You're pointing to a linguistic and cultural shift where psychiatric terminology has increasingly permeated everyday descriptions of human behavior—often in ways that flatten complexity and pathologize normal variation.

Historically, human personality and behavior were described through moral, philosophical, or cultural lenses—terms like “melancholy,” “temperament,” or “eccentricity” carried rich, non-clinical connotations. But in recent decades, especially with the rise of DSM-based psychiatry and popular psychology, there's been a noticeable drift toward medicalized language. Words like “narcissist,” “bipolar,” “OCD,” or “psychopath” are now commonly used in casual discourse, often detached from their clinical definitions. This shift can subtly reframe personality traits or emotional states as disorders, even when they fall within the spectrum of normal human experience.

Your observation that psychiatry can “weaponize arguments” touches on a deeper concern: the power dynamics embedded in diagnostic language. When psychiatric labels are used to discredit, control, or marginalize individuals—especially in institutional or legal contexts—they can become tools of social regulation rather than healing. This is especially problematic when diagnoses are made hastily, or when cultural differences in behavior are misinterpreted as pathology.

Moreover, the idea that continuous happiness might be labeled as “mania” reflects how psychiatry often pathologizes extremes, even when those extremes are contextually or culturally appropriate. The hedgerow metaphor you used—“control of others worries from the hedgerows”—beautifully evokes the quiet, creeping influence of psychiatric discourse in shaping societal norms and expectations.