One can remark a number of new features of the international relations system and restrictive measures taken by both developed and developing/emerging countries in the field of foreign direct investment (FDI), before the Covid-19 pandemic and also under its influence.

Since 2018, one can notice a strong trend towards stricter FDI control regimes, especially in terms of investment in strategic industries and critical infrastructure, in response to Chinese investments, closely linked to national security motivations. The Covid-19 crisis has once again emphasized the inclination towards economic nationalism and even the goal of achieving strategic economic autonomy, not only in developed countries but also in developing ones (of particular interest in this regard are case studies on China and India).

The propensity for economic nationalism and strategic autonomy in many parts of the world falls into the category of “harmful protectionism”, in contrast to the restrictive measures imposed in order to enforce necessary environmental, social and governance standards associated with “good protectionism”. Most developing/emerging countries continue to liberalize their FDI regime in certain sectors that do not affect national security, as FDI represents their main source of capital. But starting from a higher level of restrictions, developing countries continue to be more protectionist than the developed ones. The uncertainty regarding the economic recovery after the Covid-19 crisis is also reflected in the field of the FDI regimes, the protectionist tendencies becoming more and more prominent, although their negative effect is obvious.

How would you caracterize the actual wave of FDI protectionism? Which are the key determinants? Do protectionist measures represent viable solutions for the national economies?

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