Rudolf Arnheim has put forward throughout his carreer in books and articles the thesis that perception is not separated from cognition. What we consider the core of cognition, abstract ideas , are in fact also the landmark of perception. Although the privilege medium for expressing of our understanding are mathematical models, or a narrative into a human language are superficially far from what we considered the proper mediums of perceptions: images, sound, touch, body movements, it is only superficial. Although our perceptions is similar to those of animals while we are very different on the level of our capacity to express through language, this does not support that understanding takes place in the superficial structures supporting language. Language only made more efficient our inborn capacity to dream while being awake, this is the only properly human capacity. This unique human capacity is based on the self-enaction of the basic schemata of our nervous system responsible for controling our body movement , performing all the actions, and doing all forms of perceptions can then be used for communication by the invention of languages. Understanding is a perceptual process which though imagination can be expressed in some language forms. Most of what we understand is about totally symbolic domains. But do not forget that these through language get integrated into our memory in the same schemata memory medium that is used by other mammals and the same mammalian perceptual process are used to find relevant structures in this schemata media. It is why most of the invention takes place sub-consciously and partly during sleep.

This is a fascinating topic, one that I made an attempt at in Orpwood R (2010), Perceptual qualia and local network behaviour in the cerebral cortex, Journal of Integrative Neuroscience, 9, 123–152. In terms of perceptual understanding I considered an example of a particular sensory experience, such as experiencing a bird

taking off. The layer 2/3 sensory processing hierarchy has the role of recognizing

the sensory input patterns at increasing levels of sophistication. There is of course

no understanding in this process. All that is going on is sensory pattern recognition.

The process of understanding in the perception of this sensory experience is one of

taking the recognized sensory input, and relating it to all the experiences the brain

in question has had up to that point in time, and any subsequent manipulation

of those experience patterns. It is putting the new input into the context of all

that it has learnt, and internally developed. Understanding can only occur if those

sensory recognitions can be related to the brain’s previous experiences. As far as

this particular brain is concerned, all it has at its disposal are all the previous

experiences it has had of bird-like experiences; how they behave, how they live, all

the myriad anecdotes of experience, together with the link to language processing

areas to enable external communication, and subsequent internal manipulations of

that information. All these experiences provide this brain with its concept of a

bird. In order to provide understanding to the new sensory input it has to be first

recognized, and then related to the brain’s set of prior similar experiences.

The paper went on to consider mechanisms underpinning this activity within the sensory cortex.

Roger Orpwood

In the topic "By modeling our minds, can we find out how the mind works? How can we model our minds, by observing the neurons, brain, behaviors?" Warren asked the question, which is quoted hereunder:

" Warren Kinston · 31.44 · 70.81

......, I "know" what I mean when I say "I know something": I can explain it to someone else in a variety of ways, I can argue for it with those who disagree, I can apply it in practice in a variety of situations. Brains do not do any of those things. So please explain In what sense a brain "knows". Also explain in what a sense "a mind" knows. thanks."

His question more relate to my question in the title of this one topic.

"To know something" has double meaning. First meaning is equivalent of process "to remember / to remind".

Second meaning is just to understand / to gain understanding.

Our brains (and brains of many animals) must understand the world. Otherwise their activity couldn't be effectual and beneficial. Finding similarity of mental correlates of external stimuli to the mental representation of the models previously learned they can complement these model for new elements. Plasticity of our Long Term Memory allows to enrich the models and create coherent and adequate model of surrounding world. This is the essence of understanding and the base of consciousness.

Understanding in a mechanical sense means we have a model in our mind which can be manipulated like the real thing, which is modeled. I think pattern of the recognized object and their behavior fit to the model if we "understand".

But there are more kinds of understanding and in each of them there must be a pattern matching process where the cognitive manipulation fits to experience with such things.

Wilfried,

We are talking not about mechanical sense, I believe, but about psychological sense. I am trying to describe and explain this psychological sense in the language of neural models and neural states. This, I hope, allow us to understand, what means "understanding. Please, note, that understanding is always translation of perceived model of surrounding (scene) to the better known models (patterns) in our memory, which we learned during our experience (training, learning procedure). Similarity, which I have mentioned at the very beginning of this topic, should occur between configuration of neural states excited by external stimuli (neural representation of perceived model) and neural states of the memory, where patterns and wider models are stored.

We can't speak about manipulations, as we don't know what it means in the categories of neural states. It's better to say, that we have learned sequences of different events stored afterwards in our episodic memory and thus we can compare (and find further similarities) of different scenarios. It gives us the chance to predict results of our actions. Even in our imagination. This is, what you are possibly calling "cognitive manipulation".

There is no differece. Information is information and if there is a kind of fitting, it will have a reaction.

"We can't speak about manipulations, as we don't know what it means in the categories of neural states."

I think we are able to speak about manipulations. We are able to observe and realize movements of objects. So we are able to imagine the neuronal representation of these movements. A kind of manipulation is to turn round an object or to move it. There is no difference in the representation of the viewed movement and the representation of a mental manipulation of this object.

This is only a simple example but I think it is prototypically for the problem.

@"manipulations"

I can't agree with you, because in the first entry you have mentioned " ... model in our mind which can be manipulated like the real thing". Models stored in our memory is very general and fuzzy in the sense of Perlovsky theory "from fuzzy to crisp". We can't manipulate these models except further associations and comparison with semblances called by Vaddakkan "the semblions" [see: Vadakkan Kunjumon I., Processing semblances induced through inter-postsynaptic functional LINKs, presumed biological parallels of K-lines proposed for building artificial intelligence, Frontiers in Bioengineering 2011)], These semblions again, are the base for imagination and in this sense manipulation is possible. Plasticity of long term memory enable influence of perceived objects on the models/concepts already residing in our memory.

Rudolf Arnheim has put forward throughout his carreer in books and articles the thesis that perception is not separated from cognition. What we consider the core of cognition, abstract ideas , are in fact also the landmark of perception. Although the privilege medium for expressing of our understanding are mathematical models, or a narrative into a human language are superficially far from what we considered the proper mediums of perceptions: images, sound, touch, body movements, it is only superficial. Although our perceptions is similar to those of animals while we are very different on the level of our capacity to express through language, this does not support that understanding takes place in the superficial structures supporting language. Language only made more efficient our inborn capacity to dream while being awake, this is the only properly human capacity. This unique human capacity is based on the self-enaction of the basic schemata of our nervous system responsible for controling our body movement , performing all the actions, and doing all forms of perceptions can then be used for communication by the invention of languages. Understanding is a perceptual process which though imagination can be expressed in some language forms. Most of what we understand is about totally symbolic domains. But do not forget that these through language get integrated into our memory in the same schemata memory medium that is used by other mammals and the same mammalian perceptual process are used to find relevant structures in this schemata media. It is why most of the invention takes place sub-consciously and partly during sleep.

I agree with the Rudolf Arnheim thesis. But I can't agree that the core of cognition are abstract ideas. We can recognise and understand perceived patterns without naming them, in similar way, like the animals devoid of the language. They understand the scene of surrounding but can't describe it in the abstract categories. These abstract ideas are also not the landmark of perception. In fact there is no such landmark, because there is continuum of understanding. Animal has also some level of the language, sometime less or more “abstract”. At least they have capability of categorisation. Also dreaming doesn't require the language skill. One can have erotic dream and the level of “understanding” which allow ejaculation without saying or thinking no single word. That way we perceive qualia. Therefore understanding is not perceptual process which through imagination can be expressed in some language form. I can't agree, that most of what we understand is about totally in the symbolic domain. Mostly because you didn't defined who are “we”. Possibly you are thinking about narrow population of the people discussing here philosophical issues. But most common peoples and we, animals, we are thinking how to eat something good, rest and sleep. We can feel which food is good, which bed is comfortable, without calling them. Symbolic knowledge is the thin film only on our consciousness. That's why your last sentences are very true and I agree with conclusions, but not with explanations.

Wieslaw,

When an animal or a human look at a tree or at another animal, its vision system has to have a whole apparatus for detecting patterns, not patterns not related to each other, but patterns as made of sub-patterns etc.. The whole visual detection apparatus implicitly knows what are the possible pattern relations. This is an a priori form of understanding built-in the visual systems, and all sensory-motor system. If this not understanding, I do not know what understanding is. Only humans will later be able to express in language forms , called ideas, these basic patterns and relationshing built-in the sensory-motor systems of all mammals. When the primate sees a tree, what the primate sees is pretty much what the human sees. The idea of a tree is based on the existence in our visual system of a network of tree detection schemata which get self-enact when you think of a tree or when you read or hear the word tree.

Wieslaw,

would you please elaborate more details of your conception of manipulation?

@ Louis,

I am afraid, the process, you described is not a full explanation of "understanding" process. Firstly, we have to describe the notion "implicitly knows" in the categories of neural process. This notion itself is not clear-cut. There is nothing like "a priori form... built-in visual system". Without sufficient training of the newborn baby visual system, sometimes seeing vertical strips, contours or other details is impossible. Most important thing is the model - concept of the scene, surroundings, environment, finally the world model.

Sub-patterns mentioned by you has their neural correlates in our memory. The brain is the machine, which compare configurations of the sensory stimuli coming bottom-up, with these neural corelates in the form of matrix of electrical states of synaptic fields. Configurations said above have the form of spike directivity according to the definitions of Neuro-Electro-Dynamic (NED) theory developed by Aur & Jog. I have no space here to explain closer these subject. These internal stimuli are transmitted to the wide brain area, but further propagation is possible only from the synaptic area, where similarity function achieved maximum value. This is attention mechanism employing WTA procedure (winner-takes-all). Stimulus from this neural field selected by similarity maximum is transfered to the higher levels of semi-hierarchical structure of the brain. That way external sti,uli are transferred to the chain of internal stimuli through the number of levels (possibly about 40-50 approx). They are constituting the semblion, dendroidal structure described by Vadakkan : http://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsemblancehypothesis.org%2FPowerpoint%2520presentation%2FSemblance%2520Hypothesis.pdf&ei=PTlQU9v6HueO4wTi1YHwAQ&usg=AFQjCNEEwnM0hJiBBU1cXDUNw3O70xfMJg&sig2=B4wuT6p8xKlObPXl2IYfKw&bvm=bv.64764171,d.bGE.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232926389_The_nature_of_internal_sensations_of_higher_brain_functions_may_be_derived_from_the_design_rules_for_artificial_machines_that_can_produce_them

These semblions allow recalling, planning, conceiving and dreaming. The specific heuristic generating the consciousness of the brain is the consequence of connectionist structure of neural synaptic fields working according to these ideas. Full explanation of basic requirements necessary for creation of consciousness is quite complicated and cannot be cite here, while precise, working model, allowing practical implementation will need a lot of further investigations and adjustment of arousal and suppression levels, strength of feedback, solution of temporal stimuli transfer to the spatial distribution in the episodic memory, effective memory with appropriate forgetting mechanism and plasticity and so on. All these problems needs next 10 – 15 years of intensive investigations.

@Wilfried,

I hope, I have answered to some extent on your request in the answer for Louis.

If not, please ask more detailed questions.

Article The nature of “internal sensations” of higher brain function...

Wieslaw,

Thank you for the answer.

Are you sudgesting that the visual system of new born babies are blank slates? That visual learning starts from scratch. That babies do not have any a priori visual knowledge? Absolutely all comes from experience and the basic visual architecture?

Newborns’ Face Recognition: Role of Inner and Outer Facial Features:

''Evidence supporting the claim that not only do

newborns differentiate between faces and nonface

visual objects but they also process information

about individual faces, derives mainly from the observation

that, within hours from birth, infants show

a visual preference for their mother’s face over a

female unfamiliar face (Bushnell, 2001; Bushnell, Sai,

& Mullin, 1989; Field, Cohen, Garcia, & Greenberg,

1984; Pascalis et al., 1995).''

This is just one among thousand of studies that show that we are borned with some visual competence and not with a visual blank state.

No, definitely newborn visual system is not blank slates and also other motor skill and systems are not. You are absolutely right.

The works of Perin, Markram and others, confirm that cortical neural columns feature innate structures which group the neurons in accordance with repetitive, species-specific rules (see: Henry Markram, Rodrigo Perin, Innate neural assemblies for Lego memory, Frontiers in Neural Circuits, May 2011, Volume 5, Article 6 and Rodrigo Perin, Thomas K. Berger, and Henry Markram, A synaptic organizing principle for cortical neuronal groups, PNAS March 29, vol. 108, no. 13 5419–5424 (2011) .

The density of neural connections differs from the statistics derived from analysing neural neighbourhood typical neural fields. The synapses form clusters and ensembles resembling Vadakkan's synaptic islands described in his works. These clusters are not limited to specific microcolumns of 100 - 150 microns, but may cover the columns as large as 300 - 500 microns. In addition to the synaptic island topology, the strength of synaptic connections is distributed in a way that reflects the structure of detected neural ensembles. The individual ensembles intermingle to form a network of multiple ensembles existing in the same synaptic space. Since the study was carried out with 12-channel probes on the brain cortex sections of 14-day-old rats, the structure of the connections could not have been formed during the learning process and ontogenesis. These findings confirm the McCulloch's intuitions presented in his works: (W.S. McCulloch, W. Pitts, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity,” Bull. Mathematical Biophysics, vol. 7, pp. 115-133, 1943. and also: W.S. McCulloch, Embodiments of Mind, 2nd edition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988, 1965) about the a priori nesting of the patterns in the brain. This may explain instinctive behaviours observed in nature. This may also explain why the animal and human brains have similar perception mechanisms. Their psychological characteristics, however, significantly differ as a result of learning in a variety of conditions and on the basis of different life experiences. The discovered innate structures, of course, do not exclude the plasticity which is a necessary condition for learning. However, experimental evidence points out that the main structures of the neural and synaptic connections are determined genetically. This claim undermines the dominant role of synaptic plasticity postulated by Hebb.

All these evidence doesn't undermine the effect mentioned by me in the previous letter.

Wieslaw,

understanding depends of the representation of objects in the mind that means the neuronal co-relate of such a representation. IMHO it is the network of all activated neurons with a lot of associations of properties of the represented Object.

Next we should ask: What do you mean with "understanding"? Is it a situation, a process, a relation, a description or a strange language?

Dear Wilfried,

Understanding is process. In previous posts I tried to explain what it is in terms of neuronal processes. In my three-part essay, "The Architecture of Consciousness" ( first part: http://www.kul.pl/wieslaw-galus-architektura-swiadomosci-czesc-i-logika-i-morfologia-sieci-neuronowej,art_64743.html) I have presented assumed biophysical mechanisms, which can explain this process.

Repeating briefly what I wrote earlier: understanding is the process of bringing into association of the neural correlates of perceptions in working memory, with the patterns that reside in the brain and produced in the process of learning and perception of similar scenes or objects in the past. Correlates of percepts take the form of multi-layered, hierarchical tree structure stimulations transmitted by the flow of electric charges. They stimulate the brain in these fields, where the structure of the local electric fields is similar to the spatial structure and topology pulses running from the lower layers (sensory). This compatibility of charges in synaptic fields means inclusion percepts to the model of the world formed in the brain and that is just understanding. Associations for understanding may include a hierarchical structure on dozens of levels (20 - 50) and cover almost the entire brain. Parallel processing does not create limitations in the speed of processing billions of synapses.

The observation of phenomena occurring in the time allows you to memorize the sequence of scenes in episodic memory, where the temporal-space transformation occur. Thanks to this, phenomena schemas can be recognized the same way as objects.

Above mentioned principles of similarities to patterns (or rather complementary) brings to mind the structures of the language, in which we describe abstract objects. This is the base of metaphors of the language of embodied mind described by Johnson and Latoffa as the basic structure of the symbolic language. I explained closer the formation of the language in the mind in my fourth paper "Semblions of the Language" (in press, but also in Polish)

http://www.kul.pl/wieslaw-galus-architektura-swiadomosci-czesc-i-logika-i-morfologia-sieci-neuronowej,art_64743.html