#H1-561. A5P4. Tim B: 1. Is it necessary it would have started only with "equilibrium" / homogenity. 2. Even if that is so necessary: there was a need for morphos as BEFORE teleos? What any separate meaning of morphos before teleos? I am unable to need a need for morphos separate from or before of teleos; nor conceive a meaning separate of purpose. 3. A need that is independent of purpose? 4. Something after the homeos (general potential for purpose) that's before connection with purpose? I think nothing after general, escapes need, purpose, and meaning. Infact, these attributes may be only different descriptions of a composite character.

Deacon's book provides many examples; I believe Bénard cells and soil polygons would be examples of morphodynamic systems that lack the further attributes of teleodynamic systems.

#H1-563. L4P3-1. I do not understand: what is the individual/ independent/ self purpose of morphos?

Since i am not satisfied with anything happening without purpose, [perhaps i misapply Ethics to where it does not belong?], i do not know if homeos and morphos could be separately, or both part of some same?

Or i should accept that purpose could had been there in pre-ethical (pre-biological) time (or what could had been it's equivalent--a kind of idea?)--it could have been function, or somethigs lesser, energy/ information density, or order/structure.

Are these physical imperatives? Then what are biological imperatives--food? Body? The ethical imperative is purpose.

Well Senthill, you're asking difficult questions, and though I hate to seem to be ducking them, I should point out that Terrence Deacon has taken the trouble to set down answers rather well in his book, and if you're interested, you should probably read his careful and expert explanations rather than my hurried, non-expert ones. If you are looking for an example of a teleodynamic system, I will point out that you are one. Deacon posits that purpose evolved with systems that attained a certain grade of physical organization, which he describes and explains with a very telling theoretical but plausible example; this grade does not correspond exactly to the emergence of life as that as is usually understood (his example lacks a genetic system, for example) but might plausibly have been a precursor to life. Indeed, experimental studies of protoliving systems are one area that I think could be affected by Deacon's thinking.

#H1-564. L4P3-2. Thanks Tim. I may not be able to read that book, nor stop getting fascinated by ideas on teleogenesis.

I do understand: nonlife to life may have been not more than border-crossing. There might be a range of proto-life.

But they are strange things to inhabit in a same strange universe: thermonuclear stars and a weak living being and ideas like innocence.

Morphos evolving into teleos: can something become more than function without the association of "intention", and this later without the association of "liveness".

Structures can proceed from "the beginning" through atoms and rocks to the expanding universe. But it seems they all children of a first god. Life is so dimensionally apart from the rocks, it seems something so momentous to even deserve to be ascribed a second god for it's creation. [do we know anything that would deserve a third? I have sometimes wondered about Ethics.]

I wonder: why should (ie how could) structure or even function can/would/do transcend/transform/evolve/grow into purpose?