'Doxic', in Husserl, refers the modality of belief. One can also call this 'doxic positionality', that is, the position of belief or disbelief. Thus, believing in the existence of an intentional object or doubting the existence of an intentional object would be doxic modes or doxic positionalities. Neutrality, on the other hand, is the suspension of all judgment or doxic positionality towards an intentional object. That is, one suspends belief and/or doubt about its existence, in order to study the noetic phases (hyletic data) and noematic acts involved in the constitution of the intentional object as such. What such investigation reveals is that, although the overall meaning of the object for the subject is affected by doxic modalities, the modalities are not represented in the content (noema).

Thank you, very much. Your explanation was very clear, and easy to read. It has also helped me articulate what my confusions are too. I have written my interpretation in a slightly different manner below in response to your answer. The purpose is that I'd really like someone to pick it a part and say, this statement is incorrect because..., or this statement is correct, .. yada yada yada

1) Re: epoche via neutrality-

My understanding is that the phenomenological reduction or epoche was much more active than a suspension of belief/doubt. In fact I thought that it was an active doubting that would eventually leave a residual experience which could then be comprehended apodeitictly. And the rest built from there.

2) Re - neutrality and the doxic mode.

-a-I saw the doxic mode as that which explains how we come to one's "axioms" "norms" informing one's reason.(so the statement "2 points can be joined by 1 exact line" )

-b -I saw neutrality as a suspension of judgment in such a way that it is what gives our quality of "rationality".

-c- I thought that one could adopt the neutral attitude while in the doxic mode so as to create what we have as a particular system of logic.

-d- I thought that positionality was that which happens when the state of affairs does not cohere with one's neutrality in the doxic mode. In other words, we remain neutral in :" if all a's are b's and all b's are c's"... but then arrive at a doxic positionality by telling them they are incorrect when they say: "therefore all a's are NOT C's."

I hope this may clear up my own position, and perhaps make it easier to criticize. Thank you for your participation.

I won't pick apart all of the parts of your interpretation, since I have to think about them a bit more in order to formulate a clear response to them. However, I can comment on the first one, regarding epoche via neutrality. The phenomenological reduction or epoche is just that, a suspension of belief/doubt. In order to phenomenologically study the intentional object as such, one must suspend all doxic positionalities with regard to its ontological status, including doubt. Otherwise, the doubt itself would interfere with the phenomenological investigation, which is only supposed to consider the noetic phases and noematic acts involved in its constitution. Sometimes, the confusion results from the fact that Husserl was influenced by Descartes, leading people to confuse phenomenological reduction with Cartesian methodological doubt. There is a sense, however, in which Husserl's epoche is a much more radical method, in that it excludes all ontological commitments or attitudes, including attitudes of disbelief/doubt. The reason for the difference is that the purpose of phenomenological investigation is different from that of active Cartesian doubt. Descartes wishes to use methodological doubt to discover foundational and apodictic axioms that he can use to build an indubitable epistemic system. Husserl, on the other hand, uses the epoche to study the essence of intentional objects, without being distracted or misled by subjective ontological commitments or positions (of belief or doubt).

Thank you very much I appreciate it!