I suggest you look at the recent exchange (Sep 2023) on the discussion attached to the question "Why do so many developing countries fail to transfer technology?" at https://www.researchgate.net/post/Why-do-so-many-developing-countries-fail-to-transfer-technology between myself and @Barnabas-Kiiza. Barnabas introduced insight from Game Theory in answering this question. In particular, he referred to the 'Prisoner's Dilemma' scenario in which consensus-breaking is shown to be the rational behaviour for a 'player' motivated to maximise their odds of getting the best outcome. I then applied this further. Specifically, to show how this insight feeds directly into the relationship between governance and economic power, how economic power comes to be developed and what is done with it. The analysis suggests that real-world democracy, demagoguery and totalitarianism are contextually determined, alternative "legitimising behavioural institutions" which function to maintain the status quo, vis-a-vis the consensus-compliant, that is favourable to a small class of economically powerful consensus-breakers. It shows that it is rational for game playing economic competitors to capture and pervert for their own protection the local institutions of power, be they democratic, tyrannical or totalitarian.

I think this analysis sheds light on the tendency to usually focus on power as domination rather than, positively, as a source of empowerment and collective action. Among others, the Journal of Political Power reflects well this duality inherent in the concept of power. If interested, I recently wrote about democracy as a source of power here https://www.researchgate.net/publication/368686530_Economic_Notes_on_the_Concept_of_Political_Power