What variables would you recommend studying under the construct "a country's legal system and culture" as regards the effect of corporate governance on firm performance?
There exists a well number of anecdotal evidence of a link between corporate governance practices and firm performance. But the empirical studies mainly focus on specific dimensions or attributes of corporate governance like board structure and composition; the role of non-executive directors; other control mechanisms such as director and managerial stockholdings, ownership concentration, debt financing, executive labour market and corporate control market; top management and compensation; capital market pressure and short-termism; social responsibilities and internationalization.
In corporate governance we distinguish two legal system - Anglo-saxon and continental. You can use this division to see the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. Note that corporate governance consists of legal and voluntary norms.
Research: Index Funds Are Improving Corporate Governance!
"...The rise of mutual funds designed to mimic stock indices rather than outperform them seems destined to change the dynamic of company boardrooms and executive suites. Since passive investors have dramatically more assets under management, they might be expected to exert more influence over corporate decision making.
The question is, do they really? And if so, are they using that power?
Until now, the chief answer to both questions has been no. The prevailing wisdom in the ongoing debate has been that the shift in the ownership of publicly traded firms actually weakens corporate oversight..."
I would recommend studying Online web-enabled business Strategies. It has a significant impact on productivity and has a great potential for influencing corporate governance, and for improving firm performance?
Take a look...
Conference Paper Why Companies embracing Online web-enabled Product Developme...
There are two studies that may answer your question.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) found that companies operating in countries whose legal systems protect minority interests have higher stock market valuations than companies operating in countries with lesser protections.
Source: LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. 2002. “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation.” Journal of Finance 57 (3): 1147-1170.
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) found that companies that employ “shareholder-friendly” governance features significantly outperform companies that employ “shareholder unfriendly” governance features.
Source: Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 107-155, February 2003.
Does Employee Inclusion in Corporate Governance Enhance Firm Performance? Yes, Indeed, says the research...!
"As the economies are becoming knowledge intensive and industries are
encountering turbulent technology environments, and the markets undergoing large-scale globalization with firms experiencing wild fluctuations in financial performance, firm governance structure and the functioning of corporate boards in particular are under serious scrutiny.
This article accentuates the significance of employee participation in strategic decision-making based on the following premises. First, as the number of firms with global reach have increased, there are new debates as to whether the extant corporate governance practices reflect the interests of true ownership, because in many modern corporations the capital ownership is spread far and wide and fragmented, and the major proportion of firms’ capital are built and channeled through institutional investors from the savings and contributions of employees and general public. Second, as industries have become volatile due to turbulent business environments, stock ownership has become fleeting in nature and shareholders’ transactions are often dictated by speculation rather than long-term performance. Third, with employees’ knowledge becoming a major competitive resource, employees should be viewed as the primary stakeholders of a firm..."
Most of the countries have their own CG Codes i.e., Malaysian Codes on CG, 2012, Malaysian Codes for Institutional Investors, 2014 ( in case of Malaysia), from their you can get variables for studying the impact of CG on firm performance as dependent variable. The independent variables may be board structure and compositions board process as internal CG mechanism, policies regarding shareholder participation and for the protection of minority shareholders, board Committees (audit committee), rules for related party transactions, and other disclosures,
Hope this might be useful piece of information for you Sir.
The board structure variables, ownership structure variables, and audit function variables are internal CG mechanisms that can be used as independent variables regarding their impact on firm performance. Meanwhile, a country's legal system and culture, among other constructs and variables, may be used as an external CG mechanism. Any elaboration?
With a country's legal system research often tries to address the the difference between civil law and commom law countries. The conventional view in accounting is that common law countries are more shareholder oriented than civil law countries. This is why it is assumed that the implementation of accounting standards that adress the information needs of shareholders and investors do not lead to such dramatic improvements in common law countries, compared to civil law countries.
I am wondering, whether this assumption can also be made for corporate governance. To be sure, the corporate governance debate emerged from common law countries (UK & USA), because of the dispersed shareholdings and the need to address minority shareholder interests in that jurisdictions.
However, if the legal system caused the CG debate to emerge, can we say that this very legal system is by itself an external CG mechanism? In my view, if we need CG mechanisms to address the shortcomings of the common law legal system, then the common law legal system by itself is not a reliable CG instrument.
In one of the numeous threads on corporate governance we have discussed the idea of bundles. As you remember, I am a strong supporter of the idea of corporate governance bundles given fundamental differences among countries. I am sceptical as to whether we can establish variables that will provide us with reliable and comparable results in a multilateral setting.
Here are some of concluding remarks from @Romer's resource.
Corporate governance affects the development and functioning of capital markets and exerts a strong influence on resource allocation. In an era of increasing capital mobility and globalisation, it has also become an important framework condition affecting the industrial competitiveness and economies..
One of the most striking differences between countries’ corporate governance systems is the difference in the ownership and control of firms that exist across countries. There are tradeoffs between ownership concentration and voting power concentration. Systems of corporate governance can be distinguished according to the degree of ownership and control and the identity of controlling shareholders...
There is no single model of good corporate governance, and both insider and outsider systems have their strengths, weaknesses, and different economic implications. Furthermore, the effectiveness of different corporate governance systems is influenced by differences in countries’ legal and regulatory
frameworks, and historical and cultural factors, in addition to the structure of product and factor markets....
The benefits of concentrated ownership are that it brings more effective monitoring of management and helps to overcome agency problems. However, the costs associated with concentrated ownership are low liquidity and reduced possibilities for risk diversification...
Since equity markets are important for R&D and innovative activity, entrepeneurship, and the development of an active SME sector, corporate governance has an underlying impact on economic growth and development. Therefore, one of the main challenges facing policy makers is how to develop a good corporate governance framework which can secure the benefits associated with controlling shareholders acting as direct monitors, while at the same time, ensuring that they do not expropriate excessive rents at
the expense of other stakeholders...
Policy recommendations should attempt to account for the interactions between corporate governance and the institutional framework in the particular country. The search for good practice should be based on an identification of what works in defined countries, to discern what broad principles can be derived from these experiences, and to examine the conditions for transferability of these practices to other countries...
All right. Now, under the legal system, what laws could we include? For example, if we can include Governance Law(s), Commercial Law, what other laws do you recommend?
I would treat https://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html with caution. I went through some country profiles. The analysis is full of generalisations which I would refrain from using in my research. For example, for the USA you can find such statements: "Many white collar workers will move to a more fancy neighborhood after each and every substantial promotion." .... or look at this one: "American businesses measure their performance on a short-term basis, with profit and loss statements being issued on a quarterly basis." .... or this one: "9/11 has created a lot of fear in the American society culminating in the efforts of government to monitor everybody through the NSA and other security organisations".
To me, the authors just use some taken-for-granted assumptions without performing any own research.
Now, another question is raised: If we have to split CULTURE from the LEGAL SYSTEM, which is probably feasible, what variables should we consider under Culture?
Enterprises are expected to hold corporate social responsibility for the parties beyond the management and capital owners. However, enterprises sometimes ignore this responsibility on reason that such responsibility does not contribute anything to the company. This is particularly true because the relationship between the enterprises and environments is non reciprocal , meaning that the transaction between the two does not result in mutual contribution.
How to design Accounting Information System for CSR disclosure and activities?. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_design_Accounting_Information_System_for_CSR_disclosure_and_activities [accessed May 13, 2017].