See the attached figure below (from Zacks and Jablonka 2023). Notice that ‘sensory’ is segregated from ‘motor’ (except at the midbrain) just as it is for humans; in short, no sensory (and no memory) = no-consciousness. The unconscious (as studied by Sigmund Freud) is marked as ‘motor’, which includes the cerebellum.
Now that you all know that the Hard problem is a misunderstanding embraced by many (see Footnote 1), we can get on with working out the biological basis of consciousness, at least for vertebrates. Invertebrate consciousness also needs some attention. The fact that ants bury their dead speaks volumes about their social consciousness.
The Allen Institute has been able to create a plethora of genetic markers to study the mouse brain in its entirety (e.g., Allen Mouse Brain Atlas/Oh et al. 2014; http://connectivity.brainmap.org/). Soon, the same might be so for lower vertebrates and invertebrates, which would bring the study of such animals to the same level as that of the mouse, thereby further facilitating our understanding of the biological bases of consciousness in these animals as is currently being accomplished in mice (e.g., Hasanbegović 2024).
Footnote 1: Christof Koch, Francis Crick, and so on have erroneously embraced the Hard problem (Chalmers 1995, 1997); we know that no two living individuals can ever have the same experience as realized by Noam Chomsky. Chomsky (2007/8) observed the absence of consistency in brain activity between individuals performing the same linguistic task. The reason for this is that genetics and an organism’s unique learning experience guarantees that no two individuals (including identical twins) will experience the color ‘red’ (or anything transmitted by language for that matter) in the same manner, even though the individuals can agree (almost 100% of the time) on identifying the color ‘red’ at an intersection while driving a car.