EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PARADOX AND NON-LOCALITY.

IS EINSTEIN A MONIST?

Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D., Dr. phil.

1. Theoretical Foreword Indicating the Basic Presuppositions

I begin here with an allusion to the really possible but ever less experimentally observable near-infinitesimality of internal and external causal parts of influences in any object. These objects are the oft so-called fundamental particles / wavicles. The inventory of actually existent sub-microscopic processual entities need not have size limits in the line of infinitesimality.

But they are less and less experimentally observable. The varying measures of infinitesimality of internal and external causal influences in the so-called fundamental wavicles of any layer of observation must be considered as true, since anything is constituted and hence has some EXTENSION.

Every existent wavicle in Extension has some ability to impact some others at any given finite time. This impacting is CHANGE.

So, there is reason for there being actual but connected layers of sub-processes and the related possibility of observation like those of the macro-, meso-, micro-, nano-, and other ultra-quantal levels of existence and action for constructing a causal quantum physics (QM). If infinitesimality is acceptable at the fundamental level, no wave front is identical in measurement with any other of its kind on any absolute (infinite) scale, because each in all its parts is unique by reason of its unique and finite Extension-Change state measured in spacetime quantities in four dimensions.

That is, all token processes and members of each type of process are different by its own specific identity in Extension-Change. There are very close measurement affinities between the mutually approximating relevance of objects of one and the same layer of the quantal level, which we tend to measure off by common finite standards of reckoning, without taking access to all possible level of the near-infinitesimal causal effects behind any iota of motion. This does not preclude the necessity of there being causal influence on anti-particles even in experimentally controlled detection of causal action upon, around, and within a given particle.

All experiments need not directly involve anti-particles in the present physics’ ordinary causal manner that permits the transmission of causal influences only at the speed of light. Yet there can and must be some particle-influences on anti-particles as in the EPR experiments. At the outset of the present discussion, I suggest that the alleged fantastic “action-at-a-vacuous-distance” between any two such particles is realistically possible only if the action is causal influence between the particle and the anti-particle, propagating at superluminal velocities. I suggest also that this is a result where we owe much to the history of experiments and counter-experiments of the decades-long history of solutions of the EPR Paradox.

If an experimental-causal alternation of state is possible between a particle and its experimentally immediately and apparatus-wise related anti-particle, it shows the existence of a wavelike propagating, non-vacuous, and causal influence between the two. Physicists committed to the ultimacy of luminal velocity term it unscientifically as “instantaneous” without any evidence for it in a context where they presuppose luminal velocity as the only criterion. There cannot be energy or matter that propagates in the absolute straight line posited by Euclid in ideal geometry, because this presupposes infinite speed. Hence, all propagations must be four-dimensionally wavelike, which means they must move forward like a spring, without even defining a straight line.

Any infinitesimal nature in the train of particles in the four-dimensional wave-shape is not observable by arbitrarily setting up a final limit to velocity from within this island universe of ours. Hence, we must favour finite superluminal velocities to make possible the near-infinitesimally possible values of causal effects within wavicles of all layers of size of existence, i.e., issuing from all layers. Such velocities will allow interpretation of the concept of wavicles within the sub-nuclear and the quantal, without any limiting size wherein no more internal motion would be possible. To bring this about, let us attempt an objectual (i.e., non-vacuous) and ontological mode of understanding the so-called non-local causality – action-at-a-vacuous-distance – in QM.

Without further giving a detailed introduction to the EPR problem, we enter the core of it. Gell-Mann gives a simple explanation of the EPR experiment, as modified by Bohm. Hence, it is called the EPRB experiment. It deals with the decay of a particle into two anti-particles – in our case, two anti-photons:

If the particle is at rest and has no internal “spin”, then the photons travel in opposite directions, have equal energy, and have identical circular polarizations. If one of the photons is left-circularly-polarized (spinning to the left), so is the other; likewise if one is right-circularly-polarized (spinning to the right), so is the other. Furthermore, if one is plane-polarized along a particular axis (that is, has its electric field vibrating along that axis), then the other one is plane-polarized along a definite axis. There are two cases, depending on the character of the spinless particle. In one case the plane polarization axes of the two photons are the same. In the other they are perpendicular. For simplicity let us take the former case, even though in the practical situation (where the decaying particle is a neutral pi meson) the latter case applies.

[…] The setup is assumed to be such that nothing disturbs either photon until it enters a detector. If the circular polarization of one of the photons is measured by the detector, the circular polarization of the other is certain – it is the same. Similarly, if the plane polarization of one of the photons is measured, that of the other photon is certain – again, it is the same as that of the first photon. Einstein’s completeness would imply that both the circular and plane polarization of the second photon could then be assigned definite values. [Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, 171.]

The measurement problem as implying the completeness axiom for physical theory is expressed with great clarity in the words of Gell-Mann:

If, by means of a certain measurement, the value of a particular quantity Q could be predicted with certainty, and if, by an alternative, quite different measurement, the value of another quantity R could be predicted with certainty, then, according to the notion of completeness, one should be able to assign exact values simultaneously to both of the quantities Q and R. Einstein and his colleagues succeeded in choosing the quantities to be ones that cannot simultaneously be assigned exact values in quantum mechanics, namely the position and momentum of the same object. Thus a direct contradiction was set up between quantum mechanics and completeness. [Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, 168-69.]

It must be admitted here that scientism and scientific determinism are based on perspectival absolutism. They are a type of absolutism of the current and immediately possible scientific perspective and its measurementally fixed notions and definitions of physical quantities. This is not only concretism but also perspectival absolutism.

But Einstein stood for both realism and scientific determinism of the concretist variety in the expected result of the EPR thought experiment, but without holding perspectival absolutism. This is why he tried lifelong to show that “[…] if one believes the wavefunction exhausts all the statements that can be meaningfully asserted about a physical system, then one must also accept that the real physical state of the system depends on what befalls another system with which it has previously interacted, no matter how far apart the two systems may become.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 458.]

Any wavefunction has a grand causal horizonal history, which cannot be anything other than causal. All of them cannot be subsumed under the one wavefunction, because no measuremental instance can capture all that something is, by reason of the insufficiency of instantaneous or detailed measurements of its grand causal horizonal history. By our understanding of the infinitesimality and infinity of causal influences within and from without the wavicle, the wavefunction does not yield an exhaustive explanation. Peter Holland says that Einstein argues: “[…] [A]dherence to the completeness assumption compels one to adopt ‘unnatural theoretical interpretations’.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 458.]

Hence, one must relinquish one of the following assumptions: “(a) the description by means of the ψ-function is complete” (the ‘completeness’ assumption) and “(b) the real states of spatially separated objects are independent of each other” (the locality / separability criterion), under the concept of locality, i.e., “[t]he real, physical state of one system is not immediately influenced by the kinds of measurements directly made on a second system, which is sufficiently spatially separated from the first.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 460.]

It must be noted here that the locality condition means that, from within the criterion of luminal limit-velocity, each of the anti-particles experiences the action as local and separable from the other, and for the combined system of the two it is experienced as non-local. If the wavefunction is incomplete, it is possible to hold that the real states of spatially separated objects are independent of each other, but only under the assumption that the highest possible velocity in the universe is that of light. That is,

[…] for a ψ-function […] a measurement on 1 [a first atom or other particle] represents a physical operation which only affects the region of space where f1 is finite and can have no direct influence on the physical reality in the remote region of space inhabited by atom 2. Thus, the real state of affairs pertaining to atom 2 must be the same whatever action we carry out on 1 (including no measurement at all). Hence, the functions v-,v’- [wavefunction in z-direction and eigenfunction in the z’-direction of atom 1] must be simultaneously attributable to atom 2. But this is impossible, for these states differ by more than a trivial phase factor and represent different real states of affairs for 2. Einstein concludes that the coordination of several ψ-functions with what should be a unique physical condition of 2 shows that ψ cannot be interpreted as a complete description of the physical condition of a system. [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 460.]

From this it is clear that Einstein believed that it is possible to isolate 1 from 2: physics itself would become an impossible enterprise if such a distant interconnectedness were admitted as a general property of nature, for it would deny the possibility of studying segments of matter in isolation, and physics would lose its empirical basis. [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 460.] If he had attempted to provide a functional space at least in the concept for all possible causal effects on wavicles, and conceived these effects as epistemologically accessible or penetrable at least in part, he could have come up with an ontologically committed interpretation of the concept of the micro-worlds’ localized wavicles, because he had required realism out of QM.

But the fact remains that the micro-worlds’ localized wavicles are non-circumscribable by approximate meso-world appropriations and by the concept of localized sub-microworld wavicles that are non-circumscribable by micro-level approximations. This train of levels of non-circumscribability of much smaller than near-micro-world levels by use of micro-world levels has no end.

This would have inspired him to see the possibility of solving the question of positively superluminal yet finite distances between the anti-particles of the EPR paradox in a “local” but at the Extension-Change-level not fully isolable manner. Any amount of postulating “locally” justified superluminal velocities has the following reasons: the merely experimental status of the limit-velocity of light and the need to posit different past levels of finite amounts of near-infinitesimal causal influences within a given wavicle.

2. The EPR Paradox according to Murdoch

Murdoch clarifies the original intentions of the EPR argument and reformulates it into two parts. The first part explains the concept of completeness of theory and gives the condition necessary for completeness. Murdoch refers to EPR in Physical Review 47: “[…] [E]very element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory. What they [the authors: Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen] mean by ‘counterpart’ is that an element of physical reality should be represented in a state description within the theory.” [Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”, Physical Review 47, cited in Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 165]

This very condition tastes realistic classicism, and needs revision into ontological commitment to processes, instead of a vague counterpart in the physical theory – which musters some superluminal yet finite causal influence between a particle and its anti-particle, and naturally perhaps even between particles themselves and anti-particles themselves.

Before expatiating on this requirement towards the end of this section, we study the EPR. According to Murdoch, the first part of the argument is this:

(a) If a physical theory is complete, then, if xis an element of physical reality, there is a state description within the theory which includes x. (The completeness condition.) (b) There are elements x, y of physical reality that are not both included in any quantum-mechanical state description. (c) Therefore quantum mechanics is not a complete physical theory. [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 165.]

By advising to substitute the concept of prediction with the supposedly ontologically less misleading concept of determination, EPR facilitates understanding of the second part and gives a sufficient condition for the concept of ‘physical reality’: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 166.]

This being the case, my subsequent argument – in partial digression – is that any determination of values (e.g., momentum, position, etc.) of any existent process is a truth-probabilistic determination, not only based on the probabilistic character of our determinations, but also based on the state of affairs that the very momentum and/or position of a wavicle lend themselves only to probabilistic determinations. That is, the difficulty that leads to the probabilistic character of our determinations of processes is not merely epistemological but also physical-ontological.

This does not mean that nature is in itself probabilistically ontological in the sense that what we probabilistically determine is as such the case out there in nature. The “exact” determination of any one of these quantities à propos the theoretical and experimental givenness of particle S1 of the pair of anti-particles is in fact a meso-world-, or even a micro-world-, sort of levelling out of the infinite number of infinitesimal causal influences within S1.

This does not also mean that all causal influences are levelled out in their very givenness in the mathematical functions used in order to represent them. There can be measurements of great certainty by which at least the fact of a certain level of influence is admitted; and there can be measurements of very little certainty. That is, eminently clear measurements of certain quantities are the touchstone of there being some causal influence (impingement by or transfer of physical elements) determinable in its ability to strike ontological commitment to certain real (physical) elements of that level of observation. This is the minimal level necessity in physics. What may be hoped for is augmentation in the capacities of theories and instruments to detect ever deeper and ever broader levels of causation in the cosmos.

We move now to the second part of the description of some rational aspects in EPR and understand it in Murdoch’s own words:

(1) We can determine either the exact position or the exact momentum of S2 at t, but not both. (2) The real physical state of S2 is the same, whether we determine the exact position or the exact momentum of S2. (3) Therefore there is at ta single real physical state of S2 in which position and momentum both have exact values. (4) Operators representing position and momentum are non-commuting. (5) Therefore, there exists a single physical state in which two physical quantities represented by non-commuting operators have exact simultaneous values. (6) The physical state of an object at any time is completely described by a single state vector. (7) Different non-commuting operators have no state vectors in common. (8) Therefore a physical state in which physical quantities represented by non-commuting operators have exact simultaneous values is not describable in terms of a single state vector. (9) But such a physical state exists, viz. the one referred to in premiss (5). (10) Therefore there are elements of physical reality, x, y, which are not included in any quantum-mechanical state description. (Premiss (b) of the previous argument.) [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 165-66.]

This summary of the second part of the argument is straightforward, and hence we do not further discuss it by repeating its statements directly. We take for granted the state-of-the-art explanation. Now we move into Murdoch’s argument regarding the concept of measurement in Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen:

Referring now to the EPR experiment, the authors argue that since we can determine with certainty either the position or the momentum of S2at time t, on the basis of a measurement on S1, it follows via the criterion of physical reality that the position and momentum which can be determined with certainly for time t must be simultaneous elements of physical reality. [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 166.]

Murdoch opines that this is fallacious. He does this by being forgetful of the fact that what is at issue here is the speed of light taken in STR, GTR, and QM as the upper limit of all allowable speeds of communication between S1 and S2, and not the logical conjunctiveness of the negation of a disjunction, for no one measures with absolute exactitude any measurable quantity concerning a physical phenomenon. He shows the fallacy in EPR to be the following:

The truth of a disjunction does not entail the truth of the corresponding conjunction. From the fact that we can determine with certainty either the exact position or the exact momentum of S2 at time tit does not follow by way of the reality criterion that S2 has an exact position and an exact momentum at t. This argument, however, is not quite what Einstein had in mind. What he intended can be put as follows. Whether we determine at time tthe position or the momentum of S2, the physical state of S2at t remains the same, since neither a measurement on the distant S1nor the determination concerning S2 can have any effect on the physical state of S2. Hence, if we determine the position of S2 at t, then S2 must have at t whatever value of the momentum we would have determined had we so chosen; and conversely, if we determine the momentum of S2 at t, then S2must have at t whatever value of the position we would have determined had we chosen to determine the position. From what he says elsewhere, it is clear that this is the argument that Einstein had in mind. [Murdoch, Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Physics, 166. Towards the end of this quote, he makes reference to Einstein, “Quantenmechanik und Wirklichkeit”, Dialectica, 2 (1948), 323.]

To clarify what might mislead the readers in the first sentence in the citation above: Einstein thinks that the following is what should follow from the fact of non-determination of position and moment at the same time. If I say that only either a or b is determinable, we need to only conclude that since the two are not determinable at the same given time, it need not be true that the second does not have a real positions although we are not able to determine them at a given time. While determining the position or momentum of S1, we realize that it has some sort of a position or momentum independently of the other, and while determining the position or momentum of S2independently of the other, we have such a realization about S2 and of nothing else.

How Gell-Mann counters Einstein’s demand for completeness is important:

But the value of the circular polarization and the plane polarization of a photon cannot be exactly specified at the same time (any more than the position and momentum of a particle can be so specified). Consequently, the requirement of completeness is just as unreasonable in this case, from the point of view of quantum mechanics, as in the case discussed by Einstein and his colleagues. The two measurements, one of circular and the other of plane polarization, are alternatives; they take place on different branches of history and there is no reason for the results of both to be considered together. [Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, 171.]

This problem must be reflected upon and conclusions should be reached. These statements are forgetful of the fact that what in fact is at issue in the locality-criterion in EPR is the speed of light as the upper limit of speeds of communication between S1 and S2. I shall argue as follows:

The exchange particles between nucleons are μ-mesons. These constitute the strong force. Beneath them are quarks, which interact via gluons. As of the present scientific knowledge, these take subluminal velocities. By reason of the indefiniteness (not infinity) of the indefinite number of the near-infinitesimal, properly past, causal influences (from the indefinite causal sub-sub- … layers of the same particles and from their causal external vicinity) on the particles S1 and S2, we never have a measurement of absolute exactness.

We can ascertain only the most probable dimensions and variances of probable shapes of certain aspects of the wavicle motion of S1 and S2, which (the dimensions and variances) show up minutely causally at the microscopic or sub-microscopic or sub-sub-microscopic level associated to the wavicles by the respective theory. It is enough that we be able to assign at least the respective dimensions and variances of motions (and probable measurements in these dimensions and variances) to the wavicles. The causal influences over the two wavicles are quite similar, some quantities of which are opposite in direction.

3. Problems behind the EPR Assumptions and Conclusions

It should be admitted here that all agree that no physical change of dimension of motion happens without causal influences, since the very concept of causation is physical existence in Extension-Change. These influences are proper to the immediate causality in question at the micro-level. The presupposed exactness of measurement is also a culprit here. According to Gell-Mann, the crux of the measurement problem is this:

What is the actual relationship in quantum mechanics between a measurement that permits the assignment of an exact value to a particle’s position at a given time and another measurement that permits its momentum at the same time to be exactly specified? Those measurements take place on two different branches, decoherent with each other (like a branch of history in which one horse wins a given race and another branch in which a different horse wins). Einstein’s requirement amounts to saying that the results from the two alternative branches must be accepted together. That clearly demands the abandonment of quantum mechanics. [Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar, 169.]

The issue of interpretation here revolves around the question of whether positive-valued propagations could travel from the one to the other particle and vice versa – not merely at the time of causal intervention on the one, but always. These may be part of the undiscovered causal actions within and from without the particles. If the two branches measured did not belong to two totally unconnected branches of history, we can accept both together.

Einstein spoke of an isolable ‘element of reality’, thus giving rise to the possibility of Bohm’s hidden variables theory, which attempts to treat undiscovered causal events active from within the inner processual recesses of the particle: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” [Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Volume 7, Part I: Formal and Physical Sciences, 206.]

This is the viewpoint from which he argued for impossibility of the so-called non-locality – i.e., the so-called impossibility of local action of causal propagation under a positive superluminal velocity (because at least in his STR and GTR versions he did not think that superluminal velocities are possible) and of the natural absence of any propagation that miraculously brings in or witnesses an action or change in the second particle.

Before ever discussing the issue of non-locality and the contribution of John Clauser, Alain Aspect, and others to it, it should be known that the realism of locality for Einstein is equivalent to isolability of the concrete. This is the age-old classicism that mixes admitting physical-ontologically occurring (continuous near-infinitely and near-infinitesimally causal) causality along with absolute epistemological determinism.

Holding on to this assumption, the EPR article proposes (1) a necessary criterion of completeness: “Every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory” and (2) a sufficient criterion of reality: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 461.]

This sufficiency condition is considered to be violated according to the results of later quantum experiments. That is, Einstein’s realism in the EPR is an epistemologically absolute deterministic concretism (that, ideally and given enough infrastructure, we can determine every causal possible influence in any concrete case) based on (1) the concept of exact measurability of the changes that are due to casual influences (which I object to due to epistemological and ontological reasons discussed elsewhere) and (2) the concept of impossibility of superluminal causal influences (which must be considered to have been proved otherwise from the merely suppositional status of luminal velocity in STR and GTR, and the defective nature of such suppositions in the Lorentz factor).

Bohr and others held that there is no simultaneous interaction between the two anti-particles and that the systems are causally separated – both of these on the basis of Einstein’s own putting a final limit to the speed of Extension-Change-wise existent electromagnetic propagation. But,

[…] the quantum potential implies that a certain kind of ‘signalling’ does, in fact, take place between the sites of distantly separated spin ½ particles in an entangled state, if one of the particles undergoes a local interaction. This transfer of information cannot, however, be extracted by any experiment which obeys the laws of quantum mechanics. The causal interpretation thus provides an explanation of how the correlations come about in each individual process, in a way that is consistent with the statistical noncommunication of information. [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 476.]

If two systems are isolable and the light that we see has the highest permissible velocity in the cosmos, the superluminal exchange of causal propagations between the two systems is problematic. The same situation arises also when there is a total non-communication, whereby a miracle must be introduced in each such event in the cosmos. Yet, if there is some effect that is beyond the horizon of luminal exchange – be it causally superluminal and local in communication, or non-causally “non-communicative” – it must be reasonable and acceptable.

The possibility of nonlocal or non-communicative “exchange” or a miracle (if superluminal velocities are impossible, and everything is based only on luminal communication) in the EPR experiment implies the need to re-interpret the very ontology of QM, because this alone can account for the realistic case of continuous near-infinitesimal recesses of processual divisibility and the consequent ever more near-infinitesimal wavicle-existence of exchange particles in Extension-Change.

Bunge suggests a defective solution: “The original system becomes dismantled only when at least one of its original components gets integrated into another system – e.g. when it is captured or absorbed by another atom.” [Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Volume 7, Part I: Formal and Physical Sciences, 215.] In this case, so long as such an absorption does not happen, the miraculous event continues to be a non-causal event and then it switches to being a luminally causal event!

This is worse than the admission of superluminal exchanges between S1and S2, because a non-causal action-at-a-vacuous-distance can be avoided only if there is some exchange-wavicle between them before one of them is captured or absorbed by another atom, in order for a real physical change to take place in the one particle system corresponding to the change in the other. This exchange-wavicle can cause an effect in the other particle system only if it is positive-valued and superluminal in velocity. The non-recognition of this fact makes Bunge to make the following conclusion about the issue:

In conclusion, (a) when two quantons interact, their state functions become entangled (not factorizable); (b) when the two quantons separate widely in space, they continue to form part of the original system although they do not act upon one another, much less at a distance and instantaneously […] (c) spatial separation is no cause for divorce: there is divorce only if there is new marriage; (d) non-separability is a consequence of the superposition principle and the Schrödinger equation; (e) non-separability is possibly ‘the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics’ […] (f) the failure of classical separability or ‘locality’ (Einstein separability) confirms the systemic world view […] not however the holistic one, because we do succeed in conceptually analyzing the composition and structure of systems; (g) in quantum theory there is EPR distant correlation (or EPR effect) but there is no paradox: the paradox arises only if quantum theory is combined wit the classical principle of separability or ‘locality’. [Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Volume 7, Part I: Formal and Physical Sciences, 215.]

We do not admit a miracle, i.e., a spooky action-at-a-vacuous-distance without any medium of communication of causal influence. No physics can accept such a miracle. If it is admitted that the exchange is positive and superluminal, it must also be taken as causal, just to keep it natural and physical – for until then luminal communications have been positive-valued and causal. The facts of continuous near-infinite and near-infinitesimal sub-, sub-sub-, … -quantal causal influences within wavicles S1 and S2, if read together with the need to keep physical (Extension-Change level) exchange between the two temporal light cones of the EPR experiment causal, Einstein should have been persuaded of the possibility of superluminal velocities, continuous sub-, sub-sub-, … -quantal causal influences and a multitude of values of the different universal constants in actually existent worlds.

This fully “local” interpretation, happily, does not violate the discreteness- / discontinuity assumption in QM quanta for this world, but may violate the assumption of absolute discontinuity between quantum values in QM for the infinite multiverse if that is the case.

It violates also the speed barrier in STR, which can duly be clarified at discussion of the question of superluminal velocities in the foundations of STR and GTR. If there is no upper limit for superluminal velocities, there is absolute causal continuity of causal origin of all kinds of particle-values and values of constants in Reality. This is so despite the fact that quantum values in each world considered in isolation remain discrete with respect to the totality of values of constants available therein.

In this case it suffices to say that Bohr’s statistical instrumentalist interpretation does not do justice to the inner causal processes of particles that may be pinpointed through the connection of each entity with all realized entities in the proper past of the contemporary world of that entity. Here, discreteness of values in QM breaks down on the large-scale Extension-Change-wise existence proper to an infinite multiverse.

4. Einstein’s Extreme Monism vs. the Meaning of Genuine Holism

In this context, notice also that Einstein unconsciously oversteps his classicist concretist determinism and suggests a surprisingly unitary (or, physically extremely monistic and incapacitating physics to differentiate between its parts) system of the physical universe: “Nature as a whole can only be viewed as an individual system, existing only once, and not as collection of systems.” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 570.] The physics proper to it is beyond all imagination.

This shows that “[…] the state of the whole is prior to that of the parts ([…] the parts are not physically determined as aspects of the whole, as they would be in a unified field theory, for instance).” [Holland, The Quantum Theory of Motion, 568.] Bohm says: “The relationship between parts of a system described above implies a new quality of wholeness of the entire system going beyond anything that can be specified solely in terms of the actual spatial relationships of all the particles.” [Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe, 58.]

This is monism of the worst kind, not holism of any kind, as seen in Śaṅkara Vedānta. Clearly, Einstein’s dearest philosopher was Spinoza, and from this the reason for his physical monism is clear enough. In the holism of Reality that I propose, universes or physical systems are never completely unified, because no communication can travel at infinite velocity. If there is a maximal velocity in a universe or group of universes, others will have other criterial velocities. There can anyway be some causal connections between many neighbouring universes or groups of them.

This holism pivots around the highly probable fact that there is continuity of universal constants in a system that includes the existing and future universes together. As against this, Einstein’s monism would have to admit infinite velocities and complete mutual identity of Extension-Change-wise existent regions.

To concentrate more on the continuity principle, I leave out Bell’s contributions to justification or non-justification of the “locality” standpoint. Instead of studying the involving descriptions of Bell’s inequalities, I deem it sufficient to mention that Bell’s understanding of realism is a determinist (and concretist) realism, and that this is a presupposition that d’Espagnat takes as a loophole to argue against him:

However, if we examine the proof of Bell’s inequality more carefully, the assumption of realism really is one of the premises of a local realistic theory, but this premise is only a special form of realism, the deterministic realism, i.e., the existence of a hidden parameter. So that the violation of Bell’s inequality cannot be regarded as a violation of realism in general, e.g. a general statement, such as ‘disagreeing with the doctrine that the world is independent of mind’! [Zuoxiu, “On the Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen Paradox and the Relevant Philosophical Problems”, 301.]

Let us briefly study the experimental demonstration by Aspect, Clauser etc., of what they call ‘non-locality’ in nature, in order for me to suggest a causal-continuous phenomenal-noumenal interpretation. Aspect and others [Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe, 144-45.] have experimentally tested that there are (causal or non-causal?) correlations between particles S1 and S2even when the events of detection of the two photons are for him outside each other’s light cones. This violates the Bell’s inequality for locality (which shows that the disturbance from 1 is not communicated beyond the light cone of 1). Even the criticism by others of Aspect’s experiments (saying, the photon detector’s efficiency was not close to unity) may be found to be a contrivance to save the phenomena. [Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe, 144-45.] Aspect and others have also insisted that, if there are hidden variables, they are non-local under the assumption of the generally presupposed impossibility of superluminal velocities.

But I argue that, if the light cone of S1 is transgressed by the communication of the disturbance between S1 and S2, then the fixed velocity of light has been violated by a positive-valued communication that has gone superluminal.

Another matter to be discussed here is the possibility of tachyons that E. C. G. Sudarshan and others proposed based on the assumption of the velocity of light as a velocity barrier between two systems and two universes. This is still based mathematically on the questionable way of measurement of motion by the criterion of the very velocity of photons (in the Lorentz factor) that one aims at measuring. Hence, the mathematical physics behind the concepts of tachyons and photons is equally questionable. The question of superluminal velocities must therefore be discussed for its own sake in the various versions of the Theories of Relativity. The presently suggested interpretation of the EPR will be complete only after we study the possibility of superluminal velocities in the discussion on STR.

The continuity between subluminal and superluminal worlds will then follow. This is sufficient support for the phenomenal-noumenal continuity via the relativization of the macro-, meso-, micro-, sub-quantal and other perspectives based on the ontological tenability of there being Reality as extra-phenomenal, and hence in the sense of a totalized existing, things-in-themselves, which can show itself phenomenally.

Bibliography

(1) Gravitational Coalescence Paradox and Cosmogenetic Causality in Quantum Astrophysical Cosmology, 647 pp., Berlin, 2018.

(2) Physics without Metaphysics? Categories of Second Generation Scientific Ontology, 386 pp., Frankfurt, 2015.

(3) Causal Ubiquity in Quantum Physics: A Superluminal and Local-Causal Physical Ontology, 361 pp., Frankfurt, 2014.

(4) Essential Cosmology and Philosophy for All: Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology, 92 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 2nd Edition.

(5) Essenzielle Kosmologie und Philosophie für alle: Gravitational-Koaleszenz-Kosmologie, 104 pp., KDP Amazon, 2022, 1st Edition.