One theory is that it is related to the use of psychiatric drugs. I am not qualified to judge if this theory has any merit, but it is worth investigating:

http://www.storyleak.com/flashback-virtually-mass-shootings-linked-violence-inducing-psych-drugs/

One can address this question from two vantages: 1) Are there constructs enabling the explication of mass killings (subset of gun violence, both related to gun ownership and the Constitutional argument therefor) and the source, if any, for the verifiability of Hoftede's work (his fifth binary is the short-term/long-term time aspect); and 2) the extent to which 'sweeping generalizations' and 'societal profiling' are valid concerns or that their 'casting' is such as to imply false alarmism and/or insertion of anti-scientific pettifoggery into otherwise rational discussions.

The answer to the methodological issue (#1) is, yes, there are, on both counts. The response to the semiotic issue (#2) is, yes, on both counts.

Without going into a great deal of detail (a lot on my plate today so I'm not going overboard here), the mass shootings are the result of allowing deformed minds to wander around with scary thoughts and with scary means of accomplishing them; Hofstede's work makes sense when they express the honor-dignity binary, and not generally otherwise.

Terms such as ''sweeping generalizations' and 'societal profiling' arguably presuppose negative connotations. They are correct in this iff (if and only if) the underlying methodology is either deficient or the nature of the quest is necessarily dubious. It is entirely possible that structuralists (who do this kind of work) are apt to slip up if not ever-alert to error in the interpretation of empirical findings. It is not true, on the other hand, that the entire project is a fool's errand.

Generalizations are by definition sieves. By definition the truth of a valid current of related facts with a common relation to a referent fact set with parameters of, say, 1 to 1.5 standard deviations from absolute correspondence constitutes a valid and verifiable generalization. End of discussion. You disagree? Have a happy life.

Profiling is unfair not in method but in application. In method it amounts to nothing less nor more than establishing valid and verifiable generalizations. And that is by definition acceptable by any scientific standard ever devised. The use of binaries to explicate and predict cultural parameters has long been considered within broad stretches of academe to be essentially 'societal profiling'. With the academic penchant for political correctness over truth-finding, this nicely accounts for dropping the ball so suddenly and thoroughgoingly on the shame-guilt thesis established by Mead and Benedict in the nineteen-thirties.

As a structuralist metaphysician I am as 'biased' as also logically and empirically correct (curses, that Herrman--always HAS to be right!!). The entire matter boils down to demonstrating whether and to what extent simplicities can be shown to derive complexities, wherein we develop a method by which to recreate aspects of empirical reality from metaphysical constructs called paradigms.

This was the heart of Einstein's theoretical grounding, and he was no mean theorist. But it also stands to reason since structure arrived from comparative chaos, implying that simplicities were first arrived at within chaos, and that permutations characterizing chaos led simplicities to be bundled, and bundling into complexity. Alternatively we can logically start with an aggregate and ask what steps are logical necessary to arrive at an amalgam, or vice versa (in most, but hardly all, phenomena the process is reversible).

I forgot to mention something. Just as there is a distinction in law between 'beyond a reasonable doubt' and a 'preponderance of evidence' , the latter the stricter test, in science somewhat the same exists. The generalization is the easier test, whereas correspondence at a level of reliance as against chance for every application is the stronger test, generally at 85%.

Thus if we want to see if psychiatrists know what they think they know, we look to the strict test. If they answer/diagnose the same at 85% then we are satisfied. If we want a rough and ready supposition to guide further research into accuracy in psychiatric diagnosis, a generalization based on experience and even anecdotal evidence will suffice. It is sufficient to call into question or to suggest likely agreement. When I chide the profession it is typically on both counts. Patients with experience can validly report the opinion that there is too much variation (generalization), and a statistical analysis then confirms it at the higher level. It is increasingly clear, however, that while psychiatrists remain behind the eight-ball in nosological theory, they are reliable in what counts the most, a determination of 1) need for therapy and 2) likelihood of a danger to self and society.

Apologies for flubbing, the preponderance of evidence is of course the easier test.

Though I can plead dyslexia, I can also plead the tendency of law to badly phrase concepts. 'Reasonable doubt' constitutes the rough definition for a negative generalization, whereas preponderance implies deduction from what what can be fairly accurately mensurated, whence presumably goes to the higher level. The same sloppiness accounts for the failure of so much law to poorly reflect underlying jural constructs, especially when concepts of office are at stake (as they are in half of law, the half that is 85% of commonly occurring issues).

Too harsh an assessment? Not at all. This is why we have had a recent worldwide financial crisis, why professionals are far less professional than we would like, and why we have a healthcare crisis while also not finding (or punishing when found) most white collar criminals, and why our system is so expensive and slow, and much more than this. When words mean what they mean it usually signifies ethico-moral concepts than mean what they mean, ergo are taken seriously, ergo that we work harder to meet mythic desiderata, which we assuredly do not ensure for too much of our legal precepts as put into practice. Loose thinking usually translates not only to loose constructions but also to loose or changing values. Geez, where in moral philosophy have we heard that before? Start maybe with Thucydides?

Nor is it that reflecting jural constructs must be impracticable. Rather, there are folks who just don't want a system that functions better than their wallets grow fat (because not able to meet the demands of wealthy clients to gain unjust advantages). The essential theory of the professions was that if they were correctly prosecuted the generous livery would follow, and if not, would constitute a justification for modification. That wasn't supposed to mean we would evolve boutique law, boutique medicine and boutique education. Fortunately a serious segment of the population is catching on to the nonsense.

And the reason most will not listen to any of this is doubtless because Marx, the great American bogey man, would roundly approve my remarks.

As a lesson in definition: You may consider this as the example par excellence of the newest critical definition of a "rant".

Thank you, Charles! I knew that you would bring interesting and fresh insights to this topic.

Gwen