In our discourse (Tehovnik, Hasanbegović, and Chen 2025), we will present empirical evidence for the notion that consciousness in animals from the amoeba to the human is subserved by processes controlled by (1) neocortical, (2) cerebellar, and (3) hippocampal homologues, which is referred to as the tripartite model of animal consciousness (see Figure 1). A neocortical homologue is the organ that mediates sensation configured by the senses (visual, auditory, somatosensory (including vestibular), gustatory, and olfactory) and it is involved in the storage of declarative information (e.g., words, visual images, and so on as it relates to humans) using the process of synaptic modification (Hebb 1949, 1968). Consciousness is a process that is dependent on an augmented energy utilization sustained by dopaminergic-like inputs to neocortical tissues (Herculano-Houzel 2011; Plaçais et al. 2017; Sacks 1976, 2012). A cerebellar homologue controls the execution of body movements by converting the sensory codes of the neocortex into a motor code which is used by an animal to engage the outside world (Hasanbegović 2024; Tehovnik et al. 2021; Thach et al. 1992). The information stored in a cerebellar homologue is updated continuously via feedback from the senses so that a neocortical module can predict future responses based on current information, both experienced and stored. This is done by the Purkinje neurons in vertebrates which house the efference-copy codes that subserve overlearned, automatic behavioral responses which are instigated volitionally by neocortical tissues. Finally, a hippocampal homologue controls the consolidation and retrieval of neocortical and cerebellar information (Corkin 2002; Murray et al. 2017) and enables the stream of consciousness (Hassabis et al. 2007ab; James 1890).

We would suggest that the tripartite configuration of consciousness exists functionally in all animals including the amoeba, which has no problem predicting its future to obtain food and avoid predators given that these animals can learn from experience (Nakagaki et al. 2000; Saigusa et al. 2008). What distinguishes different animals is their ability to store learned information, measurable in bits (Tehovnik and Chen 2015), which is employed to predict future responses according to novel environmental contingencies, current and past. The amoeba has this capability despite its limited storage capacity. Unlike the amoeba, complex multicellular animals such as humans, elephants, whales, and so on require a protracted period of environmental stability to produce the next generation otherwise they experience the same fate as the dinosaurs 65 million years ago.

Figure 1: The tripartite model of animal consciousness is based on three functional units, a neocortical homologue, a cerebellar homologue, and a hippocampal homologue. The neocortical homologue stores declarative information based on sensation. The cerebellar homologue stores movement information in the form of an efference-copy code. The hippocampal homologue consolidates and retrieves information vis-à-vis the senses. A dopamine homologue maintains neocortical tissues at a high metabolic rate to drive behavior.