Dear Ibrahim,

Please find article prepared by Christian Stecker University of Potsdam with title: 

Voting Patterns of the parliamentary opposition in Germany. 

http://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2011/christian-stecker-914.pdf

I only hope that this analytical mainstream help you to tackle your business, in any case I will continue to find materials regarding this issue and will send you as soon as possible.

Best Regards,

Karlo 

Dear Mr. Karlo,

Thank you for the answer.

With Best Wishes 

Ibrahim

As Dirk Hanschel points out on p.357 "Konfliktlösung im Bundesstaat" (2012), the German Chancellor always oversees a majority (included a negociated coalition government) therefore does not have a veto like the US president may exercise.

The German President does not have a veto either. (German government website: http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/de/politisches-system/main-content-04/der-bundespraesident.html)

The Bundesrat can override a decision of the Bundestag but only on issues concerning provincial jurisdiction.

Best wishes

Hello Ibrahim,

the answer depends a bit on what your understanding of a "veto" is. Generally, the concept of "veto" does not make that much sense in a parliamentary system because there is no clear separation-of-powers principle at work. The German constitution does follow a certain idea of "checks and balances" (to use American parlance), but it's a bit quirky. And it's necessary to look at political, not only legal usage of the framework.

The German Bundestag has institutionalized certain minority rights and procedural privileges, normally exercised by a party group ("Fraktion") or any group with at least five percent of the MPs.

It must be noted that the special circumstances of a "Grand Coalition" of CDU/CSU and SPD reduce the chances of a minority to use their rights. Opposition parties Greens and "Die Linke" socialists have won 127 out of 631 seats in the last Bundestag election. That's about 20 percent of the seats. Procedural law require a minimum of 25 percent of all Bundestag members for various minority rights. This immediately sparked a debate about the Grand Coalition's crushing majority. Political culture and fairness arguments led the Grand Coalition to agree to a change in procedure for the current Bundestag in April 2014, reducing the 25 percent threshold to 20 percent, or more precisely, a minimum of 120 seats for exercising these minority rights. This includes the right for all non-coalition members of a leading committee to demand a public hearing. There were also informal agreements to give opposition parties more speaking time. See http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/004/1800481.pdf (in German).

These rights and privileges reduce the power of the governing majority to set the parliament's agenda; they guarantee opposition representation in committees, including chairmanships; they allow minority parties to demand and set up parliamentary hearings; they guarantee the right to question the government (and get answers), and demand formal investigations or set up an enquete commission to study certain issues.

But it would be hard to call any of that a "veto" power. Never can the opposition fully stop the majority doing what it wants as long as it sticks to the procedure. All the opposition can do is to bring issues to the public on the parliamentary stage.

If the opposition leaders play their rights in an intelligent and tactically smart way, they can slow down the legislative process a bit. If they find temporary friends in the governing coalition's ranks who may be critical of the executive's agenda, they can go far. But that's not really full "suspensive veto" power, but parliamentary maneuvering.

As Jeffrey has noted, there is a strong role for the "Bundesrat," or Federal Council representing the 16 states. And if you consider the Bundesrat a parliamentary "upper chamber," you might say there is veto power there. No political scientist would doubt that the Bundesrat is a serious "veto player" -- and this involves the parliamentary (Bundestag) opposition. 

You might say this is the parliamentary opposition's "shadow veto" power.

One problem is that the Bundesrat is not a part of parliament, i.e. not really a second chamber of it. Systematically, you might say Germany has a bicameral legislature because both Bundestag and Bundesrat are always involved in lawmaking. But the two are separate institutions, not under one roof (even physically). Moreover, the Bundesrat is not elected as such but a permanent body more like the Council of the EU (Council of Ministers), a "parliament of executives." Its members are the ministers of state governments (and their civil servants who do most of the work in the Bundesrat committees).

Jeffrey said: "The Bundesrat can override a decision of the Bundestag but only on issues concerning provincial jurisdiction." Formally, yes; but politically, no.

Point one: Because of Germany's "marble cake" style of federalism, almost all federal laws (including federal tax collection) are executed by the state administrations, and most money flows from the federal government connect with the states. Thus, a large number of laws require consent of the states in the Bundesrat.

Point two: If the federal coalition parties do not enjoy a majority in the Bundesrat, it gives political "veto" power to the parliament's opposition parties. They will use this lever in a political way, forcing the coalition to negotiate with the opposition parties.

Point three: Even if the Bundesrat cannot override the Bundestag majority, it can always slow down the process of lawmaking and push further debate and negotiations between states and federal government. That's at least a suspensive veto. And that power will typically be used by the (parliamentary) opposition. Note that all federal law proposals FIRST go to the Bundesrat, then to the parliament.

Normally, the large parties - Social and Christian Democrats - lead the state governments. Currently, there are only two states which have a "small party" minister-president (a Green in Baden-Württemberg, and a "Linke" socialist in Thuringia). But it is also normal that state government leaders do not have an absolute majority, so they form a coalition with other parties. These may be in the federal opposition.

Coalition agreements always require that all coalition partners in the state governments must fully consent to the state's voting in the Bundesrat. One coalition party cannot "force" the state's vote in the Bundesrat without its coalition partner. Doing that would most likely break the coalition and end the state government's home majority in the state legislature (Landtag).

This means, for example, that if the Green party opposes a federal law in the Bundestag, it will probably block any Bundesrat consent where it can at the state level. The Greens today (Sept. 2015) are part of coalitions in eight states. The "Linke" socialists are part of coalitions in two. Given the arithmetics of state voting power in the Bundesrat, these federal opposition parties can deny federal coalition success in important cases by blocking their state governments' consent.

Obviously, these parties will also use the Bundestag parliamentary stage to highlight their resistance to a federal legislative proposal. It demonstrates the strong role of parties in the system. Party interests cross state borders, and national party strategy will mean using state power to influence or block federal policy-making.

None of this is properly a parliamentary veto in the strict sense.

Academic literature on German federalism and on German parties can give you broader insight. Most general handbooks will explain what I mean here, and journals such as "German Politics" may further guide you on research.

The German Bundestag has an English website, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e, the Bundesrat has one also, at http://www.bundesrat.de/EN/homepage/homepage-node.html. Parliamentary minority and states' rights in legislation are laid out in the constitution, English version at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/

The Bundestag's procedural rules (Geschäftsordnung) are published in English at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80060000.pdf Find other relevant material in English here: https://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/documents/legal

The Joint Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat for the Committee pursuant to Article 77, Basic Law (Mediation Committee) may be found at http://www.bundesrat.de/VA/DE/aufgaben-arbeitsweise/go/go-va-en/go-va-en-node.html

I hope this helps!

Marco Althaus

Hello Prof Marco Althaus,

Thank you very much foe the answer, you illustrated more issues that opened my view about the veto right of parliamentary opposition in Germany.  I sow in some researches and articles talked about this but couldn't convince me . The answer and references are very helpful.

And let me sen my thankful message to Mr. Jefrrey de Fourestie, for his useful answer.

Thank you again

With Best Regards   

Ibrahim

Dear Ibrahim,

I promise you to deliver other interesting materials about the issue you raised a couple weeks ago. As I see your feedback from the side other colleagues are very fruitful, therefore you receive tentative and profound answers and resources.

In the light of this development, I think you also need some literature regarding recent parliamentary trends and troubles in European parliamentary discourse, thus I will offer you two distinguished books covered the wide range of issues you are interested.

I hope that such kind of analytical literature will enrich your intellectual horizon!

Best Wishes,

Karlo

P.S. Please, find attached files.

Dear Karlo,

Thank you for the answer and the books. I made a quick scan for the contents they contain so many topics I liked to read. Both will be very helpful for me. I always appreciate your helpful answers,  sending resources and references.

Thank you again

With Best Wishes

Ibrahim