With the advent of automated air navigation and reporting, and eventual approach, enroute and departure mandated technologies and their integration into all aircraft globally, the threat of spoofing these CNS ATM systems is currently a silent, but assumed high risk.
But no one it seems is addressing the threat by region and/or nation, or by whom; or presenting alternative technologies and/or practices to minimize the threat to future global flight safety.
I would worry less about ADS-B/Mode-S spoofing and more so about GPS spoofing, which would then, in turn, make your ADS-B location transmission incorrect. GPS spoofing is rather simple, unfortunately, due to the low power of the signal.
I agree with David. ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) and ECCM (Electronic Counter Counter Measures) for GPS is mission critical to safety & security of global aviation.
The GPS is one of 5 possible architectural data source solution sets required by ADS-B and/or Mode S.
For military aircraft, the P- or PY-coded GPS and/or EGI take care of the "spoofing".
As we move to NextGen and/or SESAR, these SSR systems become a risk area due to their "spoofing" threats.
Anyone seen any effort by EASA and/or FAA to study spoofing either within the EU and/or USA NAS?
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