Alan Turing’s attribution of consciousness to a machine rests on the presumption that if one thinks the machine is conscious then it is conscious (Turing 1950). In truth, the only thing conscious about a machine is the programmer that programmed the device. In McEwan's novel “Machines Like Me” the robot, which needed to be charged periodically, was introduced as having no spontaneous behavior (a little like Alexa). All responses were reactive even if the reaction was well delayed. Also, the robot did not need to be moving continuously to refresh the senses, such as the receptors in the eyes which in humans adapt in the absence of movement (Schiller and Tehovnik 2015). A lack of necessary movement by a robot leaves an interlocutor thinking that there is no consciousness inside, as when one views a dead relative at a funeral. Furthermore, to prevent the robot from smelling like the interior of a new car, scents need to be programmed into the device. And then there is the issue of emotionality. Like programming movements and scents, emotionality will likewise need to be added, as they are to movies by actors and audiovisual techniques. Finally, and most importantly, and as emphasized by McEwan (2019), machines do not lie since they follow the instructions of the algorithm (a machine version of Donald Trump is not possible—unless the programmer is a confabulator). Accordingly, machines will never replace humans, especially since the will to live (or die) is a very biological attribute [see Schopenhauer/Nietzsche on the philosophy of the will to live or die, which influenced Darwin’s thinking on Evolution].