18 March 2020 5 2K Report

Imagine a platoon, such as the "peloton" in a cycling competition or cars on a highway, where the players benefit from travelling close to each other due to wind drag reduction. If each speed would be determined by the optimal operating points stemming from their bikes, aerodynamics and body. For example, player 1, might be optimal (in terms of fuel efficiency) at a specific gear and given a specific cadence. Each player will propose changes to each other, such that each one will give a proposal to the player(s) which are obstructing its optimal trajectory. Negotiations, from say player 2 to player 1 (where player 1 is in front of player 2) such as "pedal 1 m/s faster and you'll get 1 buck", where the new speeds and compensations will be calculated individually from each cyclist such that the prize is lower than the potential "fuel cost" that player 2 would experience from operating at non optimal speeds. These proposals are then accepted or denied. I'm thinking that these proposals should then converge to some optimum where no members in the platoon will benefit from changing its strategy, hence a kind of Nash equilibrium.

I'm fairly new to game theory, but I want to formulate this problem as a game theoretical one, to see where these proposals would converge, and how to prove it. How would I begin?

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