In clinical research employing well-known psychoneurological tests as measures of cognitive functioning, it is common to combine tests to form composite cognitive domain scores. Although there is some small variation, there is quite strong agreement among well known and respected neuropsychological textbooks on which tests should be allocated to particular domains when forming the composite scores.

However, for some domains, the results of factor analyses do not suggest the combining of tests in the same way. That is particularly true of tests commonly combined to form the Executive Function cognitive domain. These include tests of working memory, reasoning and problem-solving, semantic verbal fluency, speeded tests involving attention switching (eg TMTB) or suppression of automatic responding (eg the Stroop test), etc. However, in well established factor-analytically based models of human mental intelligence, such as Gf/Gc theory (the Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence), such tests do not load on the same broad second-order factors. And no factor has been identified with marker tests corresponding to the range of tests commonly used by neuropsychologists to define the Executive Function cognitive domain.

There are other examples of a mismatch between the allocation of tests to cognitive domains according to common neuropsychological practice, and what is suggested by factor analysis, such as the formation of a composite Attention/processing speed cognitive domain.

Can anyone shed light on the reasons why such differences exist? Is it that the grouping of tests according to common practice by neuropsychologist has particular benefit from a clinical perspective, even those it is not consistent with the grouping of tests based on patterns of covariance as displayed in the results of factor-analysis? If so, how might this be explained?

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