Yes, embodied and embedded. Ecological psychology, the Gibson approach, Kelso's, Kugler's, Turvey's and Ester Thelen's work have emphasized the environmental factor, but this would eventually enlarge the scope from scocial neuroscienc to "ecological neuroscience" - a development to come?   

Dear Hilarion Petzold  

Since the "embodied ['in' the organism]" is so very hypothetical, far from directly relevant empirical data (and any truly relevant observations) (and these 'theorists'  really not indicating how these internal phenomenon really can/do exist, in any satisfactory manner),:  it seems to me it would be wise to find and direct us to the "embedded [in the environment ]" aspects FIRST!   That would provide at least some grounding for the otherwise seemingly much more preposterous "embedded" phenomenon 'hypothesized' nowadays.

Thus, if there is both embodied and embedded, please direct us to the embedded first.

Dear Brad Jesness,

your "embedded" argument is perfectly in line with the idea that concepts are flexible and situated, that is depend on the concrete context, in which a concept is activated. The situational context or embeddedness thus provide a further basis of the grounding of concepts, whether abstract or concrete, in perception and action.. Embodiment and embeddedness can therefore be considered as two important aspects of conceptual cognition

Dear Markus Kiefer  

YOU SAY, BUT IT SIMPLY AND DEMONSTRABLY IS NOT SO (from your viewpoint or at least from the viewpoint of some of the 'theorists' you defend) !  Even your "flexible and situated" displays the bias that the embodied behaviors are there first !

Similarly for your "further basis" statement.  It is amazing how people can display unfounded and unscientific PRESUMPTIONS, with no evidence.   (Thus your "therefore ... " does not follow !!)

While the embodied and embedded should be 2 "sides of the same coin", citing actual proximate environmental aspects (right-NOW for each major behavior pattern), CORRESPONDING to an "embedded" behavior/representation (possibly with no-representation, or with representation down-played) is rather rare for some theorists.  These same theorists also seem guilty of relying on types of supposed coordination of behaviors between adults and children and supposed social learning that also is never convincingly demonstrated.   In short, we have both unproven (and to me, unlikely) mechanisms which have very limited and only indirect empirical referents and no proximate causes cited. (To me both these aspects of the "evidence" they accept is unacceptable, if only because other possible and equally likely (or more likely) outlooks are rejected automatically -- and THESE do happen to indicate the likelihood of more direct empirical evidence AND some proximate causes.)

I am familiar with only some of these theorists, but could cite Peter Konig et al as an example (at times he even seems to have difficulty distinguishing perception from sensation).

Perhaps more central is many theorists have assumptions that completely bias their outlook (AND their possible outlooks) AGAINST perceptual/attentional shifts being part of significant behavior patterns that may occur at the inception of new qualitative ways of thinking (in children, during ontogeny).  The unfounded assumptions which prohibit even the consideration of such absolutely (otherwise) possible elements of development include:

(1) the old unfounded: all that is innate is at-birth (or MAJOR bias

     this way)

(2) the unfounded and likely false pseudo-assumption: the more

      learning an organism displays, the LESS innate guidance

      mechanisms involved

(3) the contrasting of what is innate to what is learning -- IN ANY

     FORM AT ALL:  THIS IS A WRONG DICHOTOMY AND DUALISM. 

     (There is evidence that it is only reasonable to view the "2 kinds"

     of factors occurring in effect at the SAME TIME (simultaneously,

     blended).)

(4) The failure to get away from some idea that some significant

      behavior patterns (e.g. some abstract thought) can occur

     completely internally.

     [(We are simply not that smart (even with our awesome memory

     abilities):  new levels of thought will involve some new or newly

     emphasized environmental aspects -- ONE PROXIMATE CAUSE)]

(5) The abject inability to construe behavior patterns

      expressly AS BIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING.

[ I probably should have also listed the profound bias against inductive work and (rather) pushing AND supporting coming up quickly with entire hypothetico-deductive systems (which, from a science standpoint, are grossly premature). ]

Until all 5 failures or profound biases are recognized we "will have" weird, unlikely "social learning" hypothetically aiding major behavior changes in ways they likely cannot and without direct empirical evidence and without proximate causes. 

Hen or egg, it is a question of perspective and of epistemology. Of course embedded first if you take Merleau-Ponty's concepts of the "Lebenswelt"  or of "la chair du monde" or Wolfgang Welsch's mundanology. The body as a part of the world in which he is inextricably embedded can only embody what's around.

I do not think that embodiment is more important than embeddeness (or situatedness). Both aspects are heavily interlinked. However, I endorse an representational view assuming that action and cognition is based on representations of previous actions and perceptions.

Dear Markus Kiefer  

Basically, the problems I have ARE WITH the made-up-in-people's-minds ideas about how "action and cognition is based on representations of [supposed] PREVIOUS actions and perceptions":  In particular (in the views of prevalent 'theorists' now in this area), the hypothetical [PREVIOUS] "actions" and "perceptions" 'hypothesized' [ (I usually use the word "supposed", since the 'evidence' is so very scant and indirect) ] are on a poor theoretical foundation (assumptions/presumptions), with unlikely mechanisms 'hypothesized' for development.  The supposed mechanisms of the development of "sensori-motor contingencies" (SMC's) beyond infancy and toddlerhood and thereby the development of further sensori-motor-based representations is a needlessly speculative view, founded simply on supposed (and unproven and likely unprovable) and very unlikely 'social learning'/coordinated adult-child action mechanisms (true, at least the few theorists I am familiar with, especially, for example, Peter Konig et al).   AND, it is needlessly un-empirical compared to more likely mechanisms of development such as those I put forth, involving innate guidance and stages, the kind of stages and "maturation" Piaget indicated --  ironically, on whose work the elaboration of sensori-motor actions leading to (in effect) representation is based. Piaget, this theorist  SMC people are 'elaborating' * on, would much more likely support my view than such as that of Peter Konig et al. (how much YOU exactly follow this group's line of thinking I do not know, but I am supposing it is something similar to his, as is true of the other 2 research groups I am familiar with).

Those SMC-type groups I am familiar with really have a poor basis for any embeddeness (or situatedness) because of the lack of empircism (direct evidence) behind their other concepts -- supposed KEY developmental concepts.  Lip service to embeddeness (or situatedness) does not equal a TRUE OR GOOD CONNECTNESS in theory, OR in your indirect evidence, OR in the evidence-sought TO aspects of the environment.  NO proximate causes are (EVER) cited.  I have NOT seen even a decent attempt to relate embodiment TO any realistic (or maybe even real) embeddeness (or situatedness) -- see my characterization of the "social learning", above. THUS you (or those I am associating you with) certainly do really not address how  "both [(embodiment and embeddness)] are heavily interlinked". You now can try to show me wrong:

I would love to hear a brief but notable elaboration of how  "both [[(embodiment and embeddness)] are heavily interlinked".  Make it clear by clear description how this is so.  (This would allow me to see how you may be somehow different than the prevalent SMC-type research groups I am familiar with.)

You say: "I do not think that embodiment is more important than embeddeness (or situatedness).".  Well, I can help you there: situatedness (embeddness) IS MORE IMPORTANT -- TO AN EMPIRICIST AND as indicated in well-founded theory with biologically likely assumptions.  What behavior PATTERNS are a response TO, is most basic, to an empiricist or anyone who might be interested in the science of psychology.  By reading my previous essays in Questions and Answers, under Contributions in my Profile (just see my last post, above, for one), you can learn about likely false BELIEFS you may have that you are using as guiding assumptions and theoretical assumptions, and learn about more likely alternatives (see: https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_can_straighten_out_the_mess_that_psychology_is ).

*FOOTNOTE: I see SMC people as basically elaborating-BY-ANALOGY on Piaget's description of actual sensor-motor development in infancy.  (BY ANALOGY is not how you get to things and which they THEN 'explain' with unlikely hypothetical mechanisms.) They do this because they are boxed-in by likely false, AND unproven, assumptions about human behavior and thus (literally) cannot think of anything else, such as: innate factors emerging well after infancy (up through adolescence), defining STAGES of development (like Piaget), and those factors (likely perceptual/attentional shifts) changing behavior and starting key human behaviors toward that which allows developing new cognitive abilities, at each stage. (ALL very believable with a set of more reasonable, more biologically likely set of assumptions; SEE: https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_can_straighten_out_the_mess_that_psychology_is ) AND

See attached publication:

Article A Human Ethogram: Its Scientific Acceptability and Importanc...