In Article 3 of the Swiss Animal Protection Act, "dignity" is defined as follows:

the inherent value of the animal, which is to be respected by anyone who handles it; the dignity of animals is not duly respected if they are subjected to stress which

cannot be justified by overriding interests; stress involves in particular the infliction of pain, suffering or harm on animals, frightening or degrading them, profoundly altering

their appearance or capacities, or unduly instrumentalizing them.

No. The reason why is that the function you're using is irrelevant. Not only is the notion of the possession of concepts irrelevant, the possession of concepts is entirely subjective. Let's put it another way - the phrase "use concepts" implies intelligence of at least a minimum level to some effect. So the argument could be used to state that any sentient being, with a minimum level of intelligence, has a right to life. Taking the argument to its logical conclusion, the question can simply be restated as "What is the minimum level of intelligence that a creature must possess, in order for it to be a crime to kill it?"

So, regardless of where that line is drawn, the only adherents to it would be humans, which makes it biased against humans simply on the basis that they can consider that concept at all, to begin with.

I prefer to determine the right to life based upon the actions of the being in question, not on predetermined philosophical biases.

Marshall,

Your criterion has the interest of being non-traditional. The tradition of the derivation of rights in Locke, Kant and even Mill (in chapter 5 of 'Utilitarianism') appeals to the idea of the sort of being whose nature it makes sense to speak of as being harmed in a specific sort of way. E.g. one who is capable of choosing her action or of judging something as unfair. None of these writers regard this category as exclusive to humans nor as including all humans. Rather, when careful, they stick to the term 'persons.' That the right to life should inhere in certain beings and not in others (which of course could only be determined by behavior but is not justified by behavior) is traditionally the basis for its being unalienable from those who have it. Many still regard this as an important feature. Your criterion would not seem to provide for this.

Hi Ian,

I have pondered this question with a slight variation. In showing students in a Business Ethics class the Canadian film, BACON, which deals with agro-farming in Quebec, I have couched the question in terms of whether pigs are sentient beings. My implication being if they are, then they can appreciate a certain quality of life such as being able to reproduce naturally (not only by means of artificial insemination) and being able to graze outdoors (rather than being locked in stalls too small for them to turn around). The Canadian agro-farmers in the film point out that it is a cost-efficient method of farming, noting for instance, that they save money by not allowing pigs to burn up excess calories by grazing. Since the pigs get no exercise -- either from grazing or engaging in sex -- farmers can fatten them up quickly with a minimum amount of feed. Moreover since pigs are said to have lengthy ejaculations and orgasms, one can imagine that a considerable amount of calories are expended during pig sex. (If this time expenditure is accurate, one must assume that pigs experience pleasure from engaging in sex; and thus if they are sentient beings, it would seem cruel to deny them this pleasure before they become bacon, ham or spareribs.)

During the 5 years that I have shown the BACON film, I have found that it doesn't matter whether a student thinks pigs are sentient beings or not, all students are totally "grossed out" by the film and the obvious suffering of the pigs as some try to bite their way out of the stalls. In other words, all students (even those who are not pet owners) have empathy for the pigs in the film and express disdain for the agro-farmers.

Gwen

In Article 3 of the Swiss Animal Protection Act, "dignity" is defined as follows:

the inherent value of the animal, which is to be respected by anyone who handles it; the dignity of animals is not duly respected if they are subjected to stress which

cannot be justified by overriding interests; stress involves in particular the infliction of pain, suffering or harm on animals, frightening or degrading them, profoundly altering

their appearance or capacities, or unduly instrumentalizing them.

Thank you, Louis, for citing this wonderful and humane Act. The Swiss must be really special people to memorialize the dignity of animals in such an unequivocal manner.

Gwen

Dear Dr. Ian Eagleson, The source of the concept, from where it is grasped 'plays an important role' Naturally, the source may be a society based on , religion, family, locality, nation, region and globe.

In ancient history many examples existed where concepts contradicted to right of life.

I live on the traditional territory of the Kwikwetlem First Nation. A few years ago they built a traditional canoe from one giant tree. Before they cut the tree, the had a ceremony that was acknowledging the respect they had for this majestic tree that lived near a millenia.

Quote from Stó:lô Nation Resource Department:

"Xá:ls,the three sons and daughter of Red Headed Wood Pecker and Black Bear, came into the world to make it right. They traveled through as Stó:lô territory transforming people and things into their permanent state. At each village Xá:ls visited, they transformed people into what are now referred to as resources: salmon; sturgeon; beaver; stones; mountains; trees; etc. These resources were once people and are therefore still considered to be our relatives. The original people's life force, or shxweli, still exists within them. ("Xá:ls: pronounced "kals" but the "k" has the back of the throat gluteral sound.)

Dear Dr. Louis Brassard, You referred a good example. The main theme is this that how a concept is propagated and how it reaches to us. Some time ' a real fruitful concept' turns to 'a painful unethical misconception'.

Unbelievably beautiful, Louis! Thank you for sharing this prayer.

Gwen

Re: Marshall Barnes' Comment:

"I prefer to determine the right to life based upon the actions of the being in question, not on predetermined philosophical biases."

Hi Marshall,

Of course, it is none of my business; but does your statement mean that you are in favor of capital punishment but would be against killing in combat as an enlisted soldier in the military of your country? I ask this because many wars between countries are grounded on "predetermined philosophical biases" whereas capital punishment is purportedly based upon "the actions of the being in question".

Gwen

Hi Gwen,

Thanks for your discussion of the film 'Bacon.' Your discussion brings up important issues concerning (1) ethics in food production and (2) the degree to which some non-human animals may possess "morally relevant" concepts. Your discussion also provides an occasion, I think, since you focus many of your comments on the pain and pleasure of the pigs, to make the distinction between two kinds of harms. Often in the literature a distinction is made between causing pain (in any being) for morally insufficient reasons and causing the frustration or termination (by killing) of plans, expectations, activities, etc. of an agent. Presumably some animals do not have plans or expectations nor are involved in activities. (This may not be true of pigs; I don't know.) But even regarding these animals, there is a moral presumption against causing them pain (and presumably depriving them of pleasure), even if they are to be "humanely" killed so we can eat them. However, a right to life could only be present where there is a life that includes plans, expectation, activities, etc.

Ian

Ian:

I appreciate your response. I was simply viewing your statement as it read and what I saw (which is in fact non-traditional as you stated) is a way that it could be used to argue for animal rights over human ones. For example, it could be used to argue against hunting, very easily. So I went at it as it read and not within the traditional context since you didn't cite any within the content of your posting.

Thanks,

Marshall

Gwendolyn:

I'm for capitol punishment in special cases. As for war, I recognize the need for a national defense, so I am not anti-war but recognize the corruption and the abuses that make most war unwarranted. That being said, I am not a pacifist. Pacifism is a selfish delusion only made possible by those willing to fight against aggression, in my opinion. Otherwise, pacifism would have died out long ago.

Many things are predicated on predetermined philosophical biases but the actions of a being in question can alter the decision otherwise dictated by the philosophy. My personal leaning is that I like raccoons. I saved one's life one time. However, I had to help a friend get rid of 5 raccoons that had invaded her home, killed her pets and then refused to leave the house by setting up inside of the ceiling of her second floor. This is after she had them removed professionally and humanely - they kept coming back. It took a year, but I made sure they won't be returning from where I put them. The idea that they had a right to life because of their ability to hold certain concepts was forfeit when they didn't give a damn about the right to life of those creatures whose home they invaded and then slaughtered, and the humaneness with which they were originally treated when given the opportunity to make a home in the wild where they belonged. I will say that they were really smart, it's just too bad that they weren't smart enough to stay off her property when given every chance to do so, but that's the way they wanted. They held the concept in their minds that they wanted that house and were willing to kill for it and then try their best to outwit me to stay there, no matter what. Really amazing when you think of it.

The actions of an individual or group of individuals can trump an otherwise closely held philosophy. However, my statement about predetermined philosophical biases was really a reflection of my attitude that I can think for myself and don't need some pre-established philosophy to tell me what to do...

Marshall,

Your explication of your position is quite useful. And I think it is true that you speak for many, if not most, people when you say that one needn't rely on a pre-established philosophy to determine or justify one's actions. I would suggest, nonetheless, that there is, there exists, some principle for right action underlying the sort of action you describe. That is, that you, or any agent, has some reason or WAY of justifying the action available to him whether he has made it explicit to himself or not. And indeed you have made such a reason explicit in your comment above. It is not pre-established in the sense that it is not dictated by some external authority. But it remains of interest to the philosopher. A philosopher in looking at such reasons might ask, what standards of consistency if any should be upheld among reasons like this? Are the "reasons" the raccoons were using of the same kind so as to put them on the same "moral playing field"? Your story has an element of self-defense. Were that element removed, how would that change the status of the killing? To go even further, do raccoons have a notion of 'self'? And if not, do they have a right to life at all?

Thanks,

Ian

Ian,

''I would suggest, nonetheless, that there is, there exists, some principle for right action underlying the sort of action you describe. That is, that you, or any agent, has some reason or WAY of justifying the action available to him whether he has made it explicit to himself or not.''

Would you agree that some aspects of reality that are motivating us might not even in principle be within the realm of any possible reason. I am arguing a kind of principle of limit to reason similar to the one found in quantum physics where in principle reality cannot be fully describable. My contention is that consciousness of a human might sometime reach beyond any possible reason in its connection with the noumenal.

Louis,

I certainly would agree that we are driven to behave by forces that, one might say, we do not own. (Although I would wish to separate this comment from what I would say about what we are responsible for.) And, in the end, our values and the reasoning that serves them rely on a biological home (the brain) which, as you suggest, must conform to physical principles of physics as much as any other part of nature. It seems plausible that this fact must complicate the question of which behaviors/actions issue from "the unity of the self" and its unified view on the world and its reasons for action. What I mean is that this fact must complicate the notion of the ideal of this kind of unity.

So, on the one hand there are passions, which famously can derail us from ourselves. But, on the other hand there are, as it were, disunities, alternative unities, etc., which might make problematic the very idea of the self. That nature has a hand in this seems undeniable. Perhaps it is the entire explanation.

Ian

Ian,

I do not disagree with what you said but it is not describe what I was trying to describe.

My point was that for deciding what is right to do in the case described in the thread as in any other moral issue, it is my opinion that ultimately it is not reason, not unconsious causes acting on us, but us as an real actor in contact with reality but not into a specifiable contact in principle that is taking the decision. Basically I am putting my intimate reality into a contact with reality that is prior to all other aspects that can be rationalized.

Louis,

I guess I'm not really sure what you mean. If you mean that our being-in-the-world is (in principle) distinct from what we can say about our being-in-the-world, I certainly wouldn't disagree with that. But I don't see how that distinction, or something like it, need take reason (having a reason) out of the picture of action and deciding to act. An element of immediacy, either in cognition or decision, connects me (my bases for understanding and my dispositions for decision and action) to the world. But I wouldn't want to say that my concepts and beliefs are not engaged in the very unfolding of my cognitions and decisions.

Ian

Ian,

I have the impression that reason plays a role in my behavior but it is not in the driver seat. The instinctual behavior is in the driver seat. By instinctual I do not mean a behavior that is on the auto pilot. When we are intensely into the action , a difficult situation, our emotions get us in high gears and in a creative mode and we kind feel our way into the situation. All my previous experience, including all that I know help me but not in an intellectual level, a discursive mode of thinking, but instinctual action mode. If I feel that a moral question is important then it is my emotions that will guide me towards a type of answer which my intellectual capacities will explore and criticized but it is agains my feeling that will tell me if I am close or not. They are many moral questions that I have no clue how to justify intellectually but it is not really important given that the intellectual justification is really not what tell me how to behave, it is just a nice thing being able to come up with in order to convince other to behave the way I decided to do.

ian:

What I mean by a predetermined philosophy is a philosophy that has originated beyond my own experience and understanding. Of course I have a way of justifying my actions but it's not because some guy in the 16th century, or any other time period, said so.

As far as the moral playing field that exists between humans and animals, only people who have not studied animals in the wild very much or are simply "anti-human" would not see the parity that already exists. It simply takes a visit to Youtube to see examples of animals consciously determining if and when they kill and who and why. Animals do not simply act on instinct - that is an outdated notion as much as the idea that animals don't feel pain the way we do. Without going into too much detail, the bottom line is that there is a criteria that exists which determines who or what can be killed legitimately, but not everyone agrees on what that is. For me, the intelligence level, or what concepts the entity can recognize, comprehend, whatever, is irrelevant. If that were the case, the argument for self-defense against another human goes right out the window, and when that happens, only evil men will ultimately prevail.

So, in the end, my own predetermined philosophy is that self-preservation, in the face of a violent attack from anyone or anything, is justified by any available means, executed in the standard measured response continuum, up to and including lethal force, regardless of what concepts the attacker can use. Beyond that, in regards to killing to eat, many animals do that, and as most scientists consider humans to be another kind of animal, the moral playing field is already level. Any attempts to confer a privilege on animals when they themselves can't recognize it, would be hypocritical folly. If the life of a deer is sacred, the wolf will not recognize that, so why discriminate against man? We protect animals so that they don't go instinct, not because of their intelligence and other animals don't give a damn how smart their prey is unless they're so smart that they elude their stalkers. I actually enjoy watching animals escape the attacks of predators, it's a refreshing alternative to the usual outcome. But using intelligence as some kind of determining factor for whether a life has worth or not is a game favored by those who would set the bar very high so as to devalue the lives of those not meeting that standard, ultimately, as history has so repeatedly borne out...

Louis,

Consider the phenomenon of akrasia or weakness of will, i.e. when one acts against one's better judgment. (Say, e.g., I have a desire to lose weight, but upon seeing the chocolate that desire is overwhelmed by a desire to consume the chocolate.) In such cases one typically does not become oblivious to the "background" (lose weight) desire. To the contrary, one's satisfaction is muted by the presence of the background desire even while the dominant desire motivates one to act. Such weakness frequently occurs in properly moral contexts as well. ("I was just following orders.")

I think this conflict of desires is not possible without involving, in this very process, concepts and beliefs. But this is just to say that when we *act*, we use practical reason. These are all just features of the description of the phenomenon of action. Justification, in contract to description, is quite another matter. Surely, as you suggest, justification of our actions is a reflective exercise. And we're not going around requiring ourselves to justify our actions as we act. Nonetheless, we do not act without an awareness of what we are doing and why. I am reaching for the chocolate because is looks marvelous. My desire and action requires, e.g., that I am using the concept 'chocolate,' otherwise my reaching for it doesn't really make sense in this context.

Any concepts, beliefs and infact every process of life is the reflective effect of our thought that results in mind. The way we think is based on the concepts that have emerged due to experience in the past. These concepts when strengthened by similar experiences become belief and these beliefs inturn lead to every process of life. All that is in life is an event. This event will result in advantage or disadvantage; useful and useless, etc according to the thought that the individual possesses at that point of time. Accordingly, he develops the concepts and beliefs. In the same context desire has a role that spurts an individual to action. This is again based on the concepts and beliefs that the individual has already lodged in the mind. For example let us consider a conversation between two individuals. In this situation it is obvious that there will be a difference of opinion. Now if both are of the belief that the conversation is only to pass their time, then there will be no chance of any friction even if there is an difference in opinions and occurs only a passive role of beliefs and concepts. But when the conversation continues and triggers a desire of overpowering one over the other then the active role of beliefs and concepts will take place. This inturn leads to friction and based on the same beliefs it may lead to any level of violence. Thus a small casual conversation may also lead to a huge war which is completely based on the strength of the concepts of the individual and his beliefs altogether.

On the other hand control of mind by controlling emotions which is a major function of mind that are instrumental in leading to beliefs and concepts will lead to a clear and better understanding of knowledge. Hence practices and concepts like YOGA and MEDITATION have been widely accepted because they control the emotions which inturn controls every activity of life including desires. This totally will relieve stress and strain leading to a better and well understood life making it pleasant and happy irrespective of any condition and status. After all it is nothing but happiness and peace that everyone yearns for.

Right on Mahesh