Gandhi chose civil-disobedience within a non-violent context to achieve political ends, but did what success he have come as the result of his methods functioning in law abiding societies?
Gandhi was absolutely a pragmatist, and was willing to play the long game even if it meant short-term problems for him. He knew very well that Britain's imperial edifice depended not only on the use of violence but on the violence itself being seen as legitimate. The only strategy that could beat this was consistent non-violence (and publicity). Consider the Salt March of 1930 - Gandhi made sure that he received plenty of media coverage, even bending the "moral" rules that his followers had to stick to for international reporters.
Gandhi's methods hold up well in republican/democratic societies as well. Governments cannot endlessly rely on force to quell all dissent and protest without losing legitimacy and popular support. His methods have been applied successfully in South Africa and the US, though the current popular understanding of them focuses more on the spiritual ideal than the underlying pragmatism.
Surely, Anirudh, this solution works only through the cooperation of the host society or authority? If an authority is required or requires to maintain legitimacy, often expressed through rule of law, then it should or may work. It seems an ideal method. In a society for whom legitimacy is at best a secondary matter or which controls media and therefore publicity it cannot work.
You are, I think, right about the pragmatic nature of Gandhi's methods.
I have a real interest in what you consider Britian's use of violence in India to keep control. Can you elucidate?
Well, there was occasional violence, Mushtaq, but Anirudh appears to project something more. Does he believe it was some kind of police state-which it wasn't? Far from it. It worked unfortunately top-down, with British people as the top, preferred culture. Racism if you like, but one that fitted in with the Indian Hindu caste system.
I've ked at Anirudh's piece again and as he says ' violence itself being seen as legitimate' he clearly means something more subtle. I await his response.
Okay. So consider the British response to the Black Hole of Calcutta, the Sepoy Mutiny, or any number of wars in India. Always, the use of military force was justified by portraying Indians as the aggressors, even if the reason for the Indian aggression was British provocation. The same applies, I believe, to the Zulu and Boer Wars.
British imperialism very self-consciously modelled itself on the idea of Rome as a civilising influence (consider the monumental architecture of New Delhi and Calcutta, which fuses neoclassical and Indo-Saracenic influences). Imperialism was not justified to the world and to British citizens based solely on the exercise of absolute power - rather, it was cast in terms of destiny and the White Man's Burden, of bringing civilisation to barbaric natives until they were capable of ruling themselves.
This brings up the question of what would be done once "natives" were "civilised". Indian elites made a very conscious effort to ape British culture, but did not receive self-rule. That was the original reason for the formation of the Indian National Congress, interestingly - to demand self-rule, not independence. Only when it was absolutely clear that self-rule would not materialise did demands turn to independence.
The problem with fighting for independence from an empire is that it can be cast as sedition and put down with violence, and the populace is likely to support that. The use of violence is also likely to terrify subject peoples into subservience.
But unleashing brutality against nonviolent protesters is impossible to justify - especially if imperialism is cast as being there to civilise them in the first place. If the "civiliser" is more brutal than the "civilised", does that not bring into question the very foundation of the imperial rule?
Gandhi realised that it was impossible to beat the British at the military game, but it was possible to beat them at the ideological game. His target was not the imperial military machine - it was the foundation of the empire itself. If the British used violence against him, then the world would no longer see British rule as legitimate. They were left with a simple choice - let Gandhi do what he wanted and gradually lose the Indian territories, or use violence against Gandhi and immediately lose the legitimacy they needed to control the entire empire. Hope this clarifies my argument. :)
Can I take your points one by one, but not necessarily in the order you have presented them?
Although imperialism is frowned on now, the reverse was by and large the case then. The White Man's burden was a rationale of Empire, yes, that is true and along with that racism.
Did Britain deliberately emulate Rome? All empires and up and coming states emphasis grandeur, not just Rome, nor Germany, Russia, China and the USA.
Yes, Britain do act as aggressors and then turn it into defence. Not uncommon, but true.
Your understanding of violent and non-violent responses is correct from my knowledge. But surely, again, it was more complex than that?
Military machine? What military machine? There wasn't that much of it in India, or, except during the war, anywhere else.
My problem here: Gandhi's methods would not have worked under the rule of undemocratic (yes, ideas of superiority and civilising processes worked to keep peoples down and provide cover by establishing good opinions in the home country) states and he would have been simply imprisoned and killed in Germany, Russia, and China, his reputation blackened in the USA and imprisoned for 80 years on trumped up charges. Was Britain better? Only perhaps by default, but he did take his arguments into Britain itself and received in the main a cordial reception. He was perhaps allowed to change India's status.
You perhaps both overrate the British of the time and equally underate them.
Yes, all empires do emphasise grandeur, but I think the British took it a step beyond that. I would point you to the work of David Mattingly, who has extensively deconstructed how Rome justified its imperial mission and how those narratives were further developed and applied by British translators and classicists during their own imperial period.
Of course violence and non-violence are more complex than my answer indicates. I just abstracted them to apply them to this particular question. :)
I am puzzled that you say that Britain did not have much of a military machine considering the size of its navy, army, and its technological edge over a mostly de-militarised country.
Yes, Gandhi's methods wouldn't have worked in an authoritarian country. His strategy was tailored to one which was founded on a certain set of values and behaviours which he was able to exploit, as I pointed out. But one cannot say for sure that if the Nazis had conquered India, Gandhi would actually have stuck to nonviolence. Since the situation did not arise, neither you nor I can be certain, but I suspect that Gandhi would have realised that nonviolence would no longer be a viable or pragmatic strategy.
(Sorry for the late reply, as I was travelling this weekend.)
I question less the validity of your claims, except the military one, but why you see them as important. I have no doubt that the British empire expressed itself through Roman grandeur, although that was more based on a fusion of Roman and Greek styles. But all or the majority of Empires did and do. The Romans/ Greeks of the Hellenistic age acquired theirs from the Middle East empires of Assyria and Persia. But, so what? States construct buildings to communicate values, sometimes they construct grand buildings from weakness, or for expressions of stability. But, in this matter, so what?
Britain was not then and never has been a military society expressing a fetish for such matters. Its navy was huge, but not its army, which explains its problems against the Boer and elsewhere. Had Indians rose up, would it have survived? Although it demonstrated ruthlessness against the Boer, in specific circumstances, would it have done so in an Indian context? Historians tend to agree that Britain applied such behaviour less than any other empire, its values providing a brake. Which doesn't mean of course that it didn't.
You appear to see Gandhi's choices as entirely his own, not somehow working within conditioned environments. Gandhi was as much a puppet as anyone else, allowed certain choices. If Nazi Germany had run India, he would not have developed any. In Stalinist Russia, he would have placed his head above the parapet once and would not be seen again. He would have had no time to develop strategies. The point here is that he was a phenomenon of the British Empire not an abberation.
Ah, I see the reason for the confusion. The reason I brought up the Roman imperialism claim is to establish the kind of values that Britain modelled itself on, which you've raised as well. Should have been clearer in connecting the two in my last answer.
As regards the British using violence in India had Indians risen up: that's well attested. Consider 1857 or Jallianwala Bagh. Protests were often put down brutally until nonviolence gained international attention, and did not completely vanish even then. And Indians did take up arms (see the Azad Hind Fauj) and commit acts of terror (see Bhagat Singh), it's just that their failure and Gandhi's historical reputation causes that to be neglected.
I agree that Gandhi was a phenomenon of the British Empire. My entire point has been that pragmatic nonviolence (leaving aside the personality of Gandhi) would only work against an empire that constructed itself the way that Britain did! Even if the British were relatively a less brutal imperial power, my point is that they had a tremendous advantage over the Indian population, and using nonviolence against them could work and possibly help save lives given these constraints. Given the fact that we agree broadly on this matter, I am not sure exactly what we are debating at this point.
Anirudh, of course you have a point regarding the mid-century rebellion, and the other acts you itemise.
But I think this debate is over the military threat that you believe controlled India, whereas I consider it subject to other causes, such as encouraging advancement through cultural identification-one used often by Moslem invaders in India and elsewhere-emphasising British education, that Gandhi who benefited attacked as undermining Indian cottage education, and installing railways, which provided access to most of India and created, amongst other things, a sense of India as a single unit.
I think (you can of course persaude me differently) that your concentration on the military side is a way of not confronting historical truths-i.e your apparent belief that Britain was a tyrannical military power that kept down some 500 million Indians with, what was, a very tiny force rather than many Indians engaged with the idea of Empire.
Hahaha, of course not, Stanley (if I may call you that). I'm fully aware that the Raj was substantially possible thanks to the willing cooperation of many Indians, and its existence and legacy are extremely complicated . I'm not Shashi Tharoor, I don't believe in historical saviours or villains, and I apologise if my answers gave that impression.
The only reason I keep coming back to the military is that protesters or freedom fighters could and would be subject to lethal force, and nonviolence is pragmatic strategy that probably saved many lives as a result.
In addition, it served the purpose of giving Gandhi the moral high ground and the aura that he was continuing the tradition of Indian spiritual leaders who challenged authority, thus increasing the popularity and visibility of the movement, making it seem more viable to elites who were otherwise doing quite well under the British.
To summarise my views:
The British Raj was based on narratives - to the British and international community as a civilising influence, to Indians on cultural identification, (to borrow your term for it), to some degree on manufactured Hindu-Muslim animosity (as attested to by British narratives of Indian history) and some degree of force (or the threat thereof).
Indian elites gained much from British rule and therefore enthusiastically supported it despite the tiny numbers of actual British administrators and military men in the subcontinent.
It is not that the Indians could not or would not fight, it's just that those who had the resources to fight (kings) had been incorporated into the Raj and had no reason to do so, whereas those who would fight had little narrative or physical force backing them up.
Nonviolence as a strategy was viable because it was aimed at the narratives and ideals that the British had deliberately adopted, and it could therefore not be put down by force even if they had the inclination or the resources to do so. As such, it quite possibly saved many lives.
By casting it in spiritual terms, Gandhi managed to gain a huge amount of popular support, possibly making a case for the elites (who benefited from the Raj) to support him as well, as they could (and did) do better as an independent country.
I'm not opposed confronting historical truths at all (in fact, most of my writing is precisely about that), it's just that I appear to not have understood your question properly and therefore focused on my answers on particular topics which taken in separation may well have given that impression.
If you have the time, I've written an op-ed about a medieval Indian ruler which I would love to have your views on given your views on Islam.
Thank you so much! I'm very much a result of the British-inspired education system, though. All my schooling has been done in English and my reading is as well (though I hope to dive into Indian literature at some point).
Here's the op-ed: http://www.livemint.com/Sundayapp/A8rM7OG5zPTu7PXV1fSFcO/The-impact-of-Alauddin-Khilji.html
I am curious as to why you say that the Raj was "so few people". You've pointed out earlier that many Indians were part of the imperial project. Add that to communications technology such as the telegraph, the enforced support of Indian rulers, strategically located cantonments, and narrative structures and the Raj seems a lot more feasible. And we need to keep in mind that the Raj proper, in terms of controlling massive amounts of territory with an imperial administration, was only around for a little more than a century (roughly the late 18th to mid-20th, and for most of the 20th century it was under constant political threat).
I also think that it was less stable than is generally portrayed. The conquest of many Indian states was very bloody and difficult and British hegemony was only barely established by 1857, though much stronger then. There were no serious rebellions after that (unless you count Bose's Azad Hind Fauj) but there were a few terrorist attacks and lots of major protests. From the perspective of the imperial administrator, most of the early 20th century would have been one of constant headaches and problems - if not military, then certainly political.
Yes. No argument there again. There was a contingent quality to the Empire, both in India and elsewhere, a kind of make-do approach. It certainly had only a short life, but it was unlikely to be extended in any way, as the world changed leaving territorally based empires adrift.
The USSR survived until the end of the last century, but it had an ideological rationale for its continued existence.
Remember though, British identity, which has struggled for many decades to find alternatives, was also formed on its rule of India.
Of course. Both Indian and British identity were shaped by the Raj. Indian nationalism particularly gained a huge shot in the arm by helping the subcontinent to develop a coherent national identity, which was reinforced by opposition to the Raj and yet enabled by it.
And if I may say so, modern British identity, especially nostalgia for the Raj (to which many recent TV shows and films attest), is also a way of not confronting historical truths, and speaks volumes to the struggle to find an identity in a postcolonial world.
Looking for an alternative is indeed a measure of uncertainty and confusion. Finding a role in a post colonial world remains the essence of many European countries, promoting the kind of radical reapproachment we now see.
Interesting. Not a ruler previoiusly known to me. The tactics employed by the series of thugs you itemise were not new, the Mongol psychological terror approach was initially used by the Assyrians in the First Millennium BCE, with equally good results.
I wonder though, does a strong leader have to be murderous?
Glad that you liked it. As regards murderous rulers - not necessarily. If the conditions are right, clemency and mercy can be equally effective in legitimising a strong ruler. Consider Cyrus the Great, for example. His tolerance and clemency towards the Jews may have been a deliberate policy to set himself apart from the neo-Assyrians and neo-Babylonians. But it proved to be such a success that he was considered to be a Messiah!
Although these men, usually men, inhabited different times with different approaches (that anyway is the reasoning) exposing their appalling behaviour/attitudes is never a bad idea.
As I was writing the above, I immediately thought of all the good examples around at the same period. Bar one! Buddha, many Hindu sects-
You may find it insightful to read Upinder Singh's Political Violence in Ancient India. While Buddha himself did not support violence, he was not a king and had the luxury of not having to use it. Buddhist scriptures, however, ascribe some sort of "social contract" to him - he is supposed to have claimed that the duty of the king was to maintain order, with violence if absolutely necessary. I've explored some of these ideas in my review of the book here: https://www.thinkpragati.com/bookshelf/2669/violent-origins-land-ahimsa/
I also find it a little problematic to attach labels to their behaviour. If violence was normalised and expected, I do not see whether there is any point in our calling it "appalling", considering how different our lives and values are today. Ultimately, what has happened has happened, and attaching value judgements to it are ultimately irrelevant to the course of events and prevent us from being objective in analysing it.
My reason for attaching judgements is to encourage different ethical processes rather than continue the past. This is not about lack of objectivity on my part but a refusal to accept paradigms of violence in the past or now. In my work on religion I refuse to except a religion's legitimacy if it employed violence because the violence of the past is used to legitimise the violence of the present.
I will consider your take on Buddha but I know that like, for example, Christianity, whereby alterations occurred to what Christians call the message and after 4 hundred years it changed from a non-violent religion to one that accepted violence, there were successive changes to Buddha's ideas. I know that it is difficult to disentangle these things.
But in that view, Stanley, can there be a "legitimate" religion? Sooner or later, every religion (the older they are, the more likely this will happen at some point) will be re-appropriated into a political structure that requires it to justify violence.
Even if the original founder did not intend it, the fact remains that any religion, in practice, can and will be used for violence. How can we distinguish between the two? As you have said, it is difficult to disentangle these. It just seems puzzling to me to conceptualise a "religion" as something that does not employ violence. The more general sense of religion, as a social structure which coevolves with politics, seems to be more useful as an analytical tool in my view.
Furthermore, even if violence against humans is not propounded, there is still the problem of violence against other living beings. Even a religion which disapproves of killing people might very well approve of sacrificial offerings.
Anirudh, you propose an inevitability to the process, but here secularism in fact has led to an examination of violence. Outside of religions there is less acceptance of violence. My dismissal of religions, although I'm not certain this belongs within our general discussion, is based on many of them as connected groups accepting violence while also claiming morality. Some religions are based on violence, that is their roots are within it, and that should surely be examined? As historians we cannot choose, for the sake not abandonment of objectivity, to sit on the sense. I actually anyway don't agree with your determininist approach.
Lets get back to the issues. I want you, if you will, to consider Caesar. Even today he would generally be considered a great leader, great man, great general. Is this accurate? The evidence suggests that his 'great victories' in Gaul were genocide. The Roman world alone at that point was replete with other ethical positions, internally and from areas of the middle-east. To claim he was of his time is not sufficient. I would therefore claim objectivity by not being swayed by power tropes into investing unscrupulous successful people with virtues they didn't or barely possessed. If writing on Caesar, I would investigate such matters and approximate his achievement accordingly-but great, lets be careful there.
That is an interesting point, but I think a determinist perspective would NOT see Caesar as "great" or invest him with virtues that he didn't possess. In my view, the virtues or flaws of historical figures are not necessarily relevant in evaluating their actions and the outcomes of those. (I am glad that you mentioned Caesar, actually - if one were to look at his behaviour he could certainly be diagnosed as a psychopath for his genocide against the Gauls, but at the same time his actions also benefited substantial sections of the Roman populace. Not being swayed by power tropes should also, in my view, go together with not being swayed by modern constructions of morality.)
As you pointed out, such matters need to be carefully investigated, but I would argue that in many cases there is insufficient evidence to draw a line between the initial outlook of a religion and the form it eventually takes. For example: I am a great admirer of the philosophy of the Buddha, but the form that Buddhism later took, inclining towards polytheism, is not what he taught. At least that is what I assume based on my understanding of the scriptures, but how many scriptures have been lost over the centuries? What if Buddha or Jesus were not the peace-loving holy men that later generations made them out to be? And if we cannot conclude for sure, why not keep our analyses deterministic? I'd appreciate your views on this, as my own journey as a historian is just beginning!
I would not classify Caesar as a psychopath as, being qualified and experienced in mental health, such terms are debatable and themselves subject to moral judgements of past and present behaviours. You are doing there what you accused me of doing in religion.
I do not actually believe the description of Jesus and early Christianity is true, and that both founder and religion were different from present ideas. On one issue, the environment was different in that there were many messagers at the time, the Near East was full of them, and the John the Baptist cult was already in Syria and Turkey (?), its places of worship used by Christians.
I think that Jesus was peacemaking, but for pragmatic as well as ideological reasons. As you said, we cannot know. But as Buddha's ideas grew out of Hinduism we may have some possibility of genuine understanding.