I think this book, by Leonard Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, can be of great help for a starting point.

The difficulty with the radar example is that for Gadamer is this: in order to understand a past author one has to imagine what that author might mean given the historical situation in which that author writes: what he could have known, what language and its limitations were available to him etc. Radar can't do this.

For what it is worth, I am a phenomenologist in the Merleau-Ponty tradition which probably puts me in another camp. That might mean that I may not be able to enter fruitfully into a "genuine" phenomenological discussion. Evidence for that is that I don't understand the dialogue above. FYI

"Something is placed in the center, as the Greeks say, which the partners in dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with one another. Hence reaching an understanding on the subject matter of a conversation necessarily means that a common language must first be worked out in the conversation. This is not an external matter of simply adjusting our tools; nor is it even right to say that the partners adapt themselves to one another but, rather, in a successful conversation they both come under the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community. To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneselve forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were." (TM p.371)

The idea behind: "they both come under the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community" - is this not something like uncovering some platonic ideal.

"Thus it belongs to every true conversation taht each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to sucha n extent that he understands not the particular individual but what he says. What is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be at one with each other on the subject." (p. 387)

The idea behind: "What is to be grasped is the substantive rightness...." is this not the radar component. Thus Platonic-phenomenology follows: There exists this thing out there between you and I that we are trying to find. We enter into a discussion about it. Since we are both directed towards this ideal thing, the conversation has us, not we the conversation, and thus this thing makes us act, judge, posit, and converse in accordance to the nature of this thing. Much like how Husserl documents the experience in the transc. subject, with Gadamer we become ideal object through language and speak its essence.

http://www.mattress.org/index.cfm?event=ShowArtist&eid=25&id=67&c=Past

Maybe of interest:

http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegge.htm

(Heidegger's The basic problem of Phenomenology, Introduction)

Two important concepts for Gadamer complicate the account of understanding given above. Prejudice, or a fore structure of meanings with which we approach a text within a tradition of interpretation. Secondly distanciation, the process by which the text severs it's connection with the author, context, and time. He is reacting against the epistemological hermeneutics of Dilthey, and denying that you can develop a method for achieving authorial meanings. Ontological hermeneutics is basically claiming to tell us what happens to us every time we understand a text, that is, we achieve a fusion of horizons..

I agree with the comments of Van Harvey. Gadamer puts in quite a lot in history, tradition and language

Really interesting question. In 1968 has been published this Gadamer's work: Platos dialektische Ethik und andere Studien zur platonischen Philosophie, a collection of Gadamer's studies on Plato, which shows the extent of his commitment to Plato's philosophy. It could be useful to get this work, many of the studies collected are about the authentic forms of dialogue.

I see the connection between the radar metaphor and Plato's epistemology, which I wouldn't define phenomenology though. Since you consider the ideal archetype as a virtual object of knowledge, you can always exchange your signal with your interlocutor, in order to better tune yourself on your referent; but there is a huge difference between Plato's theory of knowledge and the Gadamer's one: in Plato's opinion you can actually achieve the truth about what you are talking; in Gadamer's not, or at least not ultimatively.

In addition, the radar imagine, as properly said by Daniel, encompasses a serial way of thinking, which is in many respects the polemical target of Gadamer's hermeneutic. Collapsing the object of talking, the truth, in a "hyperuranial" dimension, may grant the ongoing of the encoding process, but will not allow the shared horizon Gadamer is talking about.

I think Plato could be easier to read in that way, if you want to stick to the radar picture.

Greetings from Italy

Gadamer not is platonic, that no admit the posibility of a maior comprehension, but only one different comprenhension betwuin differents horizonts of interpretation. In this send continous to be a rest of historicism in their hermeneutic, and not admit the posibility of a meliorismus towards a complete comprension of the object as demand a platonism. Thanks, Carlos

There are great answers here. Thanks it is all helping me arrive at the truth of the subject matter. Sometimes, however, I think that my radar metaphor is taken a tad too literal, or perhaps more accurately put: to absolutely (I think Mr. Ghiraldi understands what I was going for best, and I would like to use his explanation).

I guess I am struggling to pinpoint phenomenology's role in Gadamer's thought, and perhaps I am trying to superimpose it. I can't tell if he absolutely dissolves it, or in fact if he takes phenomenology to the next level. When I read his text, I see all sorts of connections to phenomenology, but I'm disturbed by his distancing from Husserlian concept of knowledge. How is language simply not just one of the noema that we naturally impose on the world, how is what he is saying nothing other than a linguistic phenomenology (I think I may prefer linguistic phenomenology to Platonic, however at the same time Platonic because two people engaging to come to an understanding about some thing that is the particular case to a universal rule).

(sigh)... I have a feeling I am going to fail my course.

Mathew, I pretty much agree wit Daniel Hug's point.

I must confess that I took the radar metaphor in a very literal sense and that kind of reaction should perhaps be expected ... Let me add that if Truth & Method has anything to do with [historically shaped German] romanticism and with intersubjectivity, than my first thought would be that many might object to using technical artefacts as radars as the basis for metaphors or analogies.

Hope this comment can help...

If hermeneutic of Gadamer is as a radar, the truth (Warheit) ist relative to a historical present, that of the radar, and not can be platonic. Only can be aristotelic, according to a practical's point of view of the radar, but not metaphysics or transcendental. These point of view of Gadamer's hermeneutic can't elude a rest of historicism, only if admit a convering law metatheorical or transcendental-pragmatic, that elude the relativism, as propose Karl-Otrto Apel in 1973. But these suppose a new paradigme of first philosophy, as Apel defended in 2011.

Carlos, that was a great explanation! Ok, I followed you on "no Plato", "no metaphysics", and "not transcendental", and "not relativist" (though I still feel its transcendental, I'm not too sure what you were saying about law metatheorical or transcendental-pragmatic, but that sounds right to me).

I've numbered the questions so it would be easier to refer your responses to:

(1)Are you saying that Gadamer's hermeneutic is a metatheoretical or transcendental-pragmatic?

(2) So are you saying that what he describes is the existence of how theory is born and carried forward (metatheoretical)?

(3) Are you saying in transcendental-pragmatic that our understanding and interpretation is a transcendental matter at hand concerning a shared world?

(3b) If the answer to (3) is yes, is it fair to say that hermeneutics is a type of transcendental-naturalism (except pragmatic because action-oriented/praxis) as well?

.... I pray that I'm on the right track, because I think I finally understand what's going on here.

Yes, Mattew, the three answer are correct, also de naturalistic point of view of Gadamer and Apel, and other similar. Only the ideal of community o conmunication of Apel, or the poossibility of a maior comprensión not is naturalistic, but not is platonic or aristotelic or kantian. Only can be Peircean, if accept a fussion of horizont, according to Gadamer or if accept a universal pragmatic, as Habermas, or if acept a new paradim pragmatic-transcendental of firtst philosophy, according to Apel. But first philosophy is a concept aristotalian, the form as clasic filosophy conceibed de covering law present unther all concept or language, and that is present in alla philocophy. That is the nuclear question of philocophy perennis of all the time. But theese is my opinion, not the Gadamer or Apel.

Dear contributors,

the question is interesting and very enticing.I have never connected Plato's mode of thinking with Husserl's theory, nor phenomenological way of theorizing with Gadamer's philosophy of hermeneutics. So far I cannot see the reasons to speak of such a notion as "Platonic phenomenology", for me these to notions - Plato and phenomenology seem to be too wide apart. I simply have not considered these matters from such an angle.

Dear Zaiga,

Thank you for your comments, and I would have to agree with you now. As for the other contributors, however, I think they would have no problem agreeing with you either, nor did they see the connection either; which is why I am grateful they pecked away it.

I made the connection because I was having difficulty interpreting Gadamer's text (kind of ironic), and you could say that the forestructure of my understanding was a projection constituted by these fashioned ideas (plato and phenomenology). Admittedly, I too didn't see the connection which is why I doubted myself and was confused, and which is why I laid everything out on the line here. I did not have the proper language to come to an understanding (Gadamer reference here), and embarrassingly that was the best I could do. So how does one check your understanding? You project it, and get a "signal" back from the world, and it either aligns or doesn't align.

My most current understanding however, is based on Carlos's contributions calling it a metatheoretical, and transcendental pragmatic represents the language the sits very comfortable with me. I feel like everything shifted into place. If these labels are problematic, I, too, would love additional input....always.

As for that matter, it is amazing how grateful I feel for these contributors who have helped me tremendously, and I will probably never meet them face to face. Many thanks to all of your great comments!

M

Zaiga, in Husserl not ist e critic to platonic fenomenology, but yes to transzendental fenomenology, and to de tanscendental subjectiivity of phenomenology in Husserl, or Heidegger, but no in Desein of Heidegger.

Mattew, thank for the basical accorde weith my proposal.

Thanks, Carlos

Zaiga, new text: in Husserl not ist e critic to platonic fenomenology, but also to transzendental fenomenology, and to de tanscendental subjectiivity of phenomenology in Husserl, or Gadamer, but no in Desein of Heidegger.

Mattew, thank for the basical accorde to my proposal.

Thanks, Carlos

Let me read up on this one. I will get back to you soon!