There is a lot of popularity to embedded/embodied/enacted in new theorizing. What seems to be forgotten, in effect, is that it is fundamentally an individual [organism] 'embedded' in the environment, specifically as she/he "finds it" during ontogeny. We should NOT limit this to mainly one sphere of developmental influence in any undo way. Common examples of bad practice are limiting 'learning' to that which is social (or social learning) and/or 'making' language always key to a large part of it (when this is obviously not necessarily the case). Also, perspectives should not be self-limiting by presumptions: one clear example here is, in effect, 'assuming' all key innate features can be seen in infancy (or hypothetically very similarly sensorimotor based, basically: by analogy) -- there is no reason for such presumptions. Then, also, in modern theory, there is formalization of systems without proximate causes (supposed generally useful 'frameworks' adhering to no particular theory -- but, actually, greatly adhering to needless a priori assumptions). [ I have addressed particular examples of each of these in some detail in Comment and Replies to particular approaches, here on researchgate.net. ] There have also been plenty of information processing theories and some other perspectives basically founded on being like something else i.e. founded on analogy. If there are any other approaches of concern, I would be happy to be reminded of them, or learn about them.
All the above described is no good, because it is presumptuous and, at least to an notable or clear extent, unempirical (and also escaped or detached from the environment and only indirectly connected to the real environment (whatever that is) -- and then, needless to say, in an unclear way). Correspondingly, findings typically show just weak trends, not seen as adequate for any good science (fortunately there are exceptions, such as in some research on memory).
We need to define behavior as it relates to the environment, which we basically discover at the same time we discover behavior. How else could any human (researcher, theorist or not) keep knowledge "straight" and then have truly progressive knowledge, which we can then also keep "straight"? We are subject to the same principles of learning and memory as other humans -- something that amounts to huge consideration for amassing knowledge or progressively understanding behavior.
One thing that should be considered is that no good science begins with a "closed" hypothetico-deductive way of viewing things (this can be seen as summarizing the vast majority of bad examples, such as above). This is the major sign, in general, of bad theory development. I want to argue we depend on inductive work until forced to take some explicit hypothetico-deductive stance.
Any theory that can be seen as not providing ecological validity should be seen as bad. No connection of biological functioning (e.g. behavior) to basic biological principles is also bad.
Any other nominations for 'bad' perspectives (models, frameworks, hypotheses, theories)? Any nominations for good approaches? How do we have and find the individual organism developing in the environment as a whole, as it really is? (Many know I have my hypotheses here, which are minimal and empirical; the possibly 'minimal needed' also requiring minimal presumptions, only necessary assumptions.) [ P.S. Why is Deductive Reasoning an official Topic on researchgate.net , BUT not inductive reasoning? And this is not to mention 'ecological validity' -- still not an official topic on researchgate.net; where did that good topic go, it used to be big? ]
[ Attached, below, is an answer from ethology: ]
Article A Human Ethogram: Its Scientific Acceptability and Importanc...
P.S. On the sad, twisted notions of embedded , embodied, and "enacted"
Look for one type of process or analogous processes supposedly involving just one type of mechanism (e.g. basically, oddly modified social learning) to account for all kinds of strange concepts related to "sensorimotor contingencies". Then you can sense the presumption and get clear signs that there is a disconnect from the environment. This garbage is based on unjustified 'assumptions' (actually: presumptions or CONCLUSIONS used as 'assumptions'). At the same time other real possibilities are ruled out by the closed hypothetico-deductive systems they devise. It's more like fairy tales than like science. EXAMPLE:
See my Comments (Replies) under Log items of the following Project, https://www.researchgate.net/project/Sensorimotor-Life-An-Enactive-Proposal , to see me take down one particular unempirical and bad theory. Also see my Question under that Project.
The real reasons they are forced to such a bizarre position for explanation is simply that it is NOT ALLOWED that one hypothesize (or even imagine) that there are significant innate behavior-guidance factors that occur during development after infancy, in spite of clear universal qualitative changes in the nature of concepts (in a regular sequence, near particular ages) during child development. How dumb and presumptuous can psychology researchers be?
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