime-specific interaction of expertise and regime-internal politics, the regime constitution will have to play a constitutive role. Does this make sense?

S. Jasanoff, 'Epistemic Subsidiarity: Coexistence, Cosmopolitanism, Constitutionalism' (2013) 2 European J. of Risk Regulation 133.

I still have not gotten to it except through you and his small book on love. I sink into these writers like mud pools and don't see anything for years. I will probably be dead before it is time for Niklas