In his work "The Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics" publish in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Griffiths claims that this approach overcomes the problem of the wave-function "collapse".

His suggestion is that in each trial of an experiment, a quantum system follows a "history" meaning a succession of states.

Here is an example: consider a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with an input beam-splitter BSi, and an output beam-splitter BSo, both transmitting and reflecting in equal proportion. The outputs of BSi are denoted b and c, and those of BSo, e and f. A single-particle wave-packet |a> impinging on BSi is split as follows

(1) |a> → (1/√2)( |c> + |d>).

Before impinging on BSo the wave-packets |c> and |d> have accumulates phases

(2) (1/√2)( |c> + |d>) → (1/√2)[exp(iϕc)|c> + exp(iϕd)|d>],

and BSo induces the transformation

(3) (1/√2)[exp(iϕc)|c> + exp(iϕd)|d>] → α|e> + β|f>,

where the amplitudes α and β depend on the phases ϕc and ϕd.

In his book "Consistent quantum theory" chapter 13, Griffiths indicates two possible histories:

(4.1) |a> → (1/√2)( |c> + |d>) → (1/√2)[exp(iϕc)|c> + exp(iϕd)|d>] → |e>,

(4.2) |a> → (1/√2)( |c> + |d>) → (1/√2)[exp(iϕc)|c> + exp(iϕd)|d>] → |f>,

the history (4.1) occurring with probability |α|2, and the history (4.2) with probability |β|2.

Does somebody understand in which way these histories avoid the collapse postulate?

The correct transformation at BSo is (3), a unitary transformation, not (4.1) and not (4.2). Each one of the histories (4.1) and (4.2) involves a truncation of the wave-function at BSo. But this is exactly the mathematical expression of the collapse principle: truncation of the wave-function.

Hence my question: can somebody tell me how is it possible to claim that these histories avoid the collapse postulate?

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