For example, see how simplistic the so-called ‘indeterminacy of reference’ is presupposed, without asking whether determination and determinacy have any relationship with causal-processually existent objects: “Indeterminacy of reference is a metalinguistic, not an object-linguistic, phenomenon. It leaves object-language communication undisturbed.” [Gaskin 2021: Language and World: A Defence of Linguistic Idealism, ix]

Without any generalization about what reference – whatever – has to do with concepts (in terms of connotative universals and their concatenations inheriting their relevance from ontological universals in natural kinds and token entities / processes) and the pertinents of their existent counterparts (pertinents being the relevant ontological universes and their conglomerations in the natural kinds and token processes) in existent processes, Gaskin begins to identify referents: “Frege was right to identify the referents of predicates with concepts, but he should have taken the referents of declarative sentences to be Russellian propositions rather than truth-values.” [Gaskin 2021: ix] This tendency is typical of all the positivist, linguistic, empiricist, scienticist, and related realisms and idealisms.

Purely empirically oriented substance philosophies have been the basis of the sciences for centuries and very much even today. This has been due to the absence of the recognition that (1) truth and fact are posterior to existence in both Reality and in theory, (2) every almost infinitesimal part of physical existents is finitely active / dynamic, and (3) this kind of simultaneous and complete existence is in Extension-Change (and neither in space-time, nor in mind, nor in language) and is as such Universal Causality. Hence, linguistic idealism and their likes are fads and cannot characterize the matter-energy that supports the so-called information and virtual worlds.

Thus, for the sciences and for most science-enhancing philosophies today – including pragmatic and analytic philosophies and philosophies of sciences –, physical actions have remained the characteristic behaviour of forces on material things. For these philosophies, things exist and, behaviour, including causation, is therefore just an additional action on existent physical processes. This, in my opinion, is why a notion of Universal Causality applicable to the whole of Reality-in-total has been absent until now; and this is why so far AI information, virtual worlds, mind, etc. have been taken as containing something inexplicably mysterious.

Yes I think that in some sense linguistic idealism is a consequence of the linguistic turn in philosophy from Frege onwards. I think Frege would have been appalled at the suggestion though; after all the sense/reference distinction is the distinction between the objective and the means of representation. And of course the view that we construct a world by the use of signs goes back at least as far as William of Ockham, and Frege himself is steeped in Kant's transcendent idealist view that we construct our word by imposing space and time on it. My personal view is that Frege was right to separate the world of propositions and states-of-affairs from the linguistic description of them. There is always the concern that a language uses terms that do not refer at all because an entity thought to be an effective explanatory construct turns out to lead to experimentally incorrect results (like "phlogiston" or the "ether"). It is a mistake to be a sort of Kantian or Fregean who substitutes language for space and time though, since language itself is not important, only the goodness of fit between terms and the world of physical things and causal events. I take a strong view that there should be a canonical language to describe the physical world, but it would take us off topic to explore the nature of the mathesis universalis here.

Andrew Powell, thanks for the comment. I can appreciate the view.

Now, please take a look at some paragraphs that I quickly wrote yesterday in view of further work on it:

Non-systemically Systematic Analytic Nature of Logic:Logic from the time of Aristotle has been purely and inevitably analytic. A systemic manner (not merely systematic, but most generally systematic about systematic systems) of using the analytic methods of logic has not yet been developed, and logic continues to be analytic. Nevertheless, the strictly analytic foundations of logic and linguistic analysis captured the attention of logicians with Gottlob Frege’s work. Hence, it can be claimed that the strictly analytic school of philosophy is more than 140 years old.

Fully Denotative Characteristics of Analytic Logic: Analytic philosophies and naturally their various forms of logical application have the following hallmarks:

(1) The correspondence-wise equivocation of the denotative and connotative senses of concepts, statements, and theories with the denotables in question that may be token entities, processes, events, and states of affairs – this is accomplished under the concept of ‘reference’ in all discourse, sciences, and structural parts of discourse and sciences.

(2) The dependence on a sort of theory of logic wherein the foundations and procedures of discourse and method are defined by the denotatively qualified understanding not only of the principles of logic but also of any use of further derivative logical principles and empirically characterized uses of concepts and statements in logic.

(3) The construction of theories based on the empricially direct and indirect naturalist and anti-universalist methods of derivation of truths in the name of particular facts and states of affairs, as in the sciences, without the use of the conceptual and theory-building breadths offered by the founding of universals directly on the To Be of Reality-in-total and the to be of realties-in-particular.

The Philosophical Counterpart of Analytic Logic: This is coupled with the deep concern to dispel from philosophy and sciences all that they count as metaphysically not based on the above concept of reference. For this they use the linguistic-analytic and scientific-analytic methods of their strictly denotatively overwhelmed mode of use of logical terms and logical functions to achieve scientific and philosophical advance.

Phenomena, Acts of Perception, and Thought: We think, perceive, conceptualize, feel, speak, etc. in kinds of symbols, including language. But, for this reason, the major foundation of our ideas, perceptions, feelings, judgements, truths, theories, sciences, etc. need not necessarily be our thought, mind, language, etc. At least the metaphysical foundations and the epistemic notions of something cannot be itself (the “something”).

All these actions have some connection with the Extension-Change-wise existent processes outside in the world (and of course within the acting subjects). These “whatever” from within the layers of processes, which connect with the actions are the phenomena. The phenomena are what shine forth from the processes and then result in data of all kinds. These are not primarily the universals but the very stuff that cause in us perceptions, concepts, feelings, thoughts, language, and discourse. As they appear in our minds, they are not the phenomena. They are already altered into data and quasi-data, which include also the images.

Hence, the major agents for our thought, concepts, feelings, language, discourse, etc. will have to be the showings from the existent processes. These phenomena are founded on processual things themselves in their groups, and hence, the processes themselves and the ontologically universal qualities of the processes are the foundations of all that get conceptualized and expressed within our minds and languages – but always in extremely slight or false reflections. Now, these ontological universals too have the most general ones as their base. The latter are naturally the foundations of all others.

Foundational and Less Foundational Truths in the Sciences: Foundational truths are based on the most general somethings-in-existence status of processes. Such truths are the ones that we can assume as the most fundamental, because they are the sine qua non for all discourse.

But, for most sciences and scientific philosophies, other truths that are proved empirically repeatedly as certain are fundamental truths, e.g., ‘Humans are at least partially conscious’, ‘Water is chemically H2O’, etc. Here one forgets the conditio sine qua non nature of more foundational truths for sciences and philosophies, like those of the Categories: Extension-Change.

Without this type of universal truths, we cannot explain truths similar to the above statements in science and self-evidently also the virtual worlds of internet, AI, informatics, and BI, because all other foundations on which these truths (and the sciences and philosophies of sciences) are explained are epistemically measuremental, and not sufficiently physical-ontological.

It is clear now that epistemically measuremental derivative truths like definitions and repeatedly proved empirical truths, and even their epistemic presuppositions, can, at the most, yield truths with some theoretical truth probabilities, if the metaphysical foundations are not used to justify them.

The former truths are not ipso facto based on and justified by the Extension-Change-wise metaphysical Categories that are self-evident in the concept of To Be. Epistemically measuremental truths were often identified for millennia as the very realities in the object sets of these sciences.

For additional examples, ‘Humans are rational’, ‘This book has a finite weight’, etc. Now the questions: Are not humans rational? Do not all existent processes have some weight? We say Yes, with biological and/or physical status ratios and epistemic grades and truth probabilities. These truths are not as justifiable of all existents as the existence of anything, the Extension-Change nature of all existents, the essence of all Extension-Change-wise existents as causal and processual, etc., on which should be based all other truths.

WHAT I GIVE HERE IS A VIEWPOINT, I AM HAPPY TO BE SUBJECTED TO FURTHER CRITIQUE.

Thanks.

Raphael

Andrew Powell, here are some reflections. Kindly respond. I would like to get your critique.

Some thinkers may have the conviction that somehow linguistic analytic philosophy can justify information and virtual worlds in AI – perhaps in connection with other kinds of worlds like the aesthetical, literary, etc. Observe how and why even today the linguistic-analytic version of early 20th century empiricism using the direct and cosy sort of denotative concepts of reference and sense easily enhancing purely empirically based science without sufficiently broad theoretical foundations in the inevitable nature of existent processes and their totalities.

This is achieved via the sort of denotative concepts of reference and sense used in linguistic-analysis, and reigns supreme in the majority of academic philosophy today – even after manipulating Reality inside out and thus centring Reality on the idealistic use of the alleged centrality of language for Reality to exist.

As we have already seen, these philosophies can at the most connect all discourse with linguistic determinations or with linguistically sanctioned denotative connecting of semantic, logical, and other possible forms of functions behind the language of entities, events, etc., and their notions of natural kinds with theory. Every abnormality has at least some extreme abnormal consequences. Naturally, such theories will prove themselves soon as fads.

If you stay strictly adherent to their premises, they cannot and do not intend to connect the notions (and denotative words) of natural kinds with natural kinds themselves or with the Extension-Change kind of processes that the token members of the natural kinds are – for which a notion of the existence (To Be) of the absolutely processual Reality should have been in place, and not feared as recalling metaphysics.

The latter is what I have been attempting to do in the present work, and thus to demonstrate that information has a causal backdrop, against which information is just concatenations of connotative and denotative universals. Such information and virtuals do not exist separately but as concatenations in minds, instruments, language, etc.

Stergios Pellis, thanks for being in accord with my opinion here above, given in response to Andrew Powell.

Let me put down here a set of paradigms.

(1) One way to start thinking of experience is as experience, without admitting the existence of "somethings" out there, not existing exactly as we define and attribute qualities to; and hence without thinking equally well -- and making ways to think so -- of the status of the objects of experience as objects out there.

In this manner of thinking, we have many philosophies -- all of which are the various shades of empiricism. Linguistic-analytic philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics etc. in recent history belong to this.

And even when they admit of the thinghood of things, this is being done as the experientially defined or presupposed substantiality of things as objects. They do not delve into the flux nature of these objects as "somethings with processuality". They may admit the processuality of these things out there, but they do not make space in their theory speak of them as processes always, without over-stressing their experience-based expression by humans.

(2) On the other hand, the sciences do not want to express experience in an experience-based manner, but instead, in terms of the things out there, ignoring the experience-based nature of the ways of expression, ways of definition, and ways of explanation that we have.

Mostly they are in the delirium wherein they take the objectuality of the objects of experience as somewhat purely substantial for all purposes, thus missing the processual nature of the objects completely and missing the experience-based nature of expression, definition, and explanation completely.

This is the case even in quantum physics, where the physicist is in a fix as to what to speak of the indeterminacy and locality of quanta. They get immersed in the statistical and linguistic inability of experience to express, define, and explain the difference between substances and processes.

(3) And take the case of the few philosophers of physics like A. N. Whitehead. He is today an old-school person due to the passage of time between him and us. But his effort to processualize everything existent and his insistence not to take the merely experiential manner of expression, definition, and explanation -- are noteworthy.

He and a few others seem to have taken the existence of the objects of experience seriously, as being independent of experience and its instruments, namely, language, interpretation, ideas, etc.

The sad state of linguistic-analaytic philosophy today is this: Even while speaking of existent things, they just want to stick to the linguistic stance. A pity! But the pride with which they do it, as if they have the power to dominate all philosophy, is symptomatic. It makes them look down upon all other philosophies, not permit space for others to critique them, or at least take some opportunity to grow in the academic circles.

They do also suppose that their school of philosophy has become a science as such, since the science-similarity that it has achieved due to the linguistic and logical manipulations they have achieved.

WHAT DO YOU FEEL OF THIS?

If interested in an EVALUATION OF LINGUISTIC-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, kindly read this discussion:

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Linguistic-Analytic_Philosophy_is_more_than_130_years_old_How_to_improve_this_school_of_thought/2

Corcoran characterizes pragmatic philosophies with the following general points within their outlook:

(1) The meaning of a proposition is to be identified with its experimental and practical meaning, i.e. with the totality of possible experience it predicts. (2) The truth of a proposition consists in the long-term realization (past, present, and future) of its meaning. (3) Belief in the truth of a proposition is warranted to the extent that it has been tested in practice and found to be satisfactory (by the person or community having the belief). [Corcoran 2019]

The one thing that Corcoran does not mention (nor does any other logician, scientist, or thinker so far, as my knowledge goes) is that pragmatists never include under ‘propositions’ the foundational propositions of systems. My question here is about the propositions in the form of possible pan-disciplinary foundational principles for all sciences and philosophy together. Pragmatic kinds of definition of the demands of ‘practical’ meaning, prediction, etc. are not to be found useful or realizable at the propositional formulations of the foundational Categories or of other first principles.

Not that no pragmatism is accessed to while attempting to find the foundational Categories of all sciences and philosophy. But the said kind of Categories have the least pragmatism at use. Before laughing at the attempt, one should at least recognize that such an attempt aims to reduce the element of pragmatism from science, thought and life.

Moreover, realization of the “working” demand as the condition for anything to possess rationality has been misused by sciences, technologies, cultures, and human individuals everywhere as a part-licence to justify what they have already been doing. Such pragmatism, encountered consistently everywhere, in all strata of human action, science, philosophy, society, etc., works for me as the major academic trigger to reflections on, and to plan an exciting but base-level reform of, the foundations of thought, sciences, and humanities – of course in the simple manner that I can. If such pragmatism were in principle an unexceptionally insuperable human fate, no science and thought would have grown in the foundations, methods, and results, the sciences as it was centuries ago would have sufficed for the human race today; and no other, more general, thinking would have taken shape and would exist.

Unfortunately for the various shades of pragmatism in scientistic thinking and its practice on human feeling, thinking, bodies, lives, society, politics, and finally on humanity as such and the environment, there does exist thought that is or attempts to be more general than the sciences. Would I be permitted to try the same in a different manner? Their very existence in whatever meagre capacity invalidates the lethargic conclusion and claim that pragmatism is an insuperable fate of humans. I do not now theorize on the unethical and inhuman aspects of pragmatic practices!

The localization of anything -- including the minds / persons that cognize -- has so far been done in terms of the epistemic / cognitive / mental categories of space and time, and then space and time have been attributed as such to existent processes as if they were existent in space and time.

The question of localizability in the sciences is coupled with the measuremental aspects of cognized location. Hence, space and time continue to be physical-ontological categories. But the paradox of attributing epistemic categories to existent things / processes continues to baffle all.

Hence, we need primarily the physical-ontological Categories: Extension and Change, and secondarily also the epistemic categories parallel to them, i.e., space and time.

Existence in Extension (having parts) and Change (causing impacts) is itself causality, because only extended things and their parts can impact any other.

Now, if a portion of Causality is understandable as the very freedom that some beings exercise, then freedom is the ever growing distance from certain naural influences due to the intensification of certain types of activities in the subject. That is, this too is causation, but in a slightly different sense, and free actions are fully causal actions -- with the only difference that the causation in such cases of certain actions are induced more from within the subject's actions than from outside.

If such is freedom, then freedom is fully causal. This fact might cause the oft-hoped-for integration of the various sciences together into parts of one and the same scientific (and philosophical) enterprise.

It is here that the possibility of epistemic possibilization of physical ontology appears necessary.

MATHEMATICAL CONTINUITY IN NATURE Vs. CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN (PARTIALLY) DISCRETE "PROCESSUAL" OBJECTS. (Have patience to read till the end.)

Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature is a mere idealization. It expects nature to obey our idealization. This is what happens in all physical and cosmological (and of course other) sciences as long as they use mathematical idealizations to represent existent objects and processes.

But mathematically following nature in whatever it is in its part-processes is a different procedure in science and philosophy (and even in the arts and humanities). This theoretical attitude accepts the existence of processual entities as what they are.

This theoretical attitude accepts in a highly generalized manner that

(1) mathematical continuity (in any theory and in terms of any amount of axiomatization of physical theories) is totally non-realizable in nature as a whole and in its parts: because the necessity of mathematical approval in such a cosmology falls short miserably,

(2) absolute discreteness (even QM type, based on the Planck constant) in the physical cosmos (not in non-quantifiable “possible worlds”) and its parts is a mere commonsense compartmentalization (from the "epistemology of box-type thinking" -- Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Uni-Paderborn): because the aspect of the causally processual connection between any two quanta is logically and mathematically alienated in the physical theory of Planck’s constant, and

(3) hence, the only viable and thus the most reasonably generalizable manner of being of the physical cosmos and of biological entities is that of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS.

PHYSICS and COSMOLOGY even today tend to make the cosmos mathematically either continuous or defectively discrete or statistically oriented to epistemically logical decisions and determinations. Can anyone suggest here the existence of a different sort of physics and cosmology until today? A topology and mereology of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS, fully free of discreteness-oriented category theory and functional analysis, is yet to be born. Hence, causality in its deep roots in the very concept of To Be is yet alien to physics and cosmology till today.

LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY and even its more recent causalist child, namely, DISPOSITIONALIST ONTOLOGY are (1) overly discrete about “entities” without clearly reconciling the geometrical tendency to make every physical representation continuous, (2) comatose about the impossibility of linguistically definitional approach to the logical demands of existent physical objects without first analyzing and resolving the metaphysical implications of existent objects being irreducibly in EXTENSION and CHANGE, and (3) unable to get at the causally continuous nature of the partially discrete processual objects in the physical world.

PHENOMENOLOGY has done a lot to show the conceptual structures of ordinary reasoning, physical reasoning, mathematical and logical thinking, and reasoning in the human sciences. But due to its lack of commitment to building a physical ontology of the cosmos and its purpose as a research methodology, phenomenology has failed to show the nature of causal continuity (instead of mathematical continuity) in the only physically existent objects, namely processually discrete objects, in nature.

HERMENEUTICS has just followed the human-scientific aspect of Husserlian phenomenology and projected it. Hence, it was no contender to accomplish the fete.

POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHIES qualified all science and philosophy as being perniciously cursed to be “modernistic” – by thus monsterizing all compartmentalization, rules, laws, axiomatization, discovery of regularities in nature, logical rigidity, etc. as an insurmountable curse of knowing and as a synonym for all that are unapproachable in science and thought.

THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE SCIENCES seem today to follow the beaten paths of linguistic-analytic philosophy, physics, mathematics, and logic, which lack a FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPT OF CAUSALLY PROCESSUAL PHYSICAL EXISTENCE.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematical_Continuity_in_Nature_Vs_Causal_Continuity_between_Partially_Discrete_Processual_Objects_Have_patience_to_read_till_the_end

MATHEMATICS AND CAUSALITY:

A SYSTEMIC RECONCILIATION

Raphael Neelamkavil

What are the bases of the problem of incompatibility of causality with mathematics and its applications? I suggest that it is the dichotomy between mathematical continuity and discreteness on the one hand and the incompatibility of applying any of them directly on the data collected / collectible from some layers of phenomena from some layers of nature. I clearly point at the avoidance, by expressions like ‘from some layers of phenomena from some layers of nature’, of the centuries of epistemological foolishness, because this is the point at which phrases and statements involving ‘data from observation’, ‘data from phenomena’, ‘data from nature’ etc. are very gross, without epistemological and ontological astuteness.

If causal continuity between partially discrete “processual” objects is the case, then the data collected / collectible cannot be the very processual objects or provide all knowledge about the processual objects. But mathematics and all other research methodologies are based on human experience and thought based on experience. Hence, it is important to define the limits of applicability of mathematics to the physics of data is the only way to approximate beyond the data and the methodologically derived conclusions beyond the data.

The same may be said also about logic and language. Logic is the broader rational picture of mathematics. Language is the symbolic manner of application of both logic and its quantitatively qualitative version, namely, mathematics, with respect to specific fields of inquiry. Here I do not explicitly discuss ordinary conversation, literature, etc. We may do well to instantiate logic as the formulated picture of reason. But reason is limited to the procedures of reasoning by brains. What exactly is the reason that existent physical processes undergo? How to get at conclusion based on but beyond data and methods? If we may call the universal reason of Reality-in-total with a name, it is nothing but Universal Causality.

How to demonstrate this as the case? ((To be developed further.))

A caveat is in place here: When I write anything here, you have the right to ask me constantly for further justifications. And if I have the right to anticipate some such questions, I will naturally attempt to be as detailed and as systemic as possible in my formulation. Each sentence is merely a part of the formulation. After reading each sentence you may pose me questions, which certainly cannot all be answered well within the sentences or after the sentences in question.

Hence, I tend to be as systemic as possible in each of the following sentences. Please do not accuse me of being too complex in my expressions. Your (and our) mathematics, physics, and logic can be very complex and prohibitive for some. But would we all accuse these disciplines or the readers if the readers find them all complex and difficult? I do not create such a state of affairs in these few sentences, but there are complexities here too. Hence, I express my helplessness in case any one of you finds these statements complex.

Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature is a mere idealization. It expects nature to obey our merely epistemic idealization where processes outside are vaguely presented primarily by the processes themselves in a natural manner, represented by the epistemic activity of the brain in a natural manner, and idealized via concepts expressed in words and sentences by the symbolizing human tendency to capture the whole of the object by use of a part of the human body-mind. The symbolizing activity is based on data, but the data are not all we have.

Insistence on mathematical continuity in nature as a natural conclusion by application of mathematics to nature is what happens in all physical and cosmological (and of course other) sciences insofar as they use mathematical idealizations to represent existent objects and processes. Logic and its direct quantitatively qualitative expression as found in mathematics are powerful tools. But, as being part of the denotative function of symbolic language, they are tendentially idealizational. By use of the same symbolizing tendency, it is perhaps possible to a certain extent to de-idealize the same symbols in the language, logic, and mathematics being used to symbolically idealize representations.

Merely mathematically following physical nature in whatever it is in its part-processes is a debilitating procedure in science and philosophy (and even in the arts and humanities), if this procedure is not de-idealized effectively. If this is possible at least to a small and humble extent, why not do it? Our language, logic, and mathematics too do their functions although they too are equally unable to capture the whole of reality in whatever it is, wholly or in in parts, too far beyond the data and their interpretations!

This theoretical attitude of partially de-symbolizing the effects of human symbolizing activity by use of the same symbolic activity accepts the existence of processual entities as whatever they are. Perhaps such a generalization can give a slightly better concept of reality than is possible by the normally non-self-aware symbolic activity in language, logic, and mathematics!

This theoretical attitude facilitates and accepts in a highly generalized manner the following three points:

(1) Mathematical continuity (in any theory and in terms of any amount of axiomatization of logical, mathematical, physical, biological, social, and linguistic theories) is totally non-realizable in nature as a whole and in its parts: because (a) the necessity of mathematical approval of any sort of causality in such a cosmology and by means of its systemic physical ontology falls short miserably in actuality, and (b) logical continuity of any kind does not automatically make symbolized representation activity adequate enough to represent the processual nature of entities as derivate from data.

(2) Absolute discreteness in nature, which, as of today, is ultimately of quantum-mechanical type based on Planck’s constant, continues to be a mathematical and physical misfit in the physical cosmos and its parts (may not of course be so in non-quantifiable “possible worlds” due to their absolute causal disconnection) and is a mere common-sense mathematical compartmentalization: (1) because the aspect of the causally processual connection between any two quanta is logically and mathematically alienated in the physical theory of Planck’s constant, and (2) by reason of the “epistemology of box-type thinking” (see Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Uni-Paderborn) implied by the non-self-aware symbolic activity of body-minds.

(3) Hence, the only viable and thus the most reasonably generalizable manner of being of the physical cosmos and of biological entities is that of existence in an extended (having parts) and changing (extended entities and their parts impacting a finite number of others in a finite amount) manner. Existence in Extension-Change-wise manner is nothing but causation. Thus, every existent is causal. There is no minute measuremental iota of time wherein such causal existing ceases in any existent. this is CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS.

The attitude of treating everything as causal my also be characterized by the self-aware symbolic activity by symbolic activity itself, in which certain instances of causation are avoided or increased or avoided incrementally. This is at the most what may be called freedom. It is fully causal, but causal not in a specific set of manners and causal in some other specific set of manners.

PHYSICS and COSMOLOGY even today tend to make the cosmos either (1) mathematically presupposedly continuous, or (2) discrete with defectively ideal mathematical status for continuity and with perfectly geometrical ideal status for specific beings, or (3) statistically indeterministic, thus considered partially causal, or even considered non-causal in the interpretation of statistics’ orientation to epistemically logical decisions and determinations based on data. If not, can anyone suggest proofs for an alleged existence of a different sort of physics and cosmology until today?

A topology and mereological physical ontology of CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE PROCESSUAL OBJECTS, fully free of discreteness-oriented category theory, geometry, functional analysis, set theory, and logic, are yet to be born. Hence, the fundamentality of Universal Causality in its deep roots in the very concept of the To Be (namely, in the physical-ontological Categories of Extension and Change) of all physically and non-vacuously existent processes, is yet alien to physics and cosmology till today.

LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY and even its more recent causalist child, namely, DISPOSITIONALIST CAUSAL ONTOLOGY (1) attribute an overly discrete nature to “entities” without ever attempting to touch the deeply Platonic (better, geometrically atomistic) shades of common-sense Aristotelianism, Thomism, Newtonianism, Modernism, Quantum Physics, etc., and without reconciling the diametrically opposite geometrical tendency to make every physical representation continuous, (2) logically comatose about the impossibility of linguistically definitional approach to the processual demands of existent physical objects without first analyzing and resolving the metaphysical implications of existent objects irreducibly being in finite EXTENSION and CHANGE, and (3) hence, unable to get at the CAUSALLY CONTINUOUS (neither mathematically continuous nor geometrically discontinuous) nature of the physical-ontologically “partially discrete” processual objects in the physical world.

PHENOMENOLOGY has done a lot to show the conceptual structures of ordinary reasoning, physical reasoning, mathematical and logical thinking, and reasoning in the human sciences. But due to its lack of commitment to building a physical ontology of the cosmos and due to its purpose as a research methodology, phenomenology has failed to an extent to show the nature of causal continuity (instead of mathematical continuity) in physically existent, processually discrete, objects in nature.

HERMENEUTICS has just followed the human-scientific interpretative aspect of Husserlian phenomenology and projected it as a method. Hence, it was no contender to accomplish the said fete.

POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHIES qualified all science and philosophy as being perniciously cursed to be “modernistic” – by thus monsterizing all compartmentalization, rules, laws, axiomatization, discovery of regularities in nature, logical rigidity, etc. as an insurmountable curse of the human project of knowing and as a synonym for all that are unapproachable in science and thought. The linguistic-analytic philosophy in later Wittgenstein too was no exception to this nature of postmodern philosophies – a matter that many Wittgenstein followers do not notice. Take a look at the first few pages of his Philosophical Investigations, and the matter will be more than clear.

THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE SCIENCES seem today to follow the beaten paths of extreme pragmatism in linguistic-analytic philosophy, physics, mathematics, and logic, which lack a FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPT OF CAUSALLY CONCRETE AND PROCESSUAL PHYSICAL EXISTENCE.

Hence, it is useful for the growth of science, philosophy, and humanities alike to research into the CAUSAL CONTINUITY BETWEEN PARTIALLY DISCRETE “PROCESSUAL” OBJECTS.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Mathematical_Continuity_in_Nature_Vs_Causal_Continuity_between_Partially_Discrete_Processual_Objects_Have_patience_to_read_till_the_end

LINGUISTIC IDEALISM IS THE POSITION CONTRARY TO THE FOLLOWING:

All impact transfers within and between entities are extended-changing. Impact transfer is nothing but the activity called Causation. Existents are in extended-changing causal process. The relation of one impact transfer process towards the constitution of another is Causality. Hence, everything is in causal process. If anything non-causal exists, it must lose contact with causal processes and cannot be connected with anything else so to result from causal processes or non-causal processes.

That is, Causality is a derivative Category pertaining to all existents. It is derived from putting together Extension and Change. Causality (the relation) and causation (the action / activity) are act-based. In general, without direct reference to the causal aspect, and with direct reference to the entity-aspect, one can say denotatively: everything is an extended-changing process. (“Everything is in process” means adjectivally: “Everything is processual”) In fact, Causation and Processuality are interchangeable; the manner of definition alone differs. But a unit process is a set of cause and effect.

TIME MUST ALWAYS BE THE MEASURE OF MOTION / CHANGE. THIS IS WHAT ARISTOTLE AND THOMAS HAVE HELD. BUT TODAY PHYSICISTS AND COSMOLOGISTS MAKE RATIOCINATIONS USING TIME AND SPACE AS IF THESE WERE SOME EXISTENT STUFF. SOME EVEN SPEAK OF SPACE-TIME CURVATURE, AND NOT OF CURVATURE OF PHYSICAL PROCESSES THAT ARE IN EXTENSION-MOTION.

Richard Marker: One more point:

So far we have been speaking of the various laws of science / natural laws. Just one among them was causality. Now, if the very physical existence is Extension-Change-wise, and if Extension-Change-wise existence is itself Causality, then every existent must be causal. This is Universal Causality, and it becomes a pre-scientific Law. I call it a metaphysical / physical-ontological Law because IT IS THE LAW OF THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF BEING TAKEN AS PHYSICALLY EXISTENT. Extension and Change are the only and the exhaustive meanings of To Be. In that case, these two Categories must have a superior Categorial position in both philosophy and the sciences.

DOES LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY HAVE ANYTHING SO FOUNDATIONAL AS THESE? ANY FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORIES LIKE THESE? OR THE PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE HAVE HAD ANYTHING LIKE THEM?

Existents have some Activity and Stability. This is a fully physical fact. These two categories may be shown to be subservient to Extension-Change. Pure vacuum (non-existence) is absence of Activity and Stability. Thus, entities, irreducibly, are active-stable processes in Extension-Change. Physical entities / processes possess finite Activity and Stability. Activity and Stability together belong to Extension; and Activity and Stability together belong to Change too. That is, Stability is not merely about space; and Activity is not merely about time. But the tradition still seems to hold so. We consider Activity and Stability as sub-categories, because they are based on Extension-Change, which together add up to Universal Causality; and each unit of cause and effect is a process.

These are not Categories that belong to merely imaginary counterfactual situations. The Categories of Extension-Change and their sub-formulations are all about existents. There can be counterfactuals that signify cases that appertain existent processes. But separating these cases from useless logical talk is near to impossible in linguistic-analytically tending logic, philosophy, and philosophy of science.

Today physics and the various sciences do something like this in that they indulge in particularistically defined terms and procedures, blindly thinking that these can directly represent the physical processes under inquiry. Concerning mathematical applications too this is the majority attitude among scientists. Hence, without a very general physical ontology of Categories that are applicable to all existent processes, all sciences are in gross handicap.

The best examples are mathematical continuity and discreteness being attributed to physical processes, which are continuous and discrete only in their Causality. This is nothing but Extension-Change-wise discrete causal continuity. At any time causality is present in anything, hence there is causal continuity. But this is different from mathematical continuity and discreteness.

Sorry I did not reply earlier Raphael Neelamkavil Are you saying that there is something wrong or incomplete about the sense/reference distinction? Frege's view in my understanding is in the Kantian tradition that making a judgment involves synthesising content of a(n in general quantified) proposition and judging the content to be true or false, so that a proposition has sense (the synthesis) and reference (the objects True and False). I am not saying that view does not have problems, some of which stem from Frege's views on objects, but what is your alternative thesis? Personally I don't like "meaning is use", which can lead to abandoning truth altogether. I would much rather see a focus on programming languages and mathematics, where judgements can be stated with a clear semantics.

There is a sense in which humans do construct the world through language. We write computer programs, construct machines and generally change the world around us. Natural language is one way in which we communicate with other humans, and we use it to record our ideas and proposals. Is that idealism? Probably not because there is reason humans cannot sense the world the way it really is (particularly with the array of sensing equipment that is readily available for purchase).

Andrew Powell,

Being able to state a clear semantics does not solve the problem. Even Frege did it in his own way, which today need not be accepted as such. But the direct-reference concept of objects that he has and hence also the concept of direct reference are not physical-ontologically to be granted as such, since the True / False system being used for quick-fix references and definitions like in the Fregean semantics are not unique. Not unique in the sense that any other more complex objects too may be referenced and defined in the same manner, and there is no reason why his reference system becomes unique.

For uniqueness, we need a manner of justification of the uniqueness of application of the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle in the special cases.

For this, we need an adequate ontology that not only fixes the problem of continuous change of theory and at the same time facilitates change of theory. I know this is difficult to understand at this level.

I believe that this is easy to understand from the viewpoint of a system in which the primary concepts of objects derive directly from the very concept of existence and existents. For more on this, please visit the other discussion sessions (questions) that I have put up here in RG and the continuing discussion generated by friends there.

MOST ANALYTIC THINKERS TAKE THEIR DISCIPLINE FOR HAVING BECOME A SCIENCE ITSELF. This is acceptable if their foundational principles are primarily scientific, and not primarily philosophical. Is this the case? Now, I presuppose that some readers might ask me, 'Who are you to criticize analytic philosophy?' I will only smile at them. My attitudes to analytic philosophy is not unique. I am not the one who can solve all problems in the world. But I try my little best.

(((As I was in MA philosophy, I was assigned as my course assignment paper topic [Course: Wittgenstein] a study of a certain concept in Wittgenstein. I wrote a detailed critique on that concept in Wittgenstein. After reading it, the prof (from a good Canadian Uni) asked me: Who are you to criticize Wittgenstein? We have not dared to do it! But I kept quiet because I would not have enough time to write on another topic. I knew he would give me very little points for this. It happened -- but at the final exam for the said course! But I was the one who helped almost of my companions in their assignments, and I knew the level of what I wrote. His reduced marks would not do me harm.)))

NOW TO LINGUISTIC IDEALISM:

The proponent/s of this new theory may or may not try or like to interact with me on this. But my arguments are very clear.

Andrew Powell, please note also this important question: Can we include in one semantic meaning-determination as many other aspects of the concept of the object as possible? If the answer is No, then our duty is to inquire into ways of doing that....

I am working on a 200 pp. book:

CAUSALITY IN PHYSICS, LANGUAGE, AI, AND MIND: PROCESS METAPHYSICS OF SPACE-TIME, UNOBSERVABLES, UNIVERSALS, AND VIRTUAL POSSIBLE WORLDS

I decided to translate it into Italian too. ((I could have done it into German myself, but I decided against this because most German-speaking scholars interested in such a topic would be able to read it in English too.))

As soon as the Italian version is ready, I will search for a publisher for both the English and Italian. In the course of time, a friend may translate it into Spanish too.

I don’t think philosophy is a science as there don’t seem to be any agreed positions at all, let alone ones that can be empirically tested. I do think sense and reference is unique for scientific propositions. it is true that you can always introduce a metalanguage, but then i don’t think sense and reference are linguistic. Sense in my view refers to an objective state of affairs if it refers to anything, which can be sensed and known.

You have already decided that in philosophy there needs to be absolutely commonly held positions and that these are present in the sciences!

The manner in which sense is being determined is merely directly denotative in linguistic philosophy and in the sciences. To avoid this what must be done? Both philosophy and the sciences need to correct themselves by use of the concept of the direct and exhaustive implications of existence, namely, Extension and Change. For more on these two notions, see some of my discussion sessions that concern Causality.

I understand that you are very pragmatic about notions. This is a typically linguistic-analytic and philosophy of science perspective. I have been active in the philosophy of physics for almost 2 decades. Thus, I am in the know of this attitude. But one question to you: If some radical overhauling of your own science or your version of philosophy were to be your task, what would be the more adequate sort of foundational concepts that you would take recourse to?

i believe that the foundational concepts of mathematics and physical science are extension (the continuum and richer) and number (cardinal and ordinal). I certainly do not believe that philosophy is conceptual engineering, and believe in foundations provided the foundations themselves can evolve.

You said: "believe in foundations provided the foundations themselves can evolve". I appreciate this.

But the foundational concepts of math and physical science being taken a extension (...) and number (...) .... this is for me insufficient in my opinion. Still we are with platonism, Brouwerian intuitionistic stuff, Linnebo's theories, etc. Extension, number etc. belong to these traditions.

I have been working on a book (did about 190 pp., where I try to give a slightly more acceptable foundation for math and physics. But left it at that because I must first do some more years of studies, which will soon be possible.

Why should philosophy be mere conceptual engineering? In a way it is not, and in another way it is! What else is being done there?

Now coming to LINGUISTIC IDEALISM, I suggest: See the first few chapters of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Simple things are said simply, and some analytically oriented persons found much there because Russell created a fanfare for Wittgenstein due to his TLP. Find out Wittgenstein's concept of mathematics and logic in this and other works. Very simplistic. HOLDING THAT LANGUAGE IS THE KEY TO ALL REALITY IS AN OVERSTATEMENT. THE SAME IS WHAT EMPIRICAL IDEALISM, CONCEPTUAL IDEALISM, etc. HAVE DONE. LANGUAGE IS JUST ONE OF THE KEYS. AND CREATING AN IDEALISM OUT OF THIS IS OVERSTATEMENT.

One may, equally well, develop a sort of "SYMBOLIC IDEALISM", "SOMATIC IDEALISM", etc. But these are very narrow, and hence fade away in time like fads.

There is a fine balance between what a subject discovers about the world and the tools they use to make discoveries. those tools could be physical sensors but they could also be conceptual categories. Mere conceptual engineering would be analysis of concepts, while a foundational approach would be to study the effects of the tools on reality in order to look for aspects of reality that are not dependent in the tools. Extension and number are examples of such invariants.

Andrew Powell, thanks for the observation.

Now, one difficulty I would point out is this: Linguistic or mathematical or logical (or any other sort of) idealism results only when we depend on the specific tool (language, math, logic, etc.) as the criterial tool. This is what has happened within extreme viewpoint-manipulations by linguistic-analytic philosophy.

The observation, verification, and theoretical enhancement as tools of science and experimental philosophy will do well, if we have the possibility of exercising conceptual engineering on the various theoretical aspects (like starting points, procedures, conclusions, etc.) and also on the empirical tools (justification and delimiting of the tools).

Such conceptual engineering is already a part of science and philosophy. I believe you will accept this. Although conceptual engineering looks a bit pejorative as a name, what is being done therein is justificable. In that case, would it be better to rename it as the more theoretical aspect of theory and experiment?

Yes I agree on your point about the risks of linguistic philosophy; you study the tool rather than the thing you are examining with the tool. It is of course important to understand aberrations caused by the choice of tool. There is nothing wrong with conceptual engineering, but as an end in itself it is futile.

Andrew Powell, thanks. I do not take the tool as an end in itself. You know that. But linguistic philosophy does take it so in an unproclaimed manner! Otherwise, it would not have ended everywhere in analysing the language in its various incarnations. Even a social, cultural, biological and similar background construction for language does not suffice. The whole of Reality, its processuality, etc. should be taken into consideration, if linguistic phil should be a philosophy!

And of course, within such a context you can do a philosophy of language too. This is what has been sacrificed beginning from the work of Frege. This tradition deserves protest. While writing of the tool (language), taking up the tool's general constructive background within Reality-in-total must be brought in. Which analytic philosopher is doing it today? Any suggestion?

Even dispositionalism is very sparing in this connection.....! This is why I say that linguistic philosophy has an inbuilt tendency to be linguistic-idealistic, which -- idealism -- they in fact eschew!

Andrew Powell, thanks. Let me tell you an experience.

As I started doing German language courses in 2008, I noticed how children-oriented the prescribed text books of each level were. I made a remark about it with one of the teachers. The substance of the argument was that we grown-ups cannot learn like the children in their summer course for children -- first just learn through various "attractive" means, like children, without asking for the grammar (or related rule/s of forms or patterns), and then receive the grammar after all the childish learning....

This teacher was somewhat informed of the recent theories. So the reply was: See some of the recent learning theories of language! Children cannot learn with grammar. Language is a thing we just learn from the lips of the mother, elders, siblings, and others around us!

Some famous Polish linguist-politicians' names (some -ski's who popularized Frege and Wittgenstein in linguistics and education) were cited (you know who!), along with Piaget. I said, these have their forerunner in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. The person was not very familiar with this work. And I said, we are not children! We think along with learning, and this is unlike children. A learned unwillingness to accept was the attitude from that side!!!

I cited an instance where I taught effectively English phonetics (British) to a small group of Spoken English teachers in my hometown. I did not just tell them 'This word is pronounced so.... and you learn it.' I showed them patterns in each case, thus they began to imagine the pattern, I explained my own manner of imagining the reasons for that pattern (not big or long theories, but just a few seconds' explanations), and then found the students correcting their mistaken patterns very fast. I did also show how (the patterns) we Indians (from the one state and from some other states) make mistakes.

As I explained this method of teaching phonetics, the German language teacher kept quiet and remained unconvinced. I say, this is the attitude that most linguistic philosophers with a superiority complex about their scientific discipline exhibit. They (my personal experience) tendentially disregard any different opinion as inimical. Now, who is being inimical here? This is more the case with many philosophers of math, logicians, etc. than with those from any other philosophical disciplines. Was it so always in human history? I do not think. THE MORE STAUNCH THE PHILOSOPHER'S DIRECTLY DENOTATIVE SORT OF DEFINITIONS (VERY MUCH THE CASE IN THE SAID DISCIPLINES) THE WORSE THEIR INFLEXIBILITY TOWARDS ANY DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL OPINION. Is this not a tendency to linguistic idealism?

See how in continental Europe (I do not know of the Americas, England, etc.) school textbooks are being written. This methodology is very much an example for the "just-attract-and-teach-and-earn-money" theory being followed.

Is this not a distant cousin of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations? To my mind, there is not so much of ingenuity in that work as many lingustic philosophers seem to try to tell us.

In a discussion forum in the internet, one person made a suggestion to a paper by a linguistic philosopher. The philosopher was irritated and called him names. In reply, he explained why he opined so, but the philosopher asked him not to write such nonsensical opinions. Then I wrote, 'Why shew away critical opinions in this manner? Let us listen!' No reply!! And the philosopher wanted me to give him a few details as to how a certain philosophical opinion in this connection is in some Indian systems. I did not respond. I said, 'Why not let that other person continue in the discussion?' No reply!

I feel this philosopher may not come into this discussion and express his opinions. Being like some Heideggerians, Husserlians, Hegelians, Humeans, etc. and defending their hero or their opinions is not philosophy. Positively expressed, they have deep scholarship about a philosopher. Negatively, it is hero worship.

My effort is not to demonize Frege or Wittgenstein. Or, have I already demonized them?

I myself began doing philosophy by idolizing a certain thinker -- way back during my second and third year of BA, and thereafter no more.

Today I try to create the foundations of a flexible philosophical system where the whole of Reality must be taken into consideration from various viewpoints. I too err in making assertions. But I cannot express the relativity-/flexibility-attitude in each sentence. I think efforts to do such philosophizing and then to do linguistic theory from within that attitude must be accepted as linguistic philosophy. All else has a tendency to hero worship than we can imagine. Like mathematicians jeering at philosophers, physicists considering themselves as the sole lawyers of Nature, logicians thinking themselves as the secretaries of Reason, and philosophers thinking of themselves as wisdom (sophia)....

Logically Complex and Systematic Language Analysis of the Sciences or of Experience Is Not Philosophy: For the above, denotative notions are recognized as interrelated by concatenation, which produces sensation, thought, language, etc., and their symbolic base. All of it (concatenations) is done in linguistic-analytic philosophies merely at the directly denotative meaning-stratum of symbols, notions, terms, sentences, scientific theories, and theories of the sciences.

Then they speak of being systematic from that level, which too is complex enough, but not metaphysically (physical-ontologically) fundamental enough. Logic can be very complex here, and systematic too. But this is no system that can involve Reality-in-total in its To Be. That is, not even attempts to demonstrate that analytic philosophy is not merely denotative at base would not save it.

How to philosophize? How to philosophize in the sciences?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_philosophize_How_to_philosophize_in_the_sciences

Scientific Metaphysical Categories beyond Heidegger

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Scientific_Metaphysical_Categories_beyond_Heidegger

I believe that relativising induction and deduction and connecting them with one another under some very general framework of thought will be a grand starting point to revolutionize the foundations of the whole of philosophy and science, and of logic and linguistic analytic philosophy in particular.

Induction or Deduction: Mutually Exclusive in Logic, Science, Mathematics, and Philosophy of Science?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Induction_or_Deduction_Mutually_Exclusive_in_Logic_Science_Mathematics_and_Philosophy_of_Science

Under the viewpoint of linguistic analytic phil, is it possible to differentiate between the general concept of freedom in the humanities and that in the physical sciences? Can these two sorts of the concept be synthesized into one? Or, is there human freedom at all, according the various schools of linguistic analysis?

In both the cases (i.e., positive or negative), what would be the fate of linguistic idealism within the background of philosophy and the sciences?

Why do linguistic analytic philosophers give only language-based examples for their theories? How can they justify how our language, mathematics, computer science etc. work, within the backdrop of the given nature whatever of physical processes? Can linguistic analytic philosophers speak of physical processes except through linguistic discussions? That is, can they ever believe that behind our linguistic, logical, mathematical, and scientific formulations some reality exists out there? Can they ever give causal explanations for physical processes except by discussing merely about causal explanations? And if physical processes really are causal, how do they insert in it human freedom which we all speak of? If they have to write off freedom, can they do anything except write off the talk of freedom?

Have you heard or read psychologists, neuroscientists, medical doctors, etc. discussing some symptoms and their causes? A book in psychology says: 'According to the bio-psycho-social approach in psychopathology, one mental disturbance CAN have many causes.' But a person trained and enthusiastic about philosophy (also of the philosophy of the sciences) would wonder why there should not be many causes, at least some of which one could seek to find....! Finding out "only the immediate, exact and unique cause" is not their work because any reason can tell us that nothing in this world has an exact cause.

This directs our attention to a basic nature of philosophy: Not that a philosopher should only generalize. But a philosopher should study any specific thing only in terms of the most generalizable notions. Here 'generality' does not directly indicate only abstraction. It demonstrates the viewpoint that philosophy always takes. Hence, speaking only of the linguistic formulation of notions and arguments, formulating arguments only of life-related events in order to prove general principles that belong to the whole of Reality, etc. are not philosophical. The philosophically trained reader can recognize which recent trends in philosophy I have in mind here.

A Trans-Pragmatic Truth Paradigm for Science, Technology, and Philosophy

https://www.researchgate.net/post/A_Trans-Pragmatic_Truth_Paradigm_for_Science_Technology_and_Philosophy

I have been revising this short discussion paper of mine in RG. It is an attempt to correct some basic attitudes in physics. Just now I have written an introduction to it. Please read it here. In a few days I shall upload the whole lead-text of this discussion for your reading and comments. Here please find only the introduction:

FOUNDATIONS OF AXIOMATIC PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

I get surprised each time when some physicists tell me that either the electromagnetic (EM) or the gravitational (G) or both the forms of energy do not exist, but are to be treated or expressed as waves or particles propagated from material objects that of course exist. Some of them put in all their energies to show that both EM and G are mere mathematical fields, and not physically existent fields of energy propagations from bodies.

This is similar in effect to Newton and his followers thinking honestly and religiously that gravitation and other energies are just miraculously non-bodily actions at a distance without any propagation particles / wavicles.

Even in the 21stcentury, we must be sharply aware that from the past more than 120 years the General Theory of Relativity and its various versions have succeeded in casting and maintaining the power of a terrifying veil of mathematical miracles on the minds of many scientists – miracles such as the mere spacetime curvature being the meaning of gravitation and all other sorts of fields.

A similar veil has been installed on the minds of many physicists by quantum physics too. We do not discuss it here. Hence, I have constructed in four published books a systemic manner of understanding these problems. I do not claim perfection in any of my attempts. Hence, I keep perfecting my efforts in the course of years. The following is a very short attempt to summarize in this effort one important point in physics and in the philosophy of physics.

How to Ground Science and Philosophy Together Axiomatically?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_Ground_Science_and_Philosophy_Together_Axiomatically

Symmetry: A Subset of Universal Causality. The Difference between Cause and Reason

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Symmetry_A_Subset_of_Universal_Causality_The_Difference_between_Cause_and_Reason

This discussion-text is just 2.5 pages, but intense. Meant for those who are interested in a clear presentation of what symmetry and symmetry breaking are, and of how physicists and mathematicians tend to misunderstand and/or misuse these concepts.

The Universally Causal context of the concept of symmetry is explained in terms of a solidly founded system of differentiation between cause and reason.

The Fallacies of Space, Time, and Spacetime in Physics

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Fallacies_of_Space_Time_and_Spacetime_in_Physics

Physical and Exact Sciences and Axiomatic Philosophy: Introducing Grounding (long text)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Physical_and_Exact_Sciences_and_Axiomatic_Philosophy_Introducing_Grounding_long_text

Causality and Statistics: Their Levels of Effect and of Explanation

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Causality_and_Statistics_Their_Levels_of_Effect_and_of_Explanation

Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox and Non-Locality: Is Einstein a Monist?

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen_Paradox_and_Non-Locality_Is_Einstein_a_Monist

The Fate of “Source-Independence” in Electromagnetism, Gravitation, and Monopoles

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Fate_of_Source-Independence_in_Electromagnetism_Gravitation_and_Monopoles

If anyone wants to read about a fantastic concept of the existence of consciousness and non-existence of the cosmos, see the comments till today here, by L Kurt Engelhart.......!!! Here you can learn the meaning of solipsism.... similar to mathematical platonism creating ideas / notions into objects.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_to_philosophize_How_to_philosophize_in_the_sciences

Essential Reason in Physicists’ Use of Logic: And in Other Sciences Too!

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Essential_Reason_in_Physicists_Use_of_Logic_And_in_Other_Sciences_Too

Preprint ESSENTIAL REASON IN PHYSICISTS' USE OF LOGIC: IN OTHER SCIENCES TOO

How Does Physics Know? The Epistemology Presupposed by Physics and Other Sciences

https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_Does_Physics_Know_The_Epistemology_Presupposed_by_Physics_and_Other_Sciences

Preprint MATHEMATICAL SOURCE OF FLAWS IN COSMOLOGICAL THEORIES: MATHE...

Preprint THE EPISTEMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY PHYSICS AND OTHER SCIENCES R...

PHYSICAL-PROCESSUAL REPRESENTATION OF IRRATIONAL NUMBERS

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Physical-Processual_Representation_of_Irrational_Numbers

THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS

3.1. Traditional Physical Categories

https://www.researchgate.net/post/The_Ontology_behind_Physics

https://www.researchgate.net/post/Grounded_Physical-Ontological_Categories_behind_Physics

Grounded (New) Physical-Ontological Categories behind Physics

Preprint THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS: CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL PHYSICA...

A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS: Beyond the Two Millennia

https://www.researchgate.net/post/A_SIMPLE_GAME-CHANGER_CAUSALITY_FOR_PHYSICS_Beyond_the_Two_Millennia

https://www.researchgate.net/post/DEFINITION_OF_THE_ONTOLOGY_BEHIND_PHYSICS_5_Paragraphs

DEFINITION OF THE ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS (5 Paragraphs)

THE ANOMALY IN MATHEMATICAL / THEORETICAL PHYSICS (Short Text)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_ANOMALY_IN_MATHEMATICAL_THEORETICAL_PHYSICS_Short_Text

Here a serious and somewhat complex matter to discuss:

NON-FOUNDATIONS OF ‘WAVICLES’ IN EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PARADOX: Bases for Quantum Physics to Evolve (Maybe a physical-ontological Breakthrough)

https://www.researchgate.net/post/NON-FOUNDATIONS_OF_WAVICLES_IN_EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN_PARADOX_Bases_for_Quantum_Physics_to_Evolve_Maybe_a_physical-ontological_Breakthrough

Preprint A SIMPLE GAME-CHANGER CAUSALITY FOR PHYSICS Beyond the Two Millennia

AGAINST COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION, etc.: A Critique of Identity, Simultaneity, Cosmic Repetition / Recycling, etc.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/AGAINST_COSMIC_ISOTROPY_CONFORMAL_CYCLIC_COSMOS_ETERNAL_INFLATION_etc_A_Critique_of_Identity_Simultaneity_Cosmic_Repetition_Recycling_etc

Preprint ESSENTIAL LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND ONTOLOGY BEHIND PHYSICS, ...

WHAT IS THE MYSTERIOUS STUFF OF INFORMATION? A Short but Clear Definition

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_THE_MYSTERIOUS_STUFF_OF_INFORMATION_A_Short_but_Clear_Definition

For me language and mathematics don't determine the world.

But you have been telling me in the other discussion that everything is a construction / construct! Existent things / processes are there outside, not in constructs!

All structure is built be us. Reality (or dings) doesn’t give us such structures as the forms in the Aristotle’s theory. Nevertheless, we can assert one structures describes the reality. But we can’t compare she with her. But we have criteria justifying such assertion. Autonomous criteria, funded of the change. Constructed structure doesn’t imply change and change doesn’t determine structure it pertains to. Change is the Epiphany of reality without determine the structure Change allows and impose to be realist. All structure is constructed excepting change. It can only be a datum. And a real structure must be constructed on changes. And we must find autonomous criteria to change our constructions. I called it Aufhebung.

"All structure is built by us." Which are these structures?

If change is the epiphany of reality, then why not I say: "Reality is just a construct", the Reality out-there does not exist, and we are all just fooling ourselves by our constructs"?

In the paper you sent me, "Theory of Poesis 2", you began the discussions with the following statement: "Epistemology is a comment on text." I think it would be good to rethink this.

The English you write is at times not clear. Could you write better in German? If you can, please write in German.

I will do in italian

Ok, good. Thanks.

Preprint COSMIC ISOTROPY, CONFORMAL CYCLIC COSMOS, ETERNAL INFLATION:...

THE PLANCK ERA / QUANTUM ERA and “DISAPPEARANCE” OF PHYSICAL CAUSALITY: “OMNIPOTENCE” OF MATHEMATICS

https://www.researchgate.net/post/THE_PLANCK_ERA_QUANTUM_ERA_and_DISAPPEARANCE_OF_PHYSICAL_CAUSALITY_OMNIPOTENCE_OF_MATHEMATICS

Formal construction (marthematic) isn't real construction.

All constructions are relative constructions.

Of course, all constructions are made by subjects.

Preprint PLANCK ERA or QUANTUM ERA,and ”DISAPPEARANCE” OF CAUSALITY. ...

I send to you my text in Italian. I will send later the English version.

Giorgio

I fund mistakes, so I send a new text.

Giorgio

The problem is not about mistakes in the language. You have taken epistemology as the manner of understanding a text. This is no epistemology. But you continue to draw your conclusions from such an epistemology in terms of the concept of construction. I do not agree on these things.

Della lettura di un testo non ritengo che il fatto che il suo senso non è al livello di ciô che è percepito (cioè la materialità del testo) ma deve essere costruito. Il senso non è mai qualcosa di percettibile. Nei suoi esperimenti sui ragazzi, Piaget non percepisce le loro structure mentali. Percepisce dei comportamenti sui quali costruisce qualcosa che non percepisce. La situazione ha qualcosa in comune con la lettura di un testo. La generalizzazione è di dire che anche negli esperimenti della fisica c’è un apsetto percettivo e una costruzione che non è nel campo della percezione. Come dice anche Mioara Mugur-Schächter un ‘entità quantistica non é oggetto dei notri sensi. Questa situazione mi par che si ritrova nella distinzione fra termini empirici et termini teorici.

Quindi mi son detto (40 anni fa’) che se riesco trovare l’attività profonda che si nasconde in queste costruzioni, dovrei disporre di un meccanismo costruttivo sempre all’opera in tutti i campi. Quest’attività l’ho chiamata poiesis. Dato che sono riuscito a descriver il livello minimo e che in seguito ho potuto costruire il tempo e poi anche una struttura spaziale, e dato che son riuscito a costruire la nozione di massa e di forza, che ho potuto interpretare l’esperienza di Young, sempre utilizzando la nozione di poiesis, che ho potuto ricostruire la relatività ristretta in questo quadro, mi son detto che l’ipotesi poteva essere considerata come confermata. La lettura di un testo e la sua scrittua comporta continuatamente delle poiesis, ma in una struttura ben più complesse di quella delle prime costruzioni a partire dal livello minimo. Quindi non è l’attività di lettura che mi interessa ma un’attività più elementare, quella di aggiunger dei termini nuovi. Il problema è di riuscire a esplicitare le regole per tale attività Credo di esserci riuascito in parte.

Non so se ho risposto alle tue critiche.

Son d’accordo con te que la semplice lettura di un testo non è dell’epistemologia. Ma l’attività profonda che vi si nasconde permette un’epistemologia.

Giorgio

(translation)

Of reading a text, I do not consider the fact that its meaning is not at the level of what is perceived (i.e. the materiality of the text) but must be constructed. Sense is never something perceptible. In his experiments with children, Piaget does not perceive their mental structures. He perceives behaviour on which he constructs something he does not perceive. The situation has something in common with reading a text. The generalisation is to say that even in physics experiments there is a perceptual apsect and a construction that is not in the realm of perception. As Mioara Mugur-Schächter also says, a quantum entity is not an object of our senses. This situation seems to me to be found in the distinction between empirical terms and theoretical terms.

So I said to myself (40 years ago) that if I can find the deep activity hidden in these constructions, I should have a constructive mechanism at work in all fields. This activity I called poiesis. Given that I was able to describe the minimal level, and that I was then able to construct time and then also a spatial structure, and given that I was able to construct the notion of mass and force, that I was able to interpret Young's experience, again using the notion of poiesis, that I was able to reconstruct special relativity within this framework, I said to myself that the hypothesis could be considered as confirmed. The reading of a text and its writing continuously involves poiesis, but in a much more complex structure than that of the first constructions from the minimal level. So it is not the activity of reading that interests me but a more elementary activity, that of adding new terms. The problem is to be able to make explicit the rules for such an activity I think I have partly succeeded.

I don't know if I have answered your criticism.

I agree with you that simply reading a text is not epistemology. But the profound activity hidden in it allows for epistemology.

Giorgio

Lei: "anche negli esperimenti della fisica c’è un apsetto percettivo e una costruzione che non è nel campo della percezione".

Non ho detto che non vi sia alcun aspetto concettuale nella conduzione della fisica o di qualsiasi altra scienza. Ma questo non significa che l’epistemologia – la scienza della conoscenza – sia la scienza di uno o più testi!

Come conoscere una conoscenza se nessuno la formula. Se la formula, produce un testo.

Where can one find knowledge if no one formulates it? And if one formulates it, it provides a text.

But formulating knowledge-texts and knowing these knowledge-texts cannot be confused with each other.

We all speak with the fundamental belief that there exists the reality outside of us. This does not mean that merely uttering the word 'reality' means knowledge of reality, exact knowledge of reality, etc.

And we all speak also with the fundamental belief that some sort of mental constructs can be made, which can be called at least as partial truths. But these truths are not mere constructs. They have foundation in the reality outside and in the reality that we human persons are. These realities exist, and are not constructs.

Preprint IS THE VELOCITY OF LIGHT SACROSANCT?

I've read your text. I commented on it and put forward my argument. As you can see, I'm coming at it from different directions.

Some of the points you make are understandable. I think I need only to revise this text another time, by explaining some of the points you have raised. But the difficulty is that RG does not accept it in a revised form unless the revision is substantial and the text gets a new title. I will do it on a later date when I have time. Now I have to read some articles sent to me by some for comments. And I have to work on my own projects.

Certain other arguments that you signal here are inspired by the same semiotic of Piaget that you follow. I do not want to say anything about those points because I have already said much on them earlier.

Preprint CAUSAL HORIZONAL RESEARCH: A METHODOLOGY IN PHYSICS Raphael ...

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHAT_IS_INFORMATION_WHAT_IS_ITS_CAUSAL_OR_NON-CAUSAL_CORE_A_Discussion

I’m very interested in this discussion. My contribution will be my first letter I’m writing to Mioara Mugur-Schächter on epistemology. I think it will be ready very soon.

Giorgio

https://www.researchgate.net/post/LINGUISTIC_HERESY_BEHIND_SELF-ORGANIZATION_SELF-REFERENCE_INTENTIONALITY_PHYSICAL_AND_BIOLOGICAL_SELF-INTERACTION_etc

Deleted research item The research item mentioned here has been deleted

Preprint LINGUISTIC HERESY OF DENOTATIVE ABSOLUTISM: PHYSICAL-BIOLOGI...

https://www.researchgate.net/post/ONTOLOGICAL_DIFFERENCES_OF_CHARACTERISTICS_OF_ARTIFICIAL_AND_BIOLOGICAL_INTELLIGENCE_ALGORITHMS_AND_PROCEDURES_Against_Exaggerations

“If perception is input from the world to the mind and action is output from the mind to the world, then the mind as distinct from the world is what the input is to and what the output is from. So, despite the web of causal relations between organisms and environments, we suppose the mind must be in a separate place, within some boundary that sets it apart from the world.” [Susan L. Hurley, Consciousness in Action, 1998: 2]

And can consciousness / mind be of the same status as information? I doubt.

https://www.researchgate.net/post/WHY_EXACTLY_THE_WAVE-PARTICLE_DUALITY_Phenomenal_Ontological_Commitment_POC_as_the_Solution

https://www.researchgate.net/post/UNTENABLE_REIFICATION_OF_CONCEPTS_IN_PHYSICS_With_Examples

Preprint WHY EXACTLY WAVE-PARTICLE DUALITY? Phenomenal Ontological Co...