Depends on the purpose of the language. If a language should be unambiguously executed, such as a computer program, it is of great advantage to remove contradictions and fuzzyess. Of course, the real world is more complex than that and communication has more layers than the logical channel alone. Thus, such a logician's language will be limited in scope, which is fine for certain purposes I guess.

O.k., involving purposes appears to me a good idea. Also, I admit that if the sentences of a language is meant to be processed by a program that is unable to manage with contradictions, then this language should be construed in such a way as to allow for no such things.

Still, I feel provoked to try to push my idea a bit further.

(1) Would you agree that, in philosophy, very few cases like these exist (i.e., cases where the possibility of the construction of contradictions would be problematic)? Could we give as much as, say, three significant cases?

(2) Also, another idea haunts my mind: Should we not expect that nowadays (as opposed to, say, the 80ies) it should even be easy to construe the relevant programs in such a way as to cope with the processing of contradictions? And would not this weaken the requirement under consideration even further?

No: what  fun would that be? Didn't Frege already try that?

Dear Scott,

thank you for your answer! ... But, er ... what is it that you are denying?

Philosophical investigations are often enriched by the contradictions (and paradoxes) that arise when carried out in natural languages, so I would suggest that a contradiction-free language may be useful in some areas of philosophy, but is not a necessity. 

"Does philosophy need a language that admits of no contradictions?"

In another sense, though, we would like to be able to accomplish something through thoughtful discourse, to make progress toward certainty, impossible as that may be. Formal systems like math are languages that attempt to limit meaning to rational statements (I am thinking of Douglas Hofstadter's Godel, Escher, Bach) that admit of no paradox. Hofstadter's thesis is that paradox plays an important role necessary to our, let us say, appreciation of existence and knowledge. The failure of formal systems to accomplish this suggest something about what we believe rationality to be: we seem to wind up in agreement with Kant yet again that there is a limit to what we can reason. Perhaps there are limitations to any discursive system we formalize: logos used to just mean "language."

Dear Scott,

Yes, this seems to me a good way of putting what many people may have in mind when they find so very attractive the idea of a language incapable of (the expression of) contradictions. But could it be that these people underestimate, or are unaware of, something like the following distinction?

(a) The possibility of forming a certain sentence in a language

(b) The literal and assertive utterance of this sentence (an assertion of what the sentence means)

When a language admits of contradictions, then this does not suggest, let alone imply, that anything disquieting has been claimed, or stated, or asserted. Probably, there would be a problem if we had reason to think that whatever can expressed is epistemologically attractive (or the like) -- but in fact we have no such reason, have we?

Thus, when I (can) say "This sentence is false", then perhaps  what I mean (as opposed to the meaning of the sentence, which is underdetermined and thus not truth-evaluable) is contradictory (sure it is in the present case); -- but this does not suggest that anything is wrong with truth (or, for that matter, with logic, or with whatever), does it?

Of course, there is 'something wrong' with the sentence, in a sense: it is contradictory; -- so you shouldn't use it for a literal statement if you want to tell the truth, or say something non-contradictory. But then, if I use it for a literal statement, this (my making the relevant statement) is the problem. The mere fact that a language is capable of forming this sentence does not entail that this sentence is used for a literal assertion, nor anything about the world, does it?

Now if this reason for favouring languages that admit of no contradictions (one of the reasons wich in my view motivate the fans of such languages) is not convincing, then my next question would be: is there any other concise and convincing reason that such a language is required? (Indeed, additional reasons are given, but are there any concise and convincing ones among them?)

You can't trust me because "I always lie." I like your exploration of the problem (no, honestly).

One may distinguish between a 'flat' language which is purely operational and does not include the practice of reference to text. In such a language, which may well have existed. There could be no reference to meaning or falsity. Once the practice of referring to what was said emerged there would be two levels of language but no incentive to distinguish between them so paradox and contradiction became possible. The possibility of contradiction emerged with reference to text. I reckon it was worth it.

Would synonymy exist in such a language, Cameron?

Two questions

1 Could synonymy exist in a flat language?: I don't see why not. A test is whether in English general usage synonymy is encountered in contexts with no semantic ascent. I think one could find examples.

2 Would this have happened prior to semantic ascent? Haven't  a clue.Either of us could make up plausible stories.

How do you think synonymy emerged?

Bill Cameron

I recommend "After Babel" by George Steiner for a in-depth discussion about how synonyms, ambiguity and different languages emerge. He does not see this as  deficiency of language, but the source of creativity and the distinguishing feature of humankind.

I think synonymy emerged because of teenagers. It's a theory. However, I think the aspiration to create a language, like Frege, Russell and Whitehead tried to do, that admits of no contradictions, is a Man of La Mancha type dream. (Maybe we're not satisfied with Wittgenstein's conclusion.) The other problem is the way any society would begin to change such a language: it has been argued that one cannot tame language that way. The question becomes, I believe, do we wish to end discourse and solve problems with discursivity once and for all (and be rationally perfect though unhappy with the solution), or do we wish to discourse? I mean, just look at the fun we're having right now!

human life is replete with ironies, oxymorones, paradoxes and conflicts , a language incapable of manifesting these elements would be preposterously faulty and aberrant. 

Does a "possible world semantics" clarify this point of language or does it further obfuscate the issue?

Dennis

Dennis Mazur