The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, also known as linguistic relativity, states that the structure of a language can shape the way a speaker thinks and perceives the world.

It has been the subject of much debate and criticism in the linguistic and cognitive science communities. While some researchers argue that language does influence thought to some extent, others believe that the relationship is much more complex and that other factors such as culture and personal experience also play a role.

So, whether or not the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is a paradox depends on one's perspective and interpretation of the evidence.

I think you have a valid point on the controversy around the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. I'm arguing for a different approach, one strictly logical.

As you state, there are people who agree with the hypothesis while other disagree. They, in other words, have arrived at a different perception of 'the world': one in which the hypothesis is untrue, another one in which the hypothesis is true. Given the fact that they have perceived the sentence in the same language, it cannot be the case that the structure of the language causes them to see the world differently.

However, in order for them to address their different evaluation of the world/the hypothesis, they need to create more words to make the difference clear. What will matter in their explanation, is not the different words they will use, but the different logic inherent in their descriptions. In other words, their use of English in order to structure their perception of the hypothesis differently.

This means: given the different perception of the world, their use of language will hint at differences in underlying logic expressed. If 'grammar' is not taken to mean what we currently refer to as grammar, but the broader way Whorf used it, this underlying logic (grammar, patterns) is the rationalized cause of their different evaluation of the world.

Which proves the hypothesis. Even if the hypothesis is regarded as untrue, it will turn out to be, in fact, true.

Hence: paradox.

I think the paradox only arises because of your interpretation of the word 'grammar.' I think the problem lies in your premise that Whorf's meaning of 'grammar' was meant to include any and all logic. However, I'm not sure I can accept that premise. Why do you think he meant that? What specific work or article are you pointing to? The works I've read (and conducted) dealing with the theory generally don't take that interpretation, but try to look at specific patterns of lexicalization; not underlying logic. The book "Rethinking linguistic relativity" (Gumprez & Levinson, 1996) has a lot of good articles that try to work through what exactly is meant by the theory, what does it entail / not entail. You might start there but then also consider some of the more recent empirical evidence for / against.

Hi!

I'm of the opinion that texts generated on top of texts increase the odds that interpretations become dominant, rather than the original words. What Max Weber referred to as intellectualization (academic production based on earlier productions, rather than engaging with reality). But that's just my post-postmodern neo-pragmatic field-level engagement...

Please, therefore, check out 'Language, Thought and Reality' (selected writings by Benjamin Lee Whorf), 1940: 221. This reads:

“(...) the linguistic relativity principle (...) means, in informal terms, that users of a markedly different grammar are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observations, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world”

In that article, no formal definition of 'grammar' is given by Whorf. But reading the article and others, his thinking seems to go towards 'patternment' and what I would call 'implicit directionality'.

My argument does not aim to address a comparison of logics. The interpretation of the hypothesis as a paradox is based on a logical evaluation of the disagreement between adopters and non-adopters. It's not the logic within the answers that will prove the hypothesis; it is the rationalization of their opinion that cannot do anything else than highlight a different 'patternment' or make explicit the directionality of their language-in-use, which will then also prove the hypothesis.

Logically, when disagreeing with the hypothesis cannot but confirm its truth-value, it must be of a paradoxical nature.

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has to do with language not logic as it is uniquely inferable by its other name (linguistic relativity), and we are dealing with the normal interpretation of language as a means of thought and communication.

Suppose that an English-speaking person with only the knowledge of English language and no other language agrees with Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and someone else with the same attribute disagrees with the hypothesis. This shows that the hypothesis does not work properly because they both possess knowledge of English language and no other language and consequently must have the same evaluation of reality; they both should agree or disagree with the hypothesis. This discrepancy in the evaluation of reality is indicative of the hypothesis malfunctioning.

Of course, unlike generative linguists, cognitive linguists believe that there is some truth in linguistic relativity, namely they say that there are pieces of evidence showing that language somehow and somewhat influences the way we think but not in that extremist way Sapir and Whorf propose.

One big problem with the original Sapir-Whorf hypothesis derives from the idea that if a person's language has no word for a specific concept, then that person would not understand that concept. Honestly, the idea that a mother tongue can restrict one's understanding has been largely unaccepted.Take for example the borrowing process; thousands or hundreds of words are not known for speakers from different countries and yet they are efficient in using them.

I didn't intend to start a debate on the original hypothesis, merely to share a reflection on it (when you deny it, clarifying your denial will inevitably prove the hypothesis; the hypothesis is therefore a paradox).

But to your point: borrowing also proves the hypothesis. When a language does not know a concept, people don't know that concept. When they happen upon another language that does know the word and thereby they learn about that concept, given that their original language does not know the word, they borrow it. In order to refer to that concept, they expand their language with the borrowed word so that they can refer to it.

Their language before borrowing and their language after borrowing directed them to a different evaluation of reality. Hence: hypothesis proven.

Alireza Khormaee, when you read what Whorf actually wrote, you'll find his hypothesis evolves around users of 'markedly different grammars'. It may be that the hypothesis has come to be referred to as linguistic relativity and that therefore, it would seem logical to state that 'linguistic relativity' "has to do with language", but it didn't to Whorf (not in the restrictive sense you desire to seem to interpret it). Whorf clearly wrote: "markedly different grammars" and I would contend that grammars can differ markedly within a language.

Now, us being in disagreement in our shared language of English, where you use the general language of science based on the pile of texts stacked upon Whorf and I actually interpret his original words, again proves the hypothesis. Your use of obligatory generalizing texts-stacks theory illustrates a markedly different language from my subtle, original, factual and insightful return to the first attempts to grasp the actual understanding.

Clearly, even within the same language (English), there can be markedly different grammars (e.g. generic science-speak versus subtle, intelligent, insightful qualitative grasping of intent).

What exactly is extremist about what Sapir and Whorf say? And is that actually their extremism? Of is that something that got introduced in the piles of texts stacked upon them?

Cees Jan Mol states that "when people reject linguistic relativity, they can only attempt to make their rejection understood by creating a different grammar." On the other, Hand Alireza Khormaee is right when he writes: "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has to do with language not logic [...] , and we are dealing with the normal interpretation of language as a means of thought and communication." If we take 'grammar' in its usual meaning (see also Spring's reply), it is undeniable that there exist 'markedly different grammars' in Whorf's wording. Neurosciences and large typological studies have nowadays raised strong doubts on the ALEC axiom (All Languages are Equally Complex), already discussed by Bickerton in his 'linguistic bioprogram'. Moreover, studies on Second Language Acquisition (SLA) have proved that some languages are more difficult to learn than others that show a more complex grammar. Evidence seems to speak in favour of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

Erratum: Moreover, studies on Second Language Acquisition (SLA) have proved that some languages are more difficult to learn than others that show a more complex grammar. Evidence seems to speak in favour of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

Corrige: Moreover, studies on Second Language Acquisition (SLA) have proved that some languages are more difficult to learn than others that show a less complex grammar. Evidence seems to speak in favour of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

Sorry for the mistake !

Paolo Ramat, apart from the very interesting points you raise, I don't think 'grammar' in the context of Sapir-Whorf should be interpreted in the regular sense as we understand that to be now. I think it should be interpreted in the way Whorf intended it to be used, which is, i would argue, not along the lines of the meaning it has currently.

Indirizzo non trovato

Il tuo messaggio non è stato recapitato a [email protected] perché l'indirizzo risulta inesistente o non può ricevere email.

Here is the mail which failed:

📷

Paolo Ramat

a Cees

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Dear Cees (if I may),

in the attachment you may find an article dealing with the ALEC problem with bibliographical references .

Best wishes and regards,

Paolo

P.S. I have personally translated in Italian Sapir's most important book, i.e. Language (1921)   and  I can assure you that the word 'grammar' is used in the traditional sense linguists are accustomed with. The same holds for Whorf's  Language, Thought, and Reality, 1956 (articles collected by J.B. Carroll).

Best wishes and regards,

Paolo

Prof. Dr. Paolo Ramat

Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Socio corrispondente

'Academia Europaea'

'Societas Linguistica Europaea', Honorary Member

Università di Pavia (retired)

Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori (IUSS Pavia) (retired)

piazzetta Arduino 11 - I 27100 Pavia

##39 0382 27027

347 044 98 44

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Un allegato • Scansione eseguita da Gmail

If you are interested in the attached article, please send me your e-mail address. Attachments don't work via Research Gate.

My own email: [email protected]

Ah. That would mean that when Sapir spoke about 'patternment', he would have been using a more generic word to make non-linguists understand what he was trying to convey? I always thought he used 'patternment' to expand linguists view on the influence of language...?

I think that Whorfs linguistic relativity hypotheses is, as have been pointed out here, fundamentally a question of language.

The view of cognitive linguistics on linguistic relativity could be summed up as the relativity of linguistic relativity.

In this respect I would recommend Chapter 18 ("Whorf and relativism") in George Lakoff, 1987, Woman, Fire, and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal about the Mind (p. 304-337).

Taking into account the relativity of linguistic relativity, the question is whether the alleged paradox subsists?

Wow! That was a great reference, many thanks. I had not read Lakoff on Whorf yet. Amazing. (This is not cynical; I just finished reading it and the reference is highly appreciated!)

From your intriguing answer, I understand that your answer to the question you raised (does the allege paradox subsist?) is 'no'. Could you perhaps clarify that answer?

In my humble opinion, Lakoff does a great job of addressing linguistic relativity from a linguistics/social sciences point of view. Another use of the hypothesis would be one from practice, from reality-in-action (as opposed to reality-under-study) .In Whorf's version referred to in this discussion, 'people being directed by their markedly different grammars towards a different evaluation of reality' can be applied to a cultural change program (and a communications campaign), to explain why some people adopt innovations faster than others (because that particular innovation fits better in their gramma), to philosophers arguing over when a (Derridian) différance starts to amount to a (Lyotardian) différend.

Without further clarification, i can't answer your question. But do you agree with the possible answer that the paradox may still persist in practical reality?

I don't have a definite answer to my question. Logically, it could be that the relativity of linguistic relativity leads to an infinite regress, but I am leaning towards the position that it doesn't.

I'm trying to send an article of mine on languages' complexity, where also Whorf comes to the fore. But the below instruction "Add files" does not work. I'm sorry.

Hans Kronning and to be honest, apart from distinguishing quite a few helpful variables around 'relativity', it seems to me that Lakoff merely adds various expressions one can incorporate into their grammar to think about Whorf's words.

In other words, against the position of people who say 'No!' to 'total relativism' (which is an interpretation quite removed from Whorf's words), he expands the grammar in order to say 'look at all these variables that can still create a degree of commensurability with something that is incommensurable on another variable'.

First of all, that is a 2nd order response to the hypothesis and does not say much about the 1st order response, the people saying 'No!'.

Second, In Lakoff's version of that response, on page 372, he suggests their argument is: when you can translate something, there can be no incommensurability. Assuming this is a correct representation of their standpoint (which he would have studied and would know how to approximate), this account proves my point: in this rationalization/interpretation, underlying logic is referred to by 'translation' and 'incomensurability'. Lakoff refers to that logic as 'objectivism' (page 302).

In other words: included in Lakoff's text is a concrete proof of (a 2nd order response providing) a 1st order response, in which words are added to broaden the grammar applied, reflecting underlying logic. This 1st order response proves the hypothesis and illustrates the paradox.

Do you agree?

(extra content)

I'm not sure an attempt at formalization is useful. But I already wrote it, so it would be a waste of effort to delete it. It may help...

S-W hypothesis: E(R1:L1) of "R" =/ E(R2:L2) of "R" (The Evaluation by a person speaking language #1 of (a statement about) R is not the same as the Evaluation of another person speaking such a markedly different grammar as to constitute a different language)

Or, in other words, E(Whorf:English) of "E(R1:L1) of R =/ E(R2:L2) of R" = true (the Evaluation by Whorf, speaking English (and German and Hopi) of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is true)

Opponents disagree. Therefore: E(R1:English) of "E(R1:L1) of "R" =/ E(R2:L2) of "R"" = untrue (someone else, speaking English, English evaluates the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis to be untrue)

Lakoff says: that's because the other persons speaks the dialect of 'objectivism'. Which is why I stated: in the rationalization of the differing evaluation, aspects of the markedly different grammar have to emerge.

This creates the situation of [E(Whorf:linguistic relativism) of "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis) = true] =/ [E(objectivist:objectivism) of "Sapir-Whorf hyothesis" = untrue]

Since "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis" is equal to "R", the situation created can also be read as E(R1:L1) of "R" =/ E(R2:L2) of "R", reflecting the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Therefore: paradox.

Any socio-linguistic model which creates a paradigm shift in think is automatically a paradox, because many paradoxes are the result of being consistent with two different paradigms at the same time. In the case of a paradigm shift, there is the old system, and there is the new system, and because the new socio-linguistic model is looking both ways (past and future), it is automatically a paradox. P.S. I have a tendency of over generalizing.